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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s patent law 
decisions in 2017 reflected significant development of the legal 
landscape.  The Federal Circuit decided many novel questions 
implementing the Supreme Court’s decision regarding venue, 
continued to address the question of patent eligibility, and 
encountered the first waves of the constitutionality of proceedings 
before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) at the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (PTO).  After a three-year stint of an overloaded 
patent docket, the Federal Circuit has adjusted to the surge of patent 
suits following the America Invents Act (“AIA”), allowing judges to 
write more opinions and reach greater consensus than previous years.  
Nevertheless, patent appeals remain the majority of the Federal 
Circuit’s workload and promises to remain so.  This Article collects and 
summarizes the Federal Circuit’s 2017 patent decisions and analyzes 
their impact on patent practice moving forward. 
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I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
A. Venue Law Post-TC Heartland 
In TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC,1 the Supreme 
Court transformed patent venue law, finding that domestic 
corporations “reside” only in their state of incorporation.  While a 
decision of the higher court, TC Heartland significantly affected 
Federal Circuit law and its aftermath is seen in the Federal Circuit’s 
rulings throughout the remainder of the term and in the lower courts.  
The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s denial of a writ of 
mandamus2 concerning venue in a patent infringement case.3  The 
Supreme Court found that the Federal Circuit erred in reasoning that 
TC Heartland, allegedly an Indiana corporation, “resided” in Delaware 
for venue purposes.4  Per Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp.,5 
the word “reside[nce]” in 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), the patent venue 
statute, as applied to a domestic corporation, refers only to the state of 
incorporation.6  Kraft’s argument that the meaning of the post-Fourco 
amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the general venue statute, altered the 
meaning of § 1400(b) failed before the court.7 
The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s rationale for 
reaching the opposite result.8  The amendments to § 1391 stated that 
for “all venue purposes,” a corporation would “reside” in any judicial 
district where it was subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction.9  The 
principal basis for the Federal Circuit’s opinion in TC Heartland was 
the holding In VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.,10 which 
held that the amendments to § 1391 redefined venue for all other 
venue statutes in the same chapter, which also included the patent 
                                               
 1. 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). 
 2. In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. 
TC Heartland LLC., 137 S. Ct. 1514. 
 3. TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1517–18. 
 4. Id. 
 5. 353 U.S. 222 (1957). 
 6. TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1520 (alteration in original); see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1400(b) (2012) (“Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the 
judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed 
acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.”). 
 7. TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1520–21; see 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (providing the 
rules governing civil action venue in United States district courts). 
 8. TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1520. 
 9. Id. (citing § 1391(c)(2)). 
 10. 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990), abrogated by TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514. 
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venue statute.11  In reversing the Federal Circuit’s denial of the writ of 
mandamus and remanding for further proceedings, the Supreme 
Court implicitly overruled VE Holding.12 
The Supreme Court’s decision appears to leave In re Cordis Corp.13 
untouched in what a “regular and established place of business” means 
under the other prong of the subject-matter jurisdiction statute 28 
U.S.C. § 1400(b).14  In re Cordis Corp. held, somewhat broadly, that “the 
appropriate inquiry is whether the corporate defendant does its 
business in that district through a permanent and continuous presence 
there.”15  Under the facts of that case, Cordis had salespeople in 
Minnesota who would visit physicians and guide them through 
surgeries.16  So Cordis had a regular physical presence and conducted 
infringing business via that physical presence in Minnesota.17  But it 
seems a stretch to read Cordis to cover omnipresent companies, such 
as Google or Amazon, and the evolving means of those companies, 
such as whether the presence of Amazon lockers would create nation-
wide venue over Amazon. 
Following TC Heartland, both the Federal Circuit and district courts 
were forced to reconcile the new venue law with ongoing litigations.  In 
In re Sea Ray Boats, Inc.,18 the Federal Circuit denied a motion to stay trial 
and a petition for a writ of mandamus following the district court’s 
denial of motion to transfer venue.19  The underlying litigation began in 
January 2015; the motion to transfer was filed approximately two weeks 
before trial, well beyond a timely motion to transfer on the eve of trial.20 
Dissenting, Judge Newman would have granted the stay and ordered 
expedited briefing and resolution of the issue, noting that the district 
court found venue in Virginia proper even under the Fourco standard21 
                                               
 11. Id. at 1575; see TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1519–20 (describing the Federal 
Circuit’s holding in VE Holding). 
 12. Id. at 1521. 
 13. 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 14. Id. at 737. 
 15. Id. (rejecting the argument that a fixed physical presence, such as an office or 
store, should be sufficient to establish place of business in a jurisdiction). 
 16. Id. at 735. 
 17. Id. at 734. 
 18. 695 F. App’x 543 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam). 
 19. Id. at 544. 
 20. Id. at 543. 
 21. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228–29 (1957) 
(holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the “sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in 
patent infringement actions,” versus the general corporation venue statute at § 1391(c)). 
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that TC Heartland embraced.22 
Addressing the question of timeliness in ongoing litigations, the 
Federal Circuit found that parties may bring venue motions based on 
TC Heartland in pending cases, but district courts have discretion 
whether the issue has been waived.  In In re Micron Technology, Inc.,23 
the Federal Circuit issued a writ of mandamus vacating the denial of a 
motion to dismiss for improper venue.24  The court determined that 
the district court erred in finding the venue issue waived based on 
Micron’s failure to include the issue in its initial motion to dismiss and 
in reasoning that TC Heartland was not a change of law sufficient to 
release Micron from the waiver.25  Per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(h)(1)(A) and Rule 12(g)(2), there was no waiver because the venue 
defense was not “available” to Micron prior to TC Heartland.26  
However, the district court declined to order either the dismissal or 
transfer of the case.27  The Federal Circuit described how district courts 
have “inherent powers” that may be used to find a venue objection 
forfeited, notwithstanding a movant’s technical compliance with Rule 
12.28  In particular, the Federal Circuit noted that district courts in the 
past did not abuse discretion by denying post-TC Heartland venue 
motions presented close to trial.29  District courts may also take into 
account the general timeliness of the motion and evidence of “a 
defendant’s tactical wait-and-see bypassing of an opportunity to 
declare a desire for a different forum.”30  On remand, the district court 
could take such issues into account. 
Applying TC Heartland, the Federal Circuit more clearly defined a 
“regular and established” place of business for venue purposes by 
excluding an employee’s home office, virtual spaces, or electronic 
communications from one person to another.  In In re Cray Inc.,31 the 
Federal Circuit issued a writ of mandamus directing a case transfer,32 
finding that the district court abused its discretion and committed an 
                                               
 22. In re Sea Ray Boats, 695 F. App’x at 544–45 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 23. 875 F.3d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 24. Id. at 1094. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 1101 (citing Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1892 (2016)). 
 29. Id. at 1102. 
 30. Id. 
 31. 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 32. Id. at 1357. 
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error of law in denying defendant’s motion for transfer on venue 
grounds, and consequently, mandamus was warranted to decide an 
issue “important to ‘proper judicial administration.’”33  The Federal 
Circuit discussed the proper standards for determining whether a 
litigant has a “regular and established place of business” in the forum 
district per § 1400(b) and TC Heartland.34  The Federal Circuit 
reasoned that the “place” of business need not be a “formal office or 
store,” but must “be a physical, geographical location in the district 
from which the business of the defendant is carried out.”35  It must also 
be a “regular” place of business, and the opinion recited various 
definitions of “regular,” such as “if it operates in a ‘steady[,] uniform[,] 
orderly[, and] methodical’ manner.’”36  It must be “established,” 
emphasizing that “the place of business is not transient.”37  Finally, it 
must be a place “of the defendant,” not solely a place of the defendant’s 
employee, noting “[e]mployees change jobs.”38  Applying those 
standards to this case, the home of a Cray employee, which does not 
seem to have been established by Cray, but rather by the employee, was 
insufficient to establish venue.39 
As the Federal Circuit and district courts develop venue law based 
on TC Heartland, litigants should consider the implications.  For 
example, the parties should consider the cost-benefit analysis of 
disputing venue at the outset of litigation to weigh overall cost and 
delay.  Ultimately, this may lead to plaintiffs choosing undisputable 
venues even if that means giving up patentee-preferred districts.  Also, 
from the outset, judges may see a rise in 12(b) motions objecting to 
venue before defendants answer the complaint.  Alternatively, the only 
practical way to seek review of venue decisions is mandamus or 
certification by a judge who is genuinely in doubt or prefers not to have 
a mandamus motion filed. 
                                               
 33. Id. at 1358 (quoting In re BP Lubricants USA Inc., 637 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
 34. Id. at 1360–62. 
 35. Id. at 1362. 
 36. Id. (alterations in original). 
 37. Id. at 1363. 
 38. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 39. Id. at 1366; see, e.g., U.S. Aluminum Corp. v. Kawneer Co., 694 F.2d 193, 195 
(9th Cir. 1982) (“Venue in a declaratory judgment action for patent noninfringement 
and invalidity is governed by the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c), 
and not the special patent infringement venue statute . . . .”). 
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B. Federal Jurisdiction 
The Federal Circuit considered the breadth of its own jurisdiction 
over several key areas of patent law.  First, analyzing 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(c), the Federal Circuit determined that it lacks jurisdiction to 
hear non-final “accounting” orders notwithstanding jurisdiction to 
hear orders “final except for an accounting.”  In Halo Electronics, Inc. v. 
Pulse Electronics, Inc.,40 the Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal of a 
decision awarding, but not actually computing, prejudgment and post-
judgment interest and supplemental damages.41  The 2016 final 
judgment followed a 2013 decision finding that Pulse infringed Halo’s 
patent.42  The Federal Circuit held that it did not have jurisdiction over 
Pulse’s appeal from the 2016 decision concerning prejudgment 
interest.43  The Federal Circuit based its opinion on 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(c),44 which permits appeals from judgments that are “final except 
for an accounting.”45  Jurisdiction for each appeal must be separately 
established.46  Therefore, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to adjudicate 
an appeal from the 2013 judgment was “not dispositive of whether we 
have jurisdiction in this appeal.”47 
In this appeal, the 2016 order was neither “final” nor “final except for 
an accounting.”48  It was not “final” because the district court had not yet 
determined the amount of prejudgment interest or the computational 
method to be used in that determination.49  And, although the 2016 
order was part of the “accounting” that followed the 2013 order, 
“§ 1292(c)(2) ‘does not go so far as to permit us to consider [a] non-
                                               
 40. 857 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 41. Id. at 1348 (dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction without reaching the 
merits of the claims). 
 42. Id. at 1348–50; see also Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., No. 2:07-cv-00331-
PMP-PAL, 2013 WL 2319145, at *16 (D. Nev. May 28, 2013), vacated 136 S. Ct. 1923 
(2016) (entering judgment in favor of Halo on the infringement claims, except for 
the willfulness claim). 
 43. Halo Elecs., Inc., 857 F.3d at 1353. 
 44. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c) (2012) (granting the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction 
over interlocutory appeals arising under § 1292(a) and (b) and appeals from final 
judgements in patent infringement suits). 
 45. Halo Elecs., Inc., 857 F.3d at 1351 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2)). 
 46. Id. at 1362–63. 
 47. 320 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 48. Halo Elecs., Inc., 857 F.3d at 1352 (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction 
under both § 1295(a)(1) and § 1292(c)(2) because the prejudgment interest order 
from the district court was not final). 
 49. Id. at 1351–52. 
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final order’ that is related to the accounting.”50  The Federal Circuit 
further noted that Pulse preserved its right to file a “proper appeal 
concerning a final award of prejudgment interest” at a later time.51 
Second, in Preston v. Nagel,52 the Federal Circuit determined that the 
America Invents Act53 (AIA) does not create an exception to the 
general bar on reviewability of orders remanding to state court, so the 
Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal from remand to state court.54  
Because the district court’s remand was based on a lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction, its order was not reviewable by the Federal Circuit 
per 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).55  Even though Mr. Nagel attempted to raise 
counterclaims for declaratory judgment of patent noninfringement, 
his actions did not create an exception to § 1447(d).56  The Federal 
Circuit rejected Mr. Nagel’s argument that the AIA created such an 
exception, and further rejected Mr. Nagel’s attempt to analogize this 
case to Osborn v. Haley,57 finding that the AIA provisions relating to 
jurisdiction over patent cases were unlike the provisions at issue in 
Osborn.58  The Federal Circuit also rejected Mr. Nagel’s contention that 
he will have been deprived of a forum for his counterclaims because 
he could still present a separate federal declaratory judgment action.59 
The Federal Circuit also determined that it lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction over overseas infringement of foreign patents, dismissing 
the cause of action in Allied Mineral Products, Inc. v. Osmi, Inc.60  The 
district court had correctly determined that the sending of a notice 
letter to two of Allied’s Mexican customers, asserting a Mexican patent 
                                               
 50. Halo Elecs., Inc., 857 F.3d at 1352 (alteration in original) (quoting Alfred E. Mann 
Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 841 F.3d 1334, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
 51. Id. at 1353. 
 52. 857 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 53. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 54. Preston, 857 F.3d at 1383. 
 55. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012) (“An order remanding a case to the State 
court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that 
an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to 
[§] 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.”). 
 56. Preston, 857 F.3d at 1384–85. 
 57. 549 U.S. 225, 252–53 (2007) (plurality opinion) (finding that the federal 
statutory bar against appellate review of remand orders did not displace provision of 
the Westfall Act, which shielded from remand any action removed to federal court 
based upon Attorney General's certification). 
 58. Preston, 857 F.3d at 1385–86. 
 59. Id. at 1386. 
 60. 870 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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and alleging acts of infringement under Mexican law, was insufficient 
to create a case or controversy in the United States to support Allied’s 
complaint for declaratory judgment.61  The Federal Circuit rejected 
Allied’s attempt to argue for jurisdiction under Innovative Therapies, 
Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc.62 or Arkema Inc. v. Honeywell International, 
Inc.63 because both involved substantially different facts.64 
Likewise, the Federal Circuit found that the district court properly 
dismissed a declaratory judgment action on patents not owned by the 
accused party.  In First Data Corp. v. Inselberg,65 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the dismissal of federal claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.66  The 
claims in question were counterclaims brought by First Data and its CEO 
Frank Bisignano for declaratory judgment of noninfringement and 
invalidity for certain patents that listed Eric Inselberg as the inventor.67  
The opinion describes how Mr. Inselberg had threatened infringement 
litigation against Mr. Bisignano and First Data.68  However, per a signed 
2011 agreement, Mr. Bisignano—not Mr. Inselberg—was the apparent 
owner of the patents in question.69  The district court did not err in 
dismissing First Data’s declaratory judgment claims because the claims 
had apparently been made solely for the purpose of establishing 
federal jurisdiction.70  Per Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Systems, Inc.71 and 
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,72 there was no plausible basis under which First 
Data could have contended that the assignment agreement was null 
and void (though Mr. Inselberg contested, via his state law claims, the 
validity of that agreement).73  The Federal Circuit explained that, 
unless and until a state court granted rescission of the 2011 
assignment, there was no dispute that Mr. Inselberg did not own any 
of the patents at issue.74  Additionally, Mr. Bisignano and First Data still 
                                               
 61. Id. at 1338–39. 
 62. 599 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 63. 706 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 64. Allied Mineral Prods., Inc., 870 F.3d at 1339–40. 
 65. 870 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 66. Id. at 1369. 
 67. Id. at 1369–70. 
 68. Id. at 1370. 
 69. Id. at 1369. 
 70. Id. at 1373. 
 71. 109 F.3d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 72. 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
 73. First Data Corp., 870 F.3d at 1374 (emphasizing that First Data’s argument 
misunderstood the reasoning in Jim Arnold). 
 74. Id. at 1375. 
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faced significant standing and ripeness challenges.75 
In ArcelorMittal v. AK Steel Corp.,76 the Federal Circuit considered its 
subject matter jurisdiction by affirming the district court’s decision, on 
remand, to invalidate its initial grant of summary judgment.77  The 
Federal Circuit stated that this dispute over the validity of an asserted 
patent is not moot despite the fact that ArcelorMittal filed with the 
court a covenant not to sue conditioned on resolution of a related 
procedural matter.78  The case was complicated by a lengthy 
procedural history involving a reissue procedure, substitution of claims 
in the complaint, and a remand.79  The Federal Circuit found that the 
district court did not err in exercising jurisdiction to invalidate two of 
ArcelorMittal’s claims.80  The Federal Circuit reached this conclusion 
even though ArcelorMittal had from time to time urged that the two 
claims were not at issue in the case, though others from the same 
patent were.81  The Federal Circuit described how ArcelorMittal made 
sufficient statements to indicate that the claims in question were 
asserted in the case and had tacitly accepted other statements by AK 
Steel indicating that they understood the claims were in the case.82  
This was sufficient to demonstrate a substantial controversy between 
the parties over these claims.83 
The Federal Circuit also determined that the issue was not moot.  
The Federal Circuit held that the district court did not err in 
determining that ArcelorMittal’s conditional tender of a covenant not 
to sue on the two claims did not moot the matter.84  Mootness arises 
when the issues are “no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable 
interest in the outcome.”85  ArcelorMittal’s various attempts to enter a 
covenant were all conditional, so its attempts did not resolve the merits 
                                               
 75. Id. (noting that because Mr. Inselberg did not have an ownership interest in 
the patent, the plaintiffs would have a difficult time establishing standing and ripeness 
due to the contingent event of Mr. Inselberg ever recovering title to the patent).  First 
Data also disputed the district court’s remand of state law claims to state court, but the 
Federal Circuit was precluded from reviewing that remand by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).  Id. 
 76. 856 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 77. Id. at 1367. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1367–68. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1369. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 1372. 
 85. Id. at 1370 (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013)). 
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of the matter.  The Federal Circuit found that “[a]t no time before the 
court entered summary judgment did ArcelorMittal unconditionally 
assure [AK Steel] and their customers that it would never assert RE’153 
claims 24 and 25 against them.”86  The Federal Circuit noted that a 
covenant, relied on by the dissent, filed with the district court by 
ArcelorMittal expressly made the covenant conditional on resolution 
of a procedural issue (a motion to amend a co-pending complaint), and 
characterized this covenant as unable to support mootness due to its 
conditional nature.87  The Federal Circuit’s rejected ArcelorMittal’s 
remaining arguments, concluding that the district court’s consideration 
of the two claims was consistent with a prior Federal Circuit remand, and 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing 
ArcelorMittal’s request for new discovery on the commercial success of 
the claims at issue.88  In dissent, Judge Wallach indicated that the 
covenant not to sue would have mooted the issue because it invalided 
the existence of a “case or controversy.”89 
1. Interlocutory Appeals 
In Waymo LLC v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,90 the Federal Circuit 
dismissed an appeal from a denial of motions seeking relief from 
discovery orders, finding that there is no interlocutory appeal for an 
order compelling document production.91  The appellant was Anthony 
Levandowski, a former Waymo employee accused of “improperly 
download[ing] thousands of documents related to Waymo’s driverless 
vehicle technology, and then [leaving] Waymo to found Ottomotto, 
which Uber subsequently acquired.”92  On appeal, Mr. Levandowski 
argued that the court should analyze whether it has jurisdiction to hear 
the case under mandamus and the Perlman93  doctrine94 because either 
doctrine authorizes immediate appeal of an order compelling third 
                                               
 86. Id. at 1370. 
 87. Id. at 1371–72. 
 88. Id. at 1372. 
 89. Id. at 1374 (Wallach, J., dissenting). 
 90. 870 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 91. Id. at 1355. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918). 
 94. Waymo LLC, 870 F.3d at 1366 (“The Perlman doctrine provides that ‘a discovery 
order directed at a disinterested third party is treated as an immediately appealable 
final order because the third party presumably lacks a sufficient stake in the 
proceeding to risk contempt by refusing compliance.’”). 
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party disclosure of privileged materials.95 
The Federal Circuit found that Mr. Levandowski’s appeal did not 
warrant a writ of mandamus because he did not establish that typical 
review after final judgment would be inadequate to protect his rights.96  
The Federal Circuit rejected both of Mr. Levandowski’s arguments:  
that certain materials ordered to be disclosed were privileged and/or 
work product and that the disclosure would be particularly injurious 
or would raise a particularly novel issue of law.97  Mr. Levandowski also 
did not establish a clear, indisputable right to a mandamus writ.98  The 
Federal Circuit further determined that he could not to assert privilege 
under “common interest doctrine” because the disclosures at issue 
were not attorney-client privileged communications.99  It rejected Mr. 
Levandowski’s argument that common interest can protect against 
disclosure of non-privileged material.100  Similarly, the Federal Circuit 
rejected Mr. Levandowski’s invocation of work-product protection 
because the material in question was not prepared by Mr. Levandowski 
or his counsel, but the material was disclosed to him by Uber’s counsel 
(in circumstances not warranting common interest protection).101  
Finally, the Federal Circuit dismissed Mr. Levandowski’s attempt to 
invoke the Fifth Amendment.102 
Mr. Levandowski’s appeal also did not warrant invocation of the 
Perlman doctrine because that doctrine generally does not apply in civil 
litigation and his issues were appealable after final judgment.103  Also, 
the Federal Circuit concluded that Mr. Levandowski was not a 
disinterested third party, as a former employee of both parties in the 
litigation, and that his actions were “central to Waymo’s claims.”104 
C. Personal Jurisdiction 
In weighing the sufficiency of contacts to establish personal 
jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit differentiated between directed 
contact with the forum and attenuated connections.  For example, in 
                                               
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1358. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1359. 
 99. Id. at 1363. 
 100. Id. at 1359–60. 
 101. Id. at 1363. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1366. 
 104. Id. 
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Xilinx, Inc. v. Papst Licensing GmbH & Co.,105 the Federal Circuit 
determined that notice letters, travel to the forum, and past litigation 
in the forum were sufficient contacts to establish personal jurisdiction 
for a declaratory judgment action that reversed the lower court’s 
dismissal.106  Although the District of Delaware had recently transferred 
Papst’s separate infringement suit against Xilinx to the district court that 
originally rejected Xilinx’s declaratory judgment action, the issue was 
not moot because Xilinx had not asserted declaratory judgment 
counterclaims in the transferred action.107  The Federal Circuit 
determined that the “[t]he mere availability of this unpursued 
alternative route to relief does not render moot Xilinx’s action seeking 
the same relief.”108  Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of California erred in 
concluding that it lacked specific personal jurisdiction over Papst.109  
The Federal Circuit determined that the record established that Papst 
had minimum contacts with the forum and that the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction was both reasonable and fair.110 
Regarding minimum contacts, the Federal Circuit found “no 
question that Papst has the required minimum contacts with 
California,” noting that Papst sent notice letters to Xilinx and traveled 
there to discuss Papst’s allegations of patent infringement.111  
Additionally, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Papst was both 
reasonable and fair.112  The Federal Circuit rejected Papst’s argument 
that, under Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc.,113 the 
exercise of jurisdiction based only on Papst’s attempt to inform Xilinx 
of its infringement would be unreasonable.114  Unlike the situation in 
Red Wing, Papst had done more than send notice letters; it had traveled 
to California to meet with both Xilinx and Altera.115  Further, the 
burden of Papst traveling to the district was mitigated, and therefore 
                                               
 105. 848 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 106. Id. at 1349. 
 107. Id. at 1352. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1358. 
 110. Id. at 1355–58. 
 111. Id. at 1354. 
 112. Id. at 1358. 
 113. 148 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 114. Xilinx, 848 F.3d at 1354 (relating Red Wing to the case at hand, namely in 
holding that cease-and-desist letters sent by the patentee in the forum are enough to 
establish minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction). 
 115. Id. at 1357. 
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not an undue burden, because Papst is a “non-practicing patent holder 
residing outside of the United States” that must litigate its U.S. patents 
overseas regardless of the forum.116  To further bolster the Federal 
Circuit’s reasoning, the court cited to the fact that Papst had previously 
litigated in California.117 
By comparison, the Federal Circuit determined that an exclusive 
license with an entity located in the forum is insufficient, without more, 
to establish specific personal jurisdiction over a patentee.  In New World 
International, Inc. v. Ford Global Technologies, LLC,118 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal of a declaratory judgment complaint for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.119  The Federal Circuit found that the district 
court correctly determined that, per Breckenridge Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. 
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc.,120 the mere existence of an exclusive license 
of certain design patents between Ford Global Technologies, LCC 
(“FGTL”) and LKQ Corp., a company doing business in Texas, was 
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over FGTL in Texas.121  The 
Federal Circuit also found that the district court correctly determined 
that FGTL’s obligation to indemnify LKQ in certain circumstances was 
insufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction.122  The Federal 
Circuit’s holding in Genetic Implant Systems, Inc. v. Core-Vent Corp.123 was 
not contrary because that case merely noted the presence of an 
indemnity obligation but did not rely on such an obligation to find 
personal jurisdiction.124  Further, the indemnity agreement required 
FGTL to indemnify LKQ for claims alleging infringement of the 
patents of others and had nothing to do with FGTL’s design patents at 
issue.125  Likewise, the Federal Circuit found that the district court also 
correctly determined that New World failed to demonstrate that, when 
FGTL sent cease-and-desist letters, it had coordinated with LKQ in any 
way.126  The Federal Circuit found that this case was thus further 
                                               
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. 859 F.3d 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 119. Id. at 1034–35. 
 120. 444 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 121. New World Int’l, Inc., 859 F.3d at 1040 (rejecting New World’s argument that 
FGTL’s license with LKQ was sufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction). 
 122. Id. at 1040–41. 
 123. 123 F.3d 1455 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 124. New World Int’l, Inc., 859 F.3d at 1040–41. 
 125. Id. at 1041. 
 126. Id. at 1042 (stating that “LKQ’s role was that of another recipient of the letters, not a co-
sender requesting that New World cease and desist infringing the [FGTL] design patents”). 
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distinguishable from Breckenridge, which demonstrated patent-
enforcement coordination between the licensee and the licensor.127  
Taking all evidence into consideration, the license between FGTL and 
LKQ did not “impose a sufficient obligation on the patent holder[, 
FGTL,] regarding the enforcement of the patent rights to subject the 
patent holder to specific jurisdiction” in Texas.128 
Lastly, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying New World’s motion to amend its 
complaint post-dismissal by adding new allegations in support of 
personal jurisdiction over FGTL.129  New World’s desire to “buttress its 
jurisdictional presentation” was insufficient to overcome the district 
court’s discretion, particularly as New World maintained that it “had 
done enough previously to avoid dismissal.”130  Notably, New World 
had not alleged the discovery of any new evidence.131 
Similarly, in NexLearn, LLC v. Allen Interactions, Inc.,132 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case for lack of personal 
jurisdiction because a website and single, free-trial offer was 
insufficient contacts with the forum.133  In NexLearn, the Federal Circuit 
held that the district court correctly determined that NexLearn’s 
complaint failed to allege specific jurisdiction over Allen relative to 
NexLearn’s patent complaint.134  Allen’s emails, presentations, and 
advertisements in Kansas were not relevant because they predated the 
asserted patent.135  A trial relating to the accused product was “too 
attenuated” to form a sufficient contact.136  And Allen’s execution of a 
Non-Disclosure Agreement and a End-Use Licensee Agreement 
including Kansas choice-of-law provisions were insufficient to confer 
jurisdiction per Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz.137  Nor did operation of 
                                               
 127. Id.; see Breckenridge Pharm., Inc. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 444 F.3d 1356, 1367 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining that an ongoing relationship was created between 
licensee and licensor through their coordinated efforts in the state of Florida). 
 128. New World Int’l, Inc., 859 F.3d at 1043. 
 129. Id. at 1044. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. 859 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 133. Id. at 1373. 
 134. Id. at 1376–77 (declining to address general jurisdiction since NexLearn did not 
claim there was general jurisdiction in its briefs to the Federal Circuit or the district court). 
 135. Id. at 1376. 
 136. Id. at 1377. 
 137. 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (requiring defendants to purposefully direct activities toward 
the forum state and for the harm to arise from their activities); NexLearn, 859 F.3d at 1377. 
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a website render it subject to specific jurisdiction, as there was no 
evidence that Allen “purposefully availed itself of Kansas [or] that 
NexLearn’s claim arises out of or relates to those contacts.”138  As in 
the application of the district’s long-arm statute in Trintec Industries, 
Inc. v. Pedre Promotional Products, Inc.,139 there was no evidence that the 
website was directed to Kansas, and there was no indication of a sale in 
Kansas from the website.140  A single post-issuance email from Allen 
into Kansas offering a free trial, while relevant, was insufficient on its 
own to confer specific jurisdiction.141  Finally, the opinion also affirmed 
the district court’s dismissal of NexLearn’s breach of contract claim for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.142 
D. Standing 
The Federal Circuit highlighted the different standing requirements 
between appellants and appellees from the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board’s (PTAB) decisions.  In Phigenix, Inc. v. ImmunoGen, Inc.,143 the 
Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal from a final inter partes 
review144 (IPR) decision for lack of standing because the appellant did 
not face any risk of invalidating appellant’s patent.145  The PTAB had 
instituted an IPR of ImmunoGen’s ’856 patent on Phigenix’s petition, 
but its final decision confirmed patentability of ImmunoGen’s claims.146  
The Federal Circuit determined that the record failed to demonstrate 
that Phigenix suffered an injury-in-fact from this decision sufficient to 
confirm Article III standing.147  Phigenix does not manufacture 
                                               
 138. NexLearn, 859 F.3d at 1378. 
 139. 395 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 140. NexLearn, 859 F.3d at 1378 (citing Trintec Industries, Inc., 395 F.3d at 1281–82) 
(comparing Allen’s website to Trintec’s website, which was not specifically directed to 
customers in the District of Columbia and had neither sales nor residents in the District). 
 141. Id. at 1379. 
 142. Id. at 1381 (noting that dismissing the patent claim left no claim over which 
the district court could exercise original subject matter jurisdiction). 
 143. 845 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 144. Inter partes review is a trial proceeding conducted by the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (PTAB) to review “claims in a patent only on a ground that could be 
raised under [35 U.S.C] §§ 102 or 103, and only on the basis of prior art consisting of 
patents or printed publications.”  Inter Partes Review, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/ 
patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/inter-partes-review 
(last modified May 9, 2018 10:15 AM). 
 145. Phigenix, 845 F.3d at 1170. 
 146. Phigenix, Inc. v. ImmunoGen, Inc., No. IPR2014-00676, 2015 WL 6550500 
(P.T.A.B. Oct. 27, 2015), appeal dismissed, 845 F.3d 1168. 
 147. Phigenix, 845 F.3d at 1174. 
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products, but it was in the process of trying to find licensees for a patent 
of its own and submitted declarations asserting that the PTAB’s 
decision tends to increase competition in those efforts to license.148 
The court found the question of what standard should apply to 
ascertaining standing for an appeal from an agency action to be one 
of first impression.149  The court took guidance from Sierra Club v. 
Environmental Protection Agency150 and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,151 
which together stand for the principle that a party facing a standing 
challenge in its efforts to seek appellate review of an agency action has 
a “summary judgment burden of production,” i.e., a party must present 
evidence sufficient to avoid summary judgment-type adjudication.152  
The Federal Circuit held that, if the appellant’s standing is not self-
evident (e.g., established by the administrative record alone), it must 
tender evidence, such as affidavits or declarations, directly to the 
appellate court.153  Further, the appellant must identify such evidence 
“at the first appropriate time” after the standing challenge surfaces, 
such as in a response to a motion to dismiss or an opening brief.154 
The Federal Circuit determined that Phigenix failed to demonstrate 
standing under such standards.  The two declarations the company 
provided as documentation were insufficient to demonstrate 
injury-in-fact, largely because “there [was] simply no allegation here 
that Phigenix [had] ever licensed [its] ’534 patent to anyone, much 
less that it licensed the ’534 patent to entities that have obtained 
licenses to the ImmunoGen ’856 patent.”155  Statements to the contrary 
were conclusory and, therefore, not contradictory.156  The Federal 
Circuit rejected Phigenix’s argument that 35 U.S.C. § 141, by creating 
a path to appeal, obviated any standing problem and instead 
concluded that “Phigenix [could not] base its injury-in-fact upon a 
violation of § 141(c) because it [had] been permitted to file its appeal, 
and the exercise of its right to appeal [did] not necessarily establish 
that it possesse[d] Article III standing.”157  It also rejected Phigenix’s 
                                               
 148. Id. at 1170, 1173–74. 
 149. Id. at 1172. 
 150. 292 F.3d 895 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 151. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 152. Phigenix, 845 F.3d at 1172–73 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). 
 153. Id. at 1173 (citing Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 900). 
 154. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 900). 
 155. Id. at 1174. 
 156. Id. at 1174–75. 
 157. Id. at 1175 (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997)). 
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attempt to argue that the IPR estoppel of § 315 created an injury-in-fact 
because “the appellant ‘is not engaged in any activity that would give 
rise to a possible infringement suit.’”158 
While appellants from the PTAB must establish Article III standing 
to bring an appeal to the Federal Circuit, appellees do not.  In Personal 
Audio, LLC v. Electronic Frontier Foundation,159 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the PTAB’s anticipation and obviousness determination160 
and Electronic Frontier Foundation’s (EFF) standing to participate in 
the appeal.161  Although Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research 
Foundation162 held that a PTAB petitioner-appellant who did not meet 
the Article III case-or-controversy requirement lacked standing to 
initiate an IPR appeal,163 in this case EFF was the appellee—not the 
appellant.164  Because EFF was not invoking judicial review, there was 
no constitutional exclusion against EFF appearing in court to defend 
the PTAB’s decision.165 
E. Injunctions 
The Federal Circuit considered the standard for awarding a 
permanent injunction focusing on the support required to find 
irreparable harm in Nichia Corp. v. Everlight Americas, Inc.166  There, the 
Federal Circuit found no error in denying a permanent injunction where 
the record indicated a past willingness to license the asserted patents, 
affirming the bench judgment of liability for patent infringement.167 
The Federal Circuit determined that the district court did not abuse 
                                               
 158. Id. at 1175–76 (quoting Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 
753 F.3d 1258, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). 
 159. 867 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2017), petition for cert. docketed, No. 17-1085 (U.S. Feb. 1, 2018). 
 160. Id. at 1247–48. 
 161. Id. at 1250. 
 162. 753 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 163. Id. at 1261–62. 
 164. Personal Audio, LLC, 867 F.3d at 1249–50. 
 165. Id. at 1250. 
 166. 855 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 167. Id. at 1344.  The Federal Circuit determined that the district court did not 
clearly err in finding Nichia’s patents, which related to designs and methods for 
manufacturing LEDs, valid and infringed.  The Federal Circuit considered how the 
district court correctly construed the claims.  Id. at 1333.  It rejected Everlight’s 
argument that “if different words are used in the claim and specification, then we must 
read that distinction as an intended difference.”  Id. at 1335–36.  While different terms 
may denote different meanings in some patents, that was not the case in Nichia’s 
patents.  Id.  The Federal Circuit also rejected Everlight’s invalidity arguments as 
lacking both in the references and in the reason to combine.  Id. at 1339. 
2018] 2017 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 1159 
 
its discretion in declining to enter a permanent injunction against 
Everlight because Nichia failed to demonstrate that irreparable harm 
would result absent an injunction.168  Moreover, the Federal Circuit 
found that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Nichia 
was not in meaningful competition with Everlight, noting that “Nichia 
is an LED chip manufacturer as well as a packager, ‘while Everlight is 
solely an LED packager.’”169  Moreover, Everlight’s sales, compared to 
Nichia’s total sales, were “the proverbial drop in the bucket.”170  
Similarly, Nichia failed to demonstrate and a single lost sale 
attributable to Everlight’s activity.171  In fact, while rejecting Nichia’s 
price erosion argument, the Federal Circuit pointed out that there 
were other low-price competitors in the market besides Everlight that 
were applying price pressure to Nichia.172  Finally, the Federal Circuit 
held that the district court did not err in concluding that Nichia’s past 
willingness to license its patents weighed against a finding of 
irreparable harm.173  Per Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.,174 the district court 
was entitled to rely on past licensing activity as suggesting that a royalty 
would be sufficient to remedy any infringement.175 
In Genband US LLC v. Metaswitch Networks Corp.,176 the Federal Circuit 
vacated an order denying a permanent injunction and remanded the 
case to ensure that the trial court did not apply too rigorous of a “causal 
nexus” standard to support a finding of irreparable harm.177  The 
Federal Circuit found that the district court’s analysis of irreparable 
harm, and specifically its determination that Genband had failed to 
show that the patented features drive demand for the infringing 
product, was unclear as to whether it was properly applying the “causal 
nexus” standard.178  Per Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. (Apple III)179 
and Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co. (Apple IV),180 Genband’s burden 
was to show that the patented features were “‘a driver’ [for demand] as 
                                               
 168. Id. at 1340. 
 169. Id. at 1342. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 1343. 
 173. Id. 
 174. 551 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 175. Nichia Corp., 855 F.3d at 1343–44. 
 176. 861 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 177. Id. at 1385. 
 178. Id. at 1382. 
 179. 735 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 180. 809 F.3d 633 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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opposed to ‘the driver,’ applied in the multi-consumer, multi-feature 
context.”181  The Federal Circuit recited some of the Federal Circuit’s 
recent case law—notably the various Apple-Samsung cases—to support this 
statement of the proper standard.182  Because the district court’s opinion 
was unclear as to whether it had properly applied this standard or had 
improperly applied a more rigorous standard, remand was necessary.183  
The Federal Circuit held that it is “not in a position to conclude that 
applying the Apple III/Apple IV standards would make no difference to the 
district court’s finding of no causal nexus and, hence, no irreparable 
injury.”184  The Federal Circuit declined to affirm based on the district 
court’s determination of no irreparable harm due to Genband’s delay 
in filing suit and ultimately remanded the case.185  The issue of 
irreparable harm was included in the remand because the assessment 
of whether and how the patented features drive demand might affect 
how the district court views the timing of Genband’s suit.186 
In the preliminary injunction space, the Federal Circuit determined 
that a claimed loss of “lifetime customers” due to brand loyalty is 
sufficient to show irreparable harm.  In Metalcraft of Mayville, Inc. v. Toro 
Co.,187 the court affirmed Scag Power Equipment’s (“Scag”) 
preliminary injunction against Toro.188  The patent at issue related to 
lawnmowers with a suspended operator platform.189  The Federal 
Circuit determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in finding that patentee Scag was entitled to preliminary relief.190  
Further, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court’s 
irreparable harm finding was not clearly erroneous.191  Scag’s assertion 
that Toro’s infringement192 could lead to the loss of “a potentially 
                                               
 181. Genband US LLC, 861 F.3d at 1382. 
 182. Id. at 1382–83. 
 183. Id. at 1384. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 1385. 
 186. Id. 
 187. 848 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 188. Id. at 1370. 
 189. Id. at 1362.  Scag is Metalcraft’s trade name.  Id. 
 190. Id. at 1363. 
 191. Id. at 1369. 
 192. Id.  The court rejected Toro’s noninfringement arguments because Scag’s 
claims cover mowers with chassis-mounted controls because the claims include no 
restriction against that configuration.  Id. at 1366–67.  As to obviousness, the district 
court did not commit clear error in concluding that Toro had failed to demonstrate a 
reason why a person of skill would have combined the references Toro was presenting.  
Id. at 1367.  The court declined to take up Toro’s anticipation arguments, as they only 
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lifelong customer” due to brand loyalty in the mower business was 
sufficient to support the irreparable harm finding.193  The Federal 
Circuit found that “the loss by Scag of customers may have far-
reaching, long-term impact on its future revenues, and the sales lost by 
Scag are difficult to quantify due to ‘“ecosystem” effects, where one 
company’s customers will continue to buy that company’s products 
and recommend them to others.’”194  The Federal Circuit also found 
that the district court did not abuse discretion in rejecting Toro’s 
equitable and public interest arguments.195  The injunction, which 
enjoined “making, using, selling, and offering to sell lawnmowers 
equipped with platform suspension systems that infringe [Scag’s 
patent],” was not overly broad, particularly as Toro had offered no 
meaningful delineation between the accused products.196 
The Mylan Institutional LLC v. Aurobindo Pharma Ltd.197 appeal raised 
questions about the suitability of the “function-way-result” equivalence test 
for some cases.198  The Federal Circuit affirmed the grant of preliminary 
injunction barring Aurobindo from making or selling isosulfan blue 
(ISB)—a dye used in the mapping of lymph nodes—but modified the 
injunction so that it is premised only on a composition patent asserted by 
Mylan.199  In doing so, the court determined that the district court had 
erroneously also based the injunction on two process patents.200 
As to the process patents, the Federal Circuit found that the district 
court abused its discretion in concluding that Mylan was likely to 
succeed on the merits by proving infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents.201  The court noted that “the district court’s analysis of 
equivalence in this case was flawed, no doubt because of the sparse and 
confusing case law concerning equivalents, particularly the paucity of 
chemical equivalence case law, and the difficulty of applying the legal 
concepts to the facts.”202  The Federal Circuit analyzed the function-way-
result test, concluding that Aurobindo had raised “sufficient doubt” as to 
                                               
addressed a subset of Scag’s asserted claims.  Id. at 1368. 
 193. Id. at 1368–69. 
 194. Id. at 1368 (quoting Apple IV, 809 F.3d 633, 641, 645 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). 
 195. Id. at 1369. 
 196. Id. at 1369–70. 
 197. 857 F.3d 858 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 198. Id. at 867. 
 199. Id. at 873. 
 200. Id. at 866. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
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whether two compounds, silver oxide and manganese oxide, oxidize 
isoleuco acid in the same way as the claimed invention as to make the 
district court’s finding abuse of discretion.203  The Federal Circuit 
noted that, at the full trial on the merits, the district court may wish to 
consider whether the “substantial differences” test for equivalents is 
better suited to chemical cases than the function-way-result test.204 
As to the composition patent, the Federal Circuit found that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Mylan likely to 
prevail on the merits.205  Aurobindo did not contest the likelihood of 
an infringement finding, and the Federal Circuit found that the 
district court did not clearly err in its rejection of Aurobindo’s 
invalidity defenses.206  Each of the errors Aurobindo alleged were 
factual in nature, so the Federal Circuit deferred to the district court.207  
It also noted that Mylan had evidence of secondary considerations to 
overcome Aurobindo’s obviousness attack.208 
As to irreparable harm, the Federal Circuit found that the district 
court did not err in rejecting Aurobindo’s arguments against causal 
nexus.209  The Federal Circuit rejected Aurobindo’s argument that the 
district court had based its finding of nexus solely on the fact that the 
FDA had approved Aurobindo’s abbreviated new drug application 
(ANDA).210  The record also included evidence of copying and 
otherwise indicated that Aurobindo would not have been able to make 
the product described in its ANDA without infringement.211 
In Tinnus Enterprises, LLC v. Telebrands Corp.,212 the Federal Circuit shed 
some light on the effect of a PTAB decision on a parallel district court 
action.  Although the PTAB has issued a Post-Grant Review (PGR)213 
                                               
 203. Id. at 866–69. 
 204. Id. at 867, 869–70. 
 205. Id. at 870. 
 206. Id. at 870–72. 
 207. Id. at 870. 
 208. Id. at 871. 
 209. Id. at 872–73. 
 210. See id. (explaining that Aurbindo misinterpreted the district court’s reasoning 
and how that court examined the evidence to find a causal nexus between harm and 
infringement). 
 211. Id. at 873. 
 212. 846 F.3d 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 213. A PGR is a procedure to review the patentability of a patent’s claims.  The 
review of a PGR is broader in scope than an IPR but must be filed within nine months 
of the issue or reissue of a patent.  Post Grant Review, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/ 
patents-application-process/appealing-patent-decisions/trials/post-grant-review (last 
modified May 9, 2017 10:16 AM). 
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determination of indefiniteness, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s parallel entry of a preliminary injunction against Telebrands.214  The 
Federal Circuit determined that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that irreparable harm would result absent the 
injunction and that Tinnus was likely to prove its patent valid and 
infringed.215  The Federal Circuit rejected Telebrands’s argument that the 
district court declined to construe two of the disputed claim terms, “not less 
than” and “connecting force”; to the contrary, the district court held that 
Tinnus was likely to prevail irrespective of those terms’ construction.216 
While evaluating the success on the merits, the court also rejected 
Telebrands’s invalidity arguments.217  Because Telebrands did not 
object to the magistrate judge’s definiteness analysis, the Federal 
Circuit reviewed the district court’s conclusion that Telebrands had 
failed to raise a substantial question of validity for plain error.218  The 
court found no such error in the district court’s reasoning that the 
term “substantially filled” could meet definiteness standards, 
particularly in view of the skill to be applied by a person having 
ordinary skill in the art.219  The Federal Circuit noted that in a month 
before the appeal, following the PGR proceedings, the PTAB entered 
a final written decision finding Tinnus’s claims indefinite.220  That 
decision is non-binding on the Federal Circuit, and the appellate 
record supported the district court’s treatment of the definiteness 
issues.221  However, the Federal Circuit suggested that “[t]he parties 
are, of course, free to ask the district court to reconsider its preliminary 
injunction in light of the PTAB’s decision.”222 
Likewise, the court found that there was no plain error in the district 
court’s rejection of Telebrands’s obviousness arguments, as Telebrands 
                                               
 214. Tinnus, 846 F.3d at 1208. 
 215. Id. at 1194. 
 216. Id. at 1203, 1204–05.  The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not 
clearly err in holding that certain tubes in Telebrands’s balloon-filling product were 
“attached” to the main housing during claim construction even though they only 
attached by sliding into place, and could be removed.  Id. at 1204–06.  And there was no 
reversible error in the district court relying on Telebrands’s instruction manual (rather 
than direct citation to the product) to find infringement likely.  Id. at 1204–05. 
 217. Id. at 1205. 
 218. Id. at 1202–03. 
 219. Id. at 1205–06. 
 220. Id. at 1202 n.7. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
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failed to identify a sufficient motivation to combine prior art.223  Finally, 
there was no clear error in the district court’s irreparable harm analysis, 
including the district court’s part-reliance on evidence from the time 
before Tinnus’s patent as circumstantial evidence of consumer 
confusion, harm to reputation, or loss of goodwill.224 
F. Collateral Estoppel 
In Phil-Insul Corp. v. Airlite Plastics Co.,225 the Federal Circuit 
determined that Rule 36 affirmances are sufficiently valid and final to 
support collateral estoppel affirming the grant of summary judgment 
for noninfringement.226  In the prior 2011 case, IntegraSpec, the trade 
name of Phil-Insul, had unsuccessfully sued separate defendants on the 
same patent, “the ’933 patent,” resulting in a claim construction and 
summary judgment of noninfringement, which the Federal Circuit 
affirmed without opinion through Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 36.227  The Federal Circuit determined that the district court 
did not err in concluding that the previous Rule 36 affirmance barred 
IntegraSpec’s assertion of the same patent in the present suit due to 
collateral estoppel.228  The Federal Circuit rejected IntegraSpec’s 
argument that a Rule 36 summary affirmance is not valid and that final 
judgments are suitable to support collateral estoppel.229  Relying on 
Taylor v. McKeithen,230 the Federal Circuit confirmed that Rule 36 
affirmances are valid and final judgments231 and support the 
application of collateral estoppel per Rates Technology, Inc. v. Mediatrix 
Telecom, Inc.232  The Federal Circuit held that TecSec, Inc. v. International 
Business Machines Corp.,233 was not contrary because, in that case, the 
issue was whether the parties were bound by a district court’s claim 
construction in a matter resolved via Rule 36 affirmance and, whether 
it was consequently preclusive because that construction was not 
                                               
 223. Id. at 1207. 
 224. Id. at 1207–08. 
 225. 854 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 226. Id. at 1359. 
 227. Id. at 1347; see FED. R. APP. P. 36 (authorizing federal appeals courts to affirm a 
lower court judgment without opinion). 
 228. Phil-Insul Corp., 854 F.3d at 1347–48. 
 229. Id. at 1354–55. 
 230. 407 U.S. 191 (1972) (per curiam). 
 231. Phil-Insul Corp., 854 F.3d at 1354–55 (citing Taylor, 407 U.S. at 194 n.4). 
 232. 688 F.3d 742, 750 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Phil-Insul Corp., 854 F.3d at 1355. 
 233. 731 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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necessary to the judgment.234  Indeed, the TecSec court expressly 
rejected the contention that Rule 36 affirmance can always support 
collateral estoppel.235  In the present appeal, it was “clear that the prior 
panel actually and necessarily adopted the district court’s claim 
constructions when it affirmed the judgments,” so TecSec did not 
apply.236  Further, IntegraSpec had not appealed certain claim 
construction issues in the prior appeal.  The Federal Circuit compared 
the prior 2011 case and the present one to find no error in the 
determination that the accused products in both cases were 
substantially the same, and, therefore, there was no error in summary 
judgment of noninfringement, giving weight to the apparent criticality 
of the claim construction to the Rule 36 affirmance.237  Finally, the 
Federal Circuit rejected IntegraSpec’s argument that claim two (in the 
present case) should be construed anew because that claim was not at 
issue in the present appeal.238 
G. Arbitration 
In Evans v. Building Materials Corp. of America,239 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss and stay pending arbitration, 
finding the arbitrability claim “wholly groundless” where a prior art 
agreement had no relationship to the patent and trade dress claims in 
suit.240  Applying Fourth Circuit law and the “wholly groundless” 
standard of Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp.,241 the Federal Circuit 
determined that the district court had correctly found the assertion of 
arbitrability by General Aniline & Film (GAF) (trade name of Building 
Materials Corp. of America) wholly groundless.242  The Federal Circuit 
declined to resolve whether the “wholly groundless” test is the only test 
                                               
 234. Phil-Insul Corp., 854 F.3d at 1355–57. 
 235. Id. at 1356. 
 236. Id. at 1357. 
 237. Id. at 1357–58 (rejecting IntegraSpec’s attempt to cite the oral argument 
transcript in the prior appeal as casting doubt on the correctness of the district court’s 
claim constructions, TecSec did not apply). 
 238. Id. at 1359 (finding that numerous claim terms overlap and rejecting IntegraSpec’s 
contention that the same words might be construed differently in the two claims). 
 239. 858 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 240. Id. at 1379.  The wholly groundless standard is a limited inquiry as to whether 
any legitimate argument could be made and applies when an arbitration agreement 
clearly and unmistakably refers the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator.  Id. at 1380. 
 241. 466 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 242. Evans, 858 F.3d at 1379. 
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to be used in review of arbitrability under Fourth Circuit law.243  Indeed, 
GAF’s claims for patent infringement, trade-dress infringement, and 
unfair competition were completely unrelated to the arbitration 
agreement, as they involved completely different products and no issue 
“related to the performance or interpretation of the contract itself.”244  
The Federal Circuit also rejected GAF’s claim that some of Mr. Evans’s 
claims incorporated a dispute over whether GAF had breached various 
confidentiality obligations.245  And while some of Mr. Evans’s claims 
urged “willfulness and similar states of mind,” those states of mind 
related to GAF’s conduct regarding its allegedly infringing products, 
not its state of mind relating to the confidentiality agreement.246 
II. VALIDITY 
A. Patent-Eligible Subject Matter 
In the 2017 term, the Federal Circuit continued to provide direction 
to the patent eligibility of computing-based claims for data organization 
and structure and pharmaceutical patents under the patent eligibility 
standard excluding laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract 
ideas.  In Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Financial Corp.,247 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court holding two 
patents ineligible under § 101, finding that the introduction of allegedly 
new “data structures” was insufficient to avoid ineligibility.248  The 
Federal Circuit found that summary judgment of ineligibility as to 
Intellectual Ventures I’s (IV) patent was warranted.249  The patent 
related to techniques for dynamically managing Extensible Markup 
Language (XML) data.250  IV’s patent failed the Supreme Court’s two-
part test for patent subject matter eligibility outlined in Alice Corp. v. 
CLS Bank International251 steps.252  At step one, the patent addressed 
                                               
 243. Id. at 1380. 
 244. Id. at 1381. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 1382. 
 247. 850 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 248. Id. at 1342–43 (granting summary judgment in a collateral estoppel claim 
regarding a third patent).  The opinion refers to the plaintiff’s as “IV”.  Id. at 1334. 
 249. Id. at 1342. 
 250. Id. at 1338–39. 
 251. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 252. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 850 F.3d at 1340, 1342.  The Alice test is a two-step 
inquiry:  (1) whether the claim under examination is a patent-ineligible concept, such 
as an abstract idea; and (2) whether the patent adds to the idea “something extra” that 
2018] 2017 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 1167 
 
abstract “data manipulation” steps.253  Though it specifically related to 
making XML documents compatible via the use of “management 
record types” (MRTs) and “primary record types” (PRTs), at best this 
limited the invention “to a technological environment for which to 
apply the underlying abstract concept,” but did not make them less 
abstract.254  At Alice step two, nothing transformed the abstract method 
into an inventive concept because the claims did little more than 
describe the method.255  The Federal Circuit rejected IV’s argument 
that the patent was unconventionally improving a technological 
process, notwithstanding its introduction of MRTs and PRTs.256  
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit concluded that “[t]he mere fact that 
the inventor applied coined labels to conventional structures does not 
make the underlying concept inventive.”257 
The Federal Circuit’s opinion in a companion case, Intellectual 
Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co.,258 discussed the ineligibility of IV’s 
third patent.259  Finding that the lack of detail as to how the asserted 
patents would accomplish the claimed benefits indicated the absence 
of inventive concept, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
judgment of § 101 ineligibility as to two patents.260  Further, the Federal 
Circuit dismissed the infringement claims under the third patent for 
lack of standing and consequently vacated a collateral holding that the 
third patent was also § 101 ineligible.261  The Federal Circuit instructed 
the lower court to dismiss the claims of the first asserted patent, the 
’581 patent,262 applying California law to the interpretation of an 
agreement between prior assignee AllAdvantage.com and a company 
called Alset (the alleged assignor to IV).263  The Federal Circuit 
                                               
embodies an “inventive concept.”  Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2355, 2357. 
 253. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, 850 F.3d at 1340. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 1341. 
 256. Id. at 1341. 
 257. Id. at 1342.  The Federal Circuit also considered how the claims lacked detail 
on how to overcome specific problems IV claimed they addressed.  Id. 
 258. 850 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 259. Id. at 1331–32 (concluding that the claims failed to “recite an inventive concept 
that transforms the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention”). 
 260. Id. at 1319. 
 261. Id. at 1332. 
 262. Id. at 1324–25. 
 263. Id. at 1320–21.  In a footnote the opinion notes that Federal Circuit law 
sometimes controls issues of assignment, but the parties seem to have agreed to 
application of California law.  See id. at 1320 n.1. 
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concluded that this agreement did not include any assignment of rights 
to the application leading to the ’581 patent, even though Alset held 
itself out as the ’581 patent’s assignee post-issuance, including updating 
power of attorneys, paying the issuance fee, and recording an 
assignment from itself to IV.264  Further, the Federal Circuit rejected 
IV’s argument that Alset and AllAdvantage.com intended to convey the 
’581 patent; the contract was unambiguous and the Federal Circuit 
declined to take up IV’s submission of extrinsic evidence as to the 
parties’ general behavior.265  Because IV was not the assignee, the court 
determined that IV lacked standing to bring suit on the ’581 patent.266  
Given the lack of standing, the Federal Circuit vacated the district 
court’s determination that the ’581 patent was § 101 ineligible.267 
The Federal Circuit also determined that summary judgment of 
§ 101 ineligibility was appropriate for IV’s other two patents.  The first, 
the ’434 patent, related to the use of an index to locate information in 
a computer database.268  The court held that this failed Alice step one, 
reasoning that the use of index-searchable databases existed long 
before the patent and cited library indexes of books.269  Further, it 
rejected IV’s argument that the patent improved how computer 
databases function, as in Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp.270  While some 
claims recited use of XML tags to improve indexing, not all claims 
required this, and the specification indicated that the invention was 
“not necessarily limited to XML language.”271  In any event, even the 
XML claims were not focused on how use of XML improved the 
technology, but merely “call[ed] for XML-specific tags in the index 
without any further detail.”272  The patent also failed Alice step two.273  
Recitation of an XML-based index was not enough to transform the 
abstract idea into a patentable invention, and the claims’ other 
                                               
 264. Id. at 1322. 
 265. Id. at 1322–23. 
 266. Id. at 1324. 
 267. Id. at 1324–25. 
 268. Id. at 1325. 
 269. Id. at 1327–28. 
 270. 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that Enfish’s “self-referential 
table” claims were not directed to an abstract idea under Alice step one because the 
techniques improved specific database functions, and thus Enfish’s claims were patent-
eligible); Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d at 1327–28. 
 271. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d at 1327–28. 
 272. Id. at 1328. 
 273. Id. 
2018] 2017 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 1169 
 
limitations recited routine computer functions.274 
The Federal Circuit further found that summary judgment of § 101 
ineligibility was also appropriate for the third patent, the ’002 patent.275  
The patent related to techniques for accessing remotely stored data 
using a “mobile interface.”276  First, the ’002 patent failed Alice step one 
because “[r]emotely accessing and retrieving user-specified information 
is an age-old practice even though the mobile interface requirement 
only specified a particular field of use.277  Second, the ’002 patent failed 
Alice step two because it simply applied a generic computer 
implementation to the abstract idea and provided no inventive 
solution.278  The court noted that the claimed interface was “so lacking in 
implementation details that it amounts to merely a generic component 
(software, hardware, or firmware) that permits the performance of the 
abstract idea.”279  And the failure to describe how the claimed mobile 
interface would overcome cited “compatibility issues” bars taking that 
“purported feature” of the invention as an inventive concept.280 
In Thales Visionx Inc. v. United States,281 the Federal Circuit reversed 
the district court’s judgment on the pleadings of § 101 patent 
ineligibility, finding that claims applying a specific algorithm to track 
movements were not abstract.282  Thales Visionx Inc.’s claims related 
to inertial tracking, i.e., using accelerometers and gyroscopes to track 
an object’s’ movement.283  The claims recited the use of two inertial 
sensors, and the computation of an object’s orientation was “based on 
signals received” from those sensors.284  The Federal Circuit reasoned 
that the claims required use of the mathematical techniques disclosed 
in the specification and were thus “indistinguishable from the claims 
at issue in [Diamond v.] Diehr.”285  The Federal Circuit determined that 
“[j]ust as the claims in Diehr reduced the likelihood that the rubber 
molding process would result in ‘overcuring’ or ‘undercuring,’ the 
claims here result in a system that reduces errors in an inertial system 
                                               
 274. Id. at 1328–29. 
 275. Id. at 1329. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 1330. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 1331. 
 280. Id. at 1331–32. 
 281. 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 282. Id. at 1349. 
 283. Id. at 1344. 
 284. Id. at 1345. 
 285. 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Thales Visionx Inc., 850 F.3d at 1348. 
1170 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1141 
 
that tracks an object on a moving platform.”286  Since the inertial 
sensors were used in a non-conventional way, the idea was patentable 
and not abstract and, thus, survived step one of Alice.287 
By comparison, in RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co.,288 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed judgment on the pleadings of patent ineligibility 
because invocation of a particular algorithm in face compositing 
claims was insufficient to confer patentability.289  RecogniCorp’s patent 
related to techniques for building a composite facial image from 
constituent parts.290  The patent failed both steps of the Alice inquiry.  
At step one, RecogniCorp’s patent addressed “the abstract idea of 
encoding and decoding image data.”291  Per Diehr, it was not the mere 
use of a mathematical formula that rendered the representative claim 
abstract, but the absence of any patentable subject matter outside of 
the mathematical formula.292  The Federal Circuit found Digitech Image 
Technologies, LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc.293 applicable because 
RecogniCorp’s claim, like the claim in Digitech, was abstract because it 
“started with data, added an algorithm, and ended with a new form of 
data.”294  At step two, the Federal Circuit rejected RecogniCorp’s 
argument that the “particular encoding process using the specific 
algorithm disclosed” was sufficient to confer patentability.295  The court 
distinguished the case from DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.296 
because, unlike DDR Holdings, there was nothing in RecogniCorp’s 
claim to provide the required inventive concept.297  The Federal Circuit 
reasoned that “[t]he addition of a mathematical equation that simply 
changes the data into other forms of data cannot save [a claim].”298  
The Federal Circuit also rejected RecogniCorp’s attempt to argue that, 
under BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v.  AT&T Mobility LLC,299 
                                               
 286. Thales Visionx Inc., 850 F.3d at 1348 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Diehr, 
450 U.S. at 187). 
 287. Id. at 1349. 
 288. 855 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 672 (2018). 
 289. Id. at 1324. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 1326–27 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187, 192 (1981)). 
 293. 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 294. RecogniCorp, 855 F.3d at 1327 (citing Digitech Image Techs., 758 F.3d at 1351). 
 295. Id. 
 296. 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 297. RecogniCorp, 855 F.3d at 1327–28. 
 298. Id. at 1328. 
 299. 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
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the claims had some “particularized application” of the image 
encoding/decoding techniques sufficient to confer patentability.300  In 
its conclusion, the Federal Circuit held that the patent “claims the use 
of a computer, but it does exactly what we have warned it may not:  tell 
a user to take an abstract idea and apply it with a computer.”301 
In Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA Corp.,302 the Federal Circuit held that a 
claim addressing use of categorical data storage in a computer memory is 
non-abstract, reversing the district court’s determination of subject-
matter-ineligibility.303  Visual Memory’s patent related to a computer 
memory system tailorable for use with different processors without a 
performance penalty.304  The Federal Circuit found that the district court 
erred at Alice step one by reasoning that Visual Memory’s claims only 
encompassed an abstract idea.305  The Federal Circuit reasoned that 
Visual Memory’s claims were addressed to an improved memory system, 
not just the abstract idea of “categorical data storage” (i.e., storing data in 
different caches based on the data type).306  The Federal Circuit noted 
that the claims recited a number of limitations restricting their coverage 
to a memory system and not “all types and all forms of categorical data 
storage.”307  Thus, Visual Memory’s patent addressed a technological 
improvement as in Enfish and Thales, and that cases like Content Extraction 
and In re TLI Communications LLC,308 were distinguishable.309 
In Judge Hughes’s dissent, he argued that the claims’ “fundamental 
concept” was expressed generally and should be interpreted as such in 
the Alice analysis.310  He would have affirmed the 
subject-matter-ineligibility finding.311 
Affirming § 101 patent-ineligibility in Smart Systems Innovations, LLC 
v. Chicago Transit Authority,312 the Federal Circuit held that claim 
                                               
 300. RecogniCorp, 855 F.3d at 1328. 
 301. Id. (citing Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1332 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015)). 
 302. 867 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 303. Id. at 1255. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. at 1257. 
 306. Id. at 1258–59 (citing Thales Visionx Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1345 
(Fed. Cir. 2017); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
 307. Id. at 1259. 
 308. 823 F.3d 607 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 309. Visual Memory, 867 F.3d at 1260. 
 310. Id. at 1262 (Hughes, J., dissenting). 
 311. Id. at 1264. 
 312. 873 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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references to tangible items are insufficient to demonstrate non-
abstractness.313  Smart Systems Innovations (“SSI”) claims related to 
techniques for using bankcards to regulate rider access to a transit 
system and for collecting/storing funding data.314  Four patents were 
at issue, and the Federal Circuit addressed them together, finding that 
they all failed both steps of the Alice inquiry.315  At step one, the Federal 
Circuit rejected SSI’s arguments that the claims were non-abstract 
because they operated in the “tangible” world.316  The claims were all 
“directed to the collection, storage, and recognition of data” and were 
thus abstract.317  The Federal Circuit also rejected SSI’s contention that 
the claims improved existing technological processes, as in Enfish and 
DDR Holdings.318  SSI’s claims did not improve computer technology, 
“but rather invoke computers in the collection and arrangement of 
data.”319  The Federal Circuit explained that there was no inventive 
concept, despite the fact that the claims were limited to mass transit 
applications.320  At step two, the Federal Circuit found no inventive 
concept sufficient to confer patentability.321  The Federal Circuit also 
rejected SSI’s arguments as to lack of preemption and alleged 
satisfaction of the machine-or-transformation test.322  Thus, the Federal 
Circuit found the patent invalid under § 101. 
Judge Linn, dissenting in part and concurring in part, would have 
found two of SSI’s patents—those specifically related to the use of a 
bankcard in accessing a transit system—to be directed to non-abstract 
ideas and thus patent-eligible.323 
In Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Communications, LLC,324 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed a determination of § 101 subject-matter 
                                               
 313. Id. at 1366–67. 
 314. Id. at 1368. 
 315. Id. at 1366–67. 
 316. Id. at 1371. 
 317. Id. at 1372. 
 318. Id. (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335–36 (Fed. Cir. 
2016); DDR Holding, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). 
 319. Id. at 1272–73. 
 320. Id. at 1373. 
 321. Id. at 1373–74 (finding no inventive concept because “the claims at issue use 
generic computer components ‘in which to carry out the abstract idea.’” (quoting 
Lending Tree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 656 F. App’x 991, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
 322. Id. at 1373–75. 
 323. Id. at 1376, 1383–84 (Linn, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
 324. 874 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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ineligibility for claims reciting results of simple functions.325  Four 
Two-Way patents were at issue, all relating to systems for streaming over 
the internet using multicasting.326  The Federal Circuit discussed them 
in two sets.  Under Alice step one, the first set of patents concerned the 
abstract idea of sending and monitoring the transmission of 
information.327  Even if Two-Way’s proposed claim constructions had 
been adopted by the district court, they did not make this idea non-
abstract.328  The Federal Circuit found that the lower court did not 
oversimplify the patent claims as Two-Way had suggested, and it 
instead agreed with the determinations that the patent claims related 
to “basic functions” instead of specific techniques that could be used 
to perform the functions.329  At Alice step two, there was no inventive 
concept in the application of the idea; the claims used only generic 
functional language to describe implementation and the order of the 
combination did not provide an inventive concept.330 
As to the second set of patents, at Alice step one, Two-Way’s claims 
were directed to the abstract idea of monitoring and measuring 
delivery of real-time information.331  Further, the district court did not 
err when it cited the claim’s preamble in analyzing the patent’s 
abstractness.332  At Alice step two, there was again no inventive concept 
because the claims only used conventional computer and network 
components, operating according to ordinary functions.333 
In Secured Mail Solutions LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc.,334 the Federal 
Circuit held postal “unique identifier” patents ineligible under § 101, 
affirming the district court’s determination.335  The case involved 
multiple patents, and the Federal Circuit addressed them in three 
categories while conducting an Alice inquiry.336  At Alice step one, the 
court reasoned that all three categories claimed abstract ideas—first, 
                                               
 325. Id. at 1332. 
 326. Id. at 1333. 
 327. Id. at 1337. 
 328. Id. at 1338. 
 329. Id. at 1337–38 (citing Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Directv, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 
1258–59 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1596 (2017) (mem.); Elec. Power Grp., 
LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
 330. Id. at 1338–39. 
 331. Id. at 1340. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. at 1340–41. 
 334. 873 F.3d 905 (Fed. Cir. 2017), petition for cert. docketed, No. 17-1319 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2018). 
 335. Id. at 907. 
 336. Id. 
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the idea of using a “unique identifier” to identify the senders of mail; 
second, the idea of using a quick response code (QR)code for a similar 
purpose; and third, the idea of using a personalized URL as an 
identifier.337  The court rejected Secured Mail’s argument, under 
Enfish, that such analysis described the claims too generally.338  At Alice 
step two, none of the categorized patents included an inventive 
concept sufficient to confer patent-eligibility.339  The Federal Circuit 
rejected Secured Mail’s citation to DDR Holdings because the claims do 
no more than “cite well known and conventional ways to allow generic 
communication between a sender and a recipient using generic 
computer technology.”340  The Federal Circuit found no error in the 
district court dismissing the case at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.341  Finally, 
the Federal Circuit rejected Secured Mail’s argument that the district 
court misplaced the burden of proof.342 
In Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC,343 the 
Federal Circuit addressed the product of nature concept of section 101 
when it affirmed the district court’s determination of patent 
ineligibility of claims for correlating enzyme levels to cardiovascular 
disease.344  The Cleveland Clinic’s patents related to methods for 
detecting myeloperoxidase (“MPO”) in the body and correlating the 
results to cardiovascular risk.345  As a procedural matter, the district 
court did not err in addressing only certain claims from Cleveland 
Clinic’s three patents.346  Per Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. 
Wells Fargo Bank,347 it is appropriate to review only representative claims 
where the claims are substantially similar and linked to the same law of 
nature.348  The Federal Circuit also found that the district court also 
did not err in rejecting the claims at the motion to dismiss stage, per 
                                               
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. at 909–11 (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1332–33 
(Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
 339. Id. at 911–12. 
 340. Id. at 912. 
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 342. Id. at 913. 
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Genetic Technologies Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C.349 and other cases.350 
At step one of the Alice analysis, Cleveland Clinic’s claims were 
directed to the natural law correlating presence of MPO to 
cardiovascular disease.351  As in Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.,352 
here, “the method starts and ends with naturally occurring phenomena 
with no meaningful non-routine steps in between.”353  The Federal 
Circuit rejected Cleveland Clinic’s citation to Rapid Litigation 
Management Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc.354 because Cleveland Clinic did not 
create a new laboratory technique but was only using well-known 
techniques to execute the claimed method.355  At step two of Alice, 
Cleveland Clinic’s claims lacked an inventive concept sufficient to 
confer patentability.  Citing Ariosa and Mayo Collaborative Services v. 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,356 the Federal Circuit concluded that 
Cleveland Clinic’s claims were merely applying a law of nature.357  The 
techniques used to assess MPO levels were well-known, as were the 
statistical techniques for making the required comparison to control 
levels.358  The Federal Circuit distinguished the case from CellzDirect 
because, in that case, there was an improvement to existing methods 
of cell preservation that applied a new discovered natural law; here, 
the patents “[did] not extend their discovery” of a correlation between 
MPO and cardiovascular disease.359 
The Federal Circuit also found that the district court also did not err 
in dismissing Cleveland Clinic’s claims under a separate patent, which 
related to methods of treating cardiovascular disease by prescribing 
lipid-lowering drugs.360  The district court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying Cleveland Clinic’s request for leave to amend its complaint 
to correct some of the issues herein; the request was “buried” in 
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776 F.3d at 1349; buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). 
 351. Id. 
 352. 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 353. Cleveland Clinic Found., 859 F.3d at 1361. 
 354. 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 355. Cleveland Clinic Found., 859 F.3d at 1361. 
 356. 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
 357. Cleveland Clinic Found., 859 F.3d at 1362. 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. (citing CellzDirect, 827 F.3d at 1051). 
 360. Id. at 1363. 
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Cleveland Clinic’s opposition to True Health’s motion to dismiss.361  
The Federal Circuit considered how True Health’s sale of lab reports, 
documenting various testing services, could not support contributory 
infringement liability because they were not a “material or apparatus” 
used for infringement.362  Nor could the sale of such reports support 
inducement due to Cleveland Clinic’s failure to allege a connection 
between True Health’s reports and any subsequent prescription of 
lipid lowering drugs by physicians.363 
B. Anticipation 
The Federal Circuit addressed issues of precision in anticipatory 
prior art.  In Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co.,364 the 
Federal Circuit held that possibilities untaught in a reference, but 
“immediately envision[ed],” may not support a finding of anticipation, 
thus reversing the PTAB’s IPR determination.365  During the IPR, the 
parties agreed that a claimed signal had to be in a certain “frame of 
reference;” however, the PTAB’s determination relied on prior art 
signals in a different reference frame.366  The Federal Circuit found 
that, even if a person of skill could “at once envisage” the claimed 
signals, that fact alone was insufficient to establish anticipation.367  
Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co.368 was not contrary because, 
there, the prior art disclosed various components and taught that they 
could be intertwined.369  As such, the reference “effectively taught” the 
claimed combination.370  The Federal Circuit reasoned that “Kennametal 
addresse[d] whether the disclosure of a limited number of combination 
possibilities discloses one of the possible combinations . . . .  [It] does 
not permit the Board to fill in missing limitations simply because a 
skilled artisan would immediately envision them.”371 
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute,372 the 
                                               
 361. Id. at 1363–64. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Id. at 1364. 
 364. 851 F.3d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 365. Id. at 1270–71. 
 366. Id. at 1273. 
 367. Id. at 1274 (quoting Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 
1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). 
 368. 780 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 369. Nidec Motor Corp., 851 F.3d at 1274 (citing Kennametal, 780 F.3d at 1382–83). 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. at 1274–75. 
 372. 849 F.3d 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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Federal Circuit applied the same concept, this time affirming the 
PTAB’s determination of non-anticipation.373  The Los Angeles 
Biomedical Research Institute at Harbor-UCLA Medical Center’s 
(“LAB”) claim required application of treatment “for not less than 45 
days.”374  The allegedly anticipatory reference did not expressly teach 
forty-five days of treatment, and the Federal Circuit found that the 
PTAB did not err in finding that it did not inherently teach such 
treatment.375  The prior art’s reference to “chronic administration” was 
insufficient to teach the full forty-five days.376  The court found 
AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc.377 directly on point because, while the prior 
art may have “suggested” the claim duration, these suggestions are 
insufficient to succeed on an anticipation claim.378  Thus, similar to 
AstraZeneca, despite the prior art suggesting the claimed duration, it 
was not enough to anticipate the claim.379 
Holding that factual predicate must be established to support reading 
prior art genus to anticipate a claimed species, the Federal Circuit 
generally affirmed IPR determinations of Wasica Finance GmbH v. 
Continental Automotive Systems, Inc.380 on patentability (finding some claims 
patentable, others not) and reversed determination of patentability as to 
one claim.381  The Federal Circuit treated the appeals from patent-owner 
Wasica and from petitioners Continental and Schrader separately.382 
In assessing Wasica’s appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the PTAB 
did not err in finding the claims under review unpatentable as anticipated 
and obvious.383  Phillips v. AWH Corp.384 sets the standard for construing 
and reviewing claims of expired patents.385  Accordingly, the Federal 
Circuit rejected Wasica’s argument that certain “pressure signal” 
limitations should have required numeric values instead of non-numeric 
                                               
 373. Id. at 1076. 
 374. Id. at 1074. 
 375. Id. at 1074–75. 
 376. Id. at 1075. 
 377. 633 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 378. Eli Lilly & Co., 849 F.3d at 1075–76 (citing AstraZeneca, 633 F.3d at 1054–55). 
 379. Id. at 1076. 
 380. 853 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 381. Id. at 1289 (finding claims 1–5, 9–19, and 21 unpatentable and claims 6–8 and 
20 patentable). 
 382. Id. at 1278, 1282. 
 383. Id. at 1278–79. 
 384. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 385. Wasica, 853 F.3d at 1279–80. 
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representations as lacking support in the claim text or description.386  The 
Federal Circuit also rejected Wasica’s argument that the claim limitation 
“emittance of a . . . signal” should have been limited to wireless signals.387  
The plain meaning of “emit” could include wired communication, and 
there was no redefinition or disavowal in the patent.388 
The PTAB did not err either when it found certain art cited by 
Schrader as too “unclear,” or when it rejected Continent’s argument 
that because the same prior art discussed using “any” modulation 
scheme, it should be held to inherently disclose the claimed 
modulation scheme.389  The Federal Circuit also found that Schrader 
waived its obviousness challenge because it did not include it in its 
petitions or appeals.390  The PTAB also did not err in rejecting 
Continental’s argument that it should be held to inherently disclose 
the claimed modulation scheme because the same prior art disclosed 
using “any” modulation scheme.391  Per Atofina v. Great Lakes Chemical 
Corp.,392 not every disclosure of a genus also discloses every species 
within.393  Moreover, the Federal Circuit determined that Kennametal is 
not contrary, and Continental failed to develop the sort of factual 
showing necessary to prove that the disclosed genus teaches the 
claimed species.394  There were similar defects in Continental’s 
obviousness contention.395 
Further, the court also found that, because a dependent claim was 
anticipated, the PTAB erred in holding that the claim was 
patentable.396  Upon review of the specification and structure of the 
claims, the Federal Circuit found that “bit sequence” could include a 
sequence of a single bit.397  Thus, the PTAB construction (“two or more 
bits”) was overly restrictive.398  Thus, under the Federal Circuit’s 
                                               
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. at 1282. 
 388. Id. 
 389. Id. at 1287. 
 390. Id. at 1284–85. 
 391. Id. at 1285. 
 392. 441 F.3d 991 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 393. Wasica, 853 F.3d at 1285 (citing Atofina, 441 F.3d at 999). 
 394. Id. at 1285–86 (citing Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 780 F.3d 
1376, 1381–83 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). 
 395. Id. at 1286. 
 396. Id. at 1288. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. 
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construction, the dependent claim was invalid as anticipated.399 
C. AIA On-Sale Bar 
In Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,400 the 
Federal Circuit held that the AIA on-sale bar may be triggered by a 
contract despite terms to keep certain invention details confidential, 
reversing a bench trial determination that Helsinn’s patents were not 
invalid per the on-sale bar provision of § 102.401  The case involved four 
Helsinn patents relating to reducing chemotherapy-induced nausea 
and vomiting.402  Pre-AIA § 102 applied to three of the patents,403 while 
AIA § 102 applied to the fourth.404 
As to the three pre-AIA patents, the Federal Circuit held that the 
district court correctly determined that a 2001 supply agreement 
between Helsinn and MGI Pharma was a contract for future sale of a 
commercial product embodying the three patents.405  The Federal 
Circuit rejected Helsinn’s argument that, because the contract was 
contingent on FDA approval for Helsinn’s product, the arrangement 
would not be commercially understood as a contract for sale.406  Citing 
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and BG Group PLC v. Republic 
of Argentina,407 the Federal Circuit reasoned that a contract with a 
condition precedent remains a valid, enforceable contract.408  The 
Federal Circuit found that although the agreement contemplated two 
products—one practicing the claims and one note—it did not change 
the outcome.409  The Federal Circuit rejected Helsinn’s argument, 
under Medicines Co. v. Hospira, Inc.,410 that the law will not find 
commercial activities invalidating if those same activities (here, MGI 
Pharma’s selection of Helsinn as a sole supplier) could have been 
performed in house.411  Helsinn’s relationship with MGI Pharma was 
                                               
 399. Id. at 1288–89. 
 400. 855 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2017), petition for cert. docketed, No. 17-1229 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2018). 
 401. Id. at 1359–60. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. at 1360. 
 404. Id. 
 405. Id. at 1364. 
 406. Id. at 1365–66. 
 407. 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014). 
 408. Helsinn, 855 F.3d at 1365 (citing U.C.C. § 2-105(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2003); BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1207). 
 409. Id. at 1366. 
 410. 827 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 411. Helsinn, 855 F.3d at 1367. 
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too different from the contract manufacturing arrangement in 
Medicines Co. to invoke that case’s rule.412 
As to the fourth patent, the Federal Circuit held that the district court 
erred in concluding that the same agreement failed to invoke the AIA 
on-sale bar because the agreement kept the actual dosing details—which 
were part of the claims—confidential.413  The Federal Circuit analyzed 
AIA § 102’s rule barring “patentability of an invention [that] was 
‘patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, 
or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the 
claimed invention.’”414  Further, it rejected Helsinn’s argument that the 
revision to § 102 means that the on-sale bar does not apply to sales that 
do not disclose the invention itself to the public—i.e., sales that keep no 
details of the invention confidential.415  Citing a variety of Supreme 
Court and Federal Circuit authority, the Federal Circuit reasoned that 
the history of the on-sale bar has not required full disclosure of all claim 
elements, so long as there is a sale of an embodiment of the invention.416  
Reviewing the legislative history of the AIA, the Federal Circuit also 
found no basis to support overturning such history.417  It therefore 
concluded that the 2001 supply agreement was a contract for future sale 
of the invention of the fourth patent.418 
Finally, the Federal Circuit concluded that the inventions of all four 
patents were ready for patenting as of the critical date, as required by 
the on-sale bar standard established in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,419 
due to actual reduction to practice.420  It was uncontested that Helsinn 
made the formulation in a stable form by that date.421  The district 
court erred in concluding that Helsinn had not yet determined that 
the invention would work for its intended purpose.422  To satisfy that 
standard, it is not necessary to meet U.S. Food and Drug 
                                               
 412. Id. 
 413. Id. at 1369. 
 414. Id. at 1368 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006)). 
 415. Id. at 1369. 
 416. Id. at 1369–71 (citing Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1829); Abbott 
Labs. V. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1317–18 (Fed. Cir. 1999); RCA Corp. v. 
Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1989), overruled in part on other grounds by 
Grp. One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 417. Id. at 1371. 
 418. Id. 
 419. 525 U.S. 55 (1998). 
 420. Helsinn, 855 F.3d at 1371 (citing Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67–68). 
 421. Id. at 1372. 
 422. Id. at 1373. 
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Administration (FDA) standards for approval, but only to show that 
the invention works “beyond a probability of failure” but not “a 
possibility of failure.”423 The Federal Circuit concluded that, on the 
record available, as of the critical date it was clear that the invention 
would work for its intended purpose.424 
D. Obviousness 
In 2017, the Federal Circuit weighed in on various secondary 
consideration analyses affecting the obviousness determinations of the 
lower courts in Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc.425  The 
Federal Circuit entered judgment for Millennium and determined 
that a failure to prove motivation to combine and failure to overcome 
secondary considerations warranted a reversal of an invalidity 
judgment.426  In this Hatch-Waxman case,427 where the defendant 
stipulated to infringement, the Federal Circuit further vacated 
judgments in separate actions that were based on collateral 
estoppel.428  Millennium’s patent claims the structure of Velcade, an 
anticancer drug.429  The Federal Circuit found that, based on the 
references, the district court erred in concluding that a person of skill 
would have had a reason to produce the compound in question.430  
There was no dispute that a key process was known in the art, but there 
was nothing in the record to suggest applying that process in the 
manner required to reach the claimed compound.431  The opinion 
discussed the various references and theories, and describes why none 
of them taught or suggested the required process.432 
The Federal Circuit found that the district court also erred in 
determining that the prior art did not teach away from application of 
                                               
 423. Id. at 1372 (quoting Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 424. Id. at 1373. 
 425. 862 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 426. Id. at 1370. 
 427. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012); see Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 189–90 
(1999) (explaining that the Hatch-Waxman Act creates a regulatory process by which 
generic pharmaceuticals are approved and relevant causes of action for developers 
seeking to safeguard their drug patenting rights). 
 428. Millennium Pharm., 862 F.3d at 1370. 
 429. Id. at 1360–61. 
 430. Id. at 1364. 
 431. Id. 
 432. Id. at 1364–65. 
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the proposed process in its application of inherency.433  While it was 
undisputed that the application of the process in question would have 
led to the claimed compound, that it did so was unexpected prior to 
the invention.434  The Federal Circuit rejected Sandoz’s argument that 
the reactions at issue could not be inventive because they were 
“inherent” to the materials and process being used.435 
The Federal Circuit found that the district court also clearly erred in 
its analysis of objective indicia of secondary considerations established 
in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,436 including unexpected results 
and long-felt need, as “[t]hese indicia cannot be set aside in the analysis 
of obviousness.”437  The opinion described how the district court erred 
in determining what the “closest prior art compound” was for purposes 
of this analysis; correcting for this, the record showed unexpected 
results.438  The Federal Circuit also found that the district court erred in 
concluding that Millennium had failed to show a long-felt need or 
commercial success because the record demonstrated both.439  In view 
of the above, the Federal Circuit held that the district court should not 
have found invalidity and reversed the district court’s judgment.440 
In another secondary considerations case, Intercontinental Great 
Brands LLC v. Kellogg North America Co.,441 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment for patent invalidity 
due to obviousness, finding no error in the district court’s 
consideration of objective indicia of nonobviousness after it found a 
prima facie obviousness case.442  Intercontinental’s patent related to 
resealable food packaging (referred to in the opinion by its former 
name, Kraft).443  The Federal Circuit determined that the district court 
did not err in granting summary judgment of obviousness,444 finding 
that the district court properly considered objective indicia of 
nonobviousness and properly based its obviousness determination on 
                                               
 433. Id. at 1366–67. 
 434. Id. 
 435. Id. 
 436. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
 437. Millennium Pharm., 862 F.3d at 1367–68. 
 438. Id. at 1368. 
 439. Id. at 1369. 
 440. Id. at 1370. 
 441. 869 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 442. Id. at 1351–52. 
 443. Id. at 1339. 
 444. Id. at 1344–45. 
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all of the Graham factors.445  The Federal Circuit thus rejected Kraft’s 
argument that the district court failed to sufficiently consider objective 
indicia.446  It also rejected Kraft’s argument that objective indicia must 
be considered before analyzing whether a skilled artisan would have a 
reason to combine prior art and emphasized that the district court’s 
ordering—analyzing objective indicia after considering the content of 
the art and the existence of a reason to combine—was not 
erroneous.447  The Federal Circuit also rejected Kraft’s arguments as to 
the content of the record and the existence of a motivation to combine 
based on that record.448  It furthermore declined to find any error in 
the district court’s analysis based on the fact that the art being analyzed 
had previously been considered during reexamination.449 
When it considered the prior art from reexamination, the Federal 
Circuit determined that the district court did not err in granting 
summary judgment of no inequitable conduct.450  Kellogg’s evidence 
was insufficient to permit a finding of intent.451  The intent issue 
concerned an article that Kraft had submitted to the PTO that 
depicted a key piece of prior art.452  The article described the prior art 
as not using “conventional wrapping film,” but Kraft suggested in 
litigation that this was a misprint.453  Kraft’s decision not to bring the 
belief of the misprint to the PTAB’s attention was not, on its own, 
sufficient to support a determination of bad intent.454  Kellogg had not 
developed evidence that Kraft’s counsel believed it was a misprint, and 
neither the ex parte requester nor the examiner had ever raised the 
issue.455  “The absence of such a statement indicates that the alleged 
misprint was not as obvious as Kellogg claims.”456 
                                               
 445. Id. at 1345.  The Graham factors to determine nonobviousness are 
consideration of:  (1) the scope and content of the relevant prior art; (2) the difference 
between the claimed invention and the relevant prior art; and (3) the level of ordinary 
skill in the relevant art.  Graham, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
 446. Id. 
 447. Id. at 1346–47. 
 448. Id. at 1348. 
 449. Id. at 1350 (“[I]n this case[,] the ‘enhanced burden’ proposition [for art 
considered in reexamination] provides no basis for a different result.”). 
 450. Id. at 1352. 
 451. Id. 
 452. Id. at 1351. 
 453. Id. 
 454. Id. at 1351–52. 
 455. Id. at 1352. 
 456. Id. 
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Judge Reyna, dissenting in part, believed that the district court 
“improperly found a prima facie case of obviousness before 
considering Kraft’s evidence of objective indicia of nonobviousness,” 
and on that basis would have reversed.457 
In Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Hospira, Inc.,458 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed a bench judgment of obviousness in Hatch-Waxman 
litigation, finding that evidence of commercial success and copying was 
insufficient to establish nonobviousness.459  Merck’s patent related to a 
process for preparing its branded antibiotic Invanz (generic name 
ertapenem).460  The Federal Circuit analyzed how, in view of the prior 
art, Merck’s claims amounted to straightforward application of well-
understood prior art principles and were obvious.461  The Federal Circuit 
also rejected Merck’s argument that the prior art failed to disclose the 
precise order and detail of claimed steps because this “would have been 
discovered by routine experimentation while implementing known 
principles.”462  The Federal Circuit noted Merck’s objective evidence 
concerning nonobviousness, particularly the commercial success of 
Merck’s Invanz product.463  After giving evidence of commercial success 
its “full and proper weight,” the Federal Circuit determined that the 
district court committed no clear error in its obviousness analysis.464  
However, the district court erred in holding that “multiple patents do 
not necessarily detract from evidence of commercial success of a 
product or process” because, since Merck had separate patents 
covering ertapenem itself, evidence of Invanz’s commercial success 
should be discounted.”465  But even correcting for this error, the 
commercial success evidence could not overcome the obviousness 
evidence.466  The Federal Circuit also rejected Hospira’s argument that 
the district court erred in finding copying by Hospira; the evidence 
could be given weight in this case because the ANDA did not require 
Hospira to copy the patented manufacturing process—only that the 
                                               
 457. Id. at 1353 (Reyna, J., dissenting in part). 
 458. 874 F.3d 724 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 459. Id. at 731. 
 460. Id. at 726. 
 461. Id. at 729. 
 462. Id. at 730. 
 463. Id. at 730–31. 
 464. Id. at 731. 
 465. Id. at 730–31. 
 466. Id. 
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result of that process matched Merck’s.467 
Dissenting, Judge Newman stated that she would have held that the 
district court gave insufficient weight to objective evidence of 
nonobviousness.468  Her opinion called for the Federal Circuit to 
“remedy our inconsistent treatment of the procedures and burdens in 
applying the evidentiary factors of obviousness.”469 
In Bayer Pharma AG v. Watson Laboratories, Inc.,470 the Federal Circuit 
reversed a bench judgment finding nonobviousness in a Hatch-
Waxman case, holding that evidence disfavoring a combination of 
reference did not teach away from it.471  The case involved Bayer’s 
patent for a formulation of an erectile-dysfunction (ED) treatment, 
vardenafil (brand name Levitra), as an oral disintegrating tablet (sold 
by Bayer as Staxyn).472  The Federal Circuit determined that the district 
court clearly erred in concluding that Watson failed to show a 
motivation to formulate ED drugs as oral disintegrating tablets (ODT), 
as the record included numerous references describing such 
formulations, each of which the district court failed to consider.473  The 
opinion discussed these references and analyzed Bayer’s 
counterarguments, concluding that the record clearly showed a 
motivation to formulate vardenafil ODT.474  The Federal Circuit found 
clear error in the district court’s conclusion that there was no 
motivation to employ technology reaching those limitations.475  There 
was clearly an “otherwise apparent motivation to formulate a product,” 
despite the fact that some of this technology had not yet been FDA-
approved.476  And while the district court did not err in finding that 
some of the combinations would have led to “bitter taste and increased 
bioavailability,” such did not rise to the level of teaching away from the 
combination—the combination would still have been productive, even 
if disfavored.477  The Federal Circuit noted that Bayer had presented 
objective evidence of nonobviousness (copying and unexpected 
                                               
 467. Id. 
 468. Id. at 733 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 469. Id. at 731. 
 470. 874 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 471. Id. at 1329. 
 472. Id. at 1319. 
 473. Id. at 1321–22. 
 474. Id. at 1322–23. 
 475. Id. at 1324–25. 
 476. Id. at 1326 (citing Allergan, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 726 F.3d 1286, 1291–92 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013)). 
 477. Id. at 1327 (citing In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 
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results), but upon weighing the factors articulated in Graham, the 
claims were obvious.478 
In Novartis AG v. Noven Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,479 the Federal Circuit 
held that the PTAB may differ in obviousness determination from 
district courts even on similar evidence and arguments.  There, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s IPR determinations of non-
patentability for obviousness.480  The existence of prior district court 
and Federal Circuit authority finding Novartis’s claims nonobvious on 
a similar record481 did not demonstrate factual or legal error in the 
PTAB’s decisions.482  As a factual matter, the record in the IPR included 
additional art and declarations not present in the district court and 
Federal Circuit cases.483  As a legal matter, the Federal Circuit held that 
the different standard of proof in IPR, preponderance of the evidence, 
and in district court, clear and convincing evidence, meant that the 
PTAB can properly reach a “different conclusion based on the same 
evidence.”484  In re Baxter International, Inc.485 was not contradictory; Baxter 
merely noted that, on the same evidence and argument, the PTO should 
“ideally” reach the same outcomes as a district court.486  However, Baxter 
“used ‘ideally’ to connote aspiration,” and recognized that the PTO has 
its own standards to apply.487  Applying the PTAB standard of proof in 
IPR, the Federal Circuit determined that substantial evidence supported 
the PTAB’s obviousness determination.488 
In Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute v. Eli Lilly & Co.,489 the 
                                               
 478. Id. at 1329. 
 479. 853 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 480. Id. at 1296. 
 481. Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Watson Labs., Inc., 611 F. App’x 988, 996 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (rejecting defendant’s claim that Novartis’s patents were invalid for obviousness 
and holding defendant liable for infringement); Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Noven 
Pharm., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 3d 474, 486–87 (D. Del. 2015) (rejecting defendant Noven’s 
claim that Novartis’s patents are invalid as obvious). 
 482. Novartis, 853 F.3d at 1293. 
 483. Id. 
 484. Id. at 1294 (citing Noven Pharm., Inc. v. Novartis AG, IPR2014-00550, 2015 WL 
5782081, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 28, 2015), aff’d, 853 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). 
 485. 678 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 486. Novartis, 853 F.3d at 1294 (citing In re Baxter, 678 F.3d at 1365). 
 487. Id. (citing In re Baxter, 678 F.3d at 1365). 
 488. See id. at 1294–95 (explaining that substantial evidence showed that a person 
having of ordinary skill in the art (“PHOSITA”) would have known to assess the 
compound of the structure prior to testing rather than waiting for tests to show 
degradation because of a PHOSITA’s knowledge of organic chemistry basics). 
 489. 849 F.3d 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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Federal Circuit vacated an IPR obviousness determination holding that 
a recitation of the treatment goal within a claim step, but not the 
preamble, supported a determination that the goal limited the claim.490  
The Los Angeles Biomedical Research Institute’s (“LAB”) patent related 
to treatment of certain symptoms (e.g., erectile dysfunction) relating to 
penile fibrosis.491  In co-pending litigation, LAB contended that Eli 
Lilly’s marketing of its erectile dysfunction treatment Cialis induced 
infringement of the patent.492  The Federal Circuit determined that the 
PTAB did not err in rejecting LAB’s priority claim to its provisional 
patent application.493  The Federal Circuit explained that to get from 
the provisional patent application’s disclosure of dosing used in a rat 
study to the later-claimed dosing of “up to 1.5 mg/kg/day,” a person 
of skill would have had to make a series of assumptions.494  Specifically, 
the person of ordinary skill would have to know the rats’ daily water 
intake, the average weights of the rats and humans, and the conversion 
methodology described in the provisional.495 
The Federal Circuit considered three claim interpretations by the 
PTAB.  First, the PTAB erred in holding that the claim term “an 
individual with at least one of penile tunical fibrosis and corporal tissue 
fibrosis” could cover individuals having symptoms “associated with” 
penile fibrosis without actually having the enumerated condition.496  
The Federal Circuit examined the patent and file history and 
concluded that, as in Rapoport v. Dement,497 the claim requires an 
individual actually having the underlying condition.498 
Second, the PTAB erred in finding the claim step, “arresting or 
regressing [the fibrosis]” did not limit the claim, as the Federal Circuit 
determined that such text required actually arresting or reversing the 
condition.499  The Federal Circuit noted that this was not a preamble 
but a step so it was distinct from other cases where preambles discussed 
other intrinsic and extrinsic evidence (including LAB’s infringement 
                                               
 490. Id. at 1067–68. 
 491. Id. at 1052. 
 492. Id. at 1054. 
 493. Id. at 1058. 
 494. Id. at 1057. 
 495. Id. at 1057–58. 
 496. Id. at 1059. 
 497. 254 F.3d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 498. L.A. Biomedical Research Inst., 849 F.3d at 1060 (citing Rapoport, 254 F.3d at 1059). 
 499. Id. at 1060–61. 
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contentions) and were held non-limiting.500 
Third, the Federal Circuit held that the PTAB did not err in 
rejecting LAB’s argument that the term “continuous long-term regimen” 
required that the drug concentration in the patient’s body be at a “constant 
level.”501  The PTAB was not required to adopt LAB’s proposed limitation 
despite the fact that the claim elsewhere required a “45-day” dosing 
regimen.502  The Federal Circuit then analyzed the references reviewed by 
the PTAB, and ultimately remanded for further determinations on issues 
necessary to reach the obviousness conclusion.503 
In a partial dissent, Judge Newman “agree[d] generally with the 
court’s discussion of the ’903 patent and the prior art.”504  However, 
she would have gone on to find LAB’s claims obvious over the cited 
references and would affirm.505 
In Meiresonne v. Google, Inc.,506 the Federal Circuit affirmed an IPR 
obviousness determination, finding that the absence of express 
criticism in the prior art reference undermined the “teaching away” 
contention.507  The Federal Circuit determined that substantial 
evidence supported the PTAB’s conclusion that the cited references 
did not teach away from Meiresonne’s claims.508  While one reference 
included some criticism of a certain approach, it “does not say or imply 
that text descriptions[, the approach at issue,] are ‘unreliable,’ 
‘misleading,’ ‘wrong,’ or ‘inaccurate,’ which might lead one of 
ordinary skill in the art to discard text descriptions completely.”509  The 
Federal Circuit rejected Meiresonne’s citation to DePuy Spine, Inc. v. 
Medtronik Sofamor Danek, Inc.,510 which expressly criticized a prior art 
approach and stated that it could lead to unacceptable failure.511 
In Novartis AG v. Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd.,512 the Federal Circuit 
confirmed that where there is no persuasive link between the product’s 
success and the innovative patent features, no nexus exists to support 
                                               
 500. Id. at 1061. 
 501. Id. at 1062–63. 
 502. Id. at 1063. 
 503. Id. at 1066–67. 
 504. Id. at 1068 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting from the judgment). 
 505. Id. 
 506. 849 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 507. Id. at 1380. 
 508. Id. at 1384. 
 509. Id. at 1383. 
 510. 567 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 511. Meiresonne, 849 F.3d at 1383–84 (citing DePuy Spine, 567 F.3d at 1326–27). 
 512. 853 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
2018] 2017 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 1189 
 
the secondary considerations to overcome nonobviousness.513  The 
Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s IPR determination of 
unpatentability for both original claims and proposed substitutes.514  
Novartis’s patent related to a solid pharmaceutical composition used 
in treating multiple sclerosis.515  As to nexus, the Federal Circuit 
determined that the PTAB did not err in rejecting Novartis’s argument 
that the commercial success, industry praise, and long-felt need 
evidence related to its Gilenya product demonstrated 
nonobviousness.516  While Gilenya was the first FDA-approved, 
commercially available, solid multiple sclerosis composition, such 
compositions were already known in the field prior to Gilenya’s 
release, so the mere fact that Gilenya was first to market did not 
demonstrate nonobviousness.517  Per Asyst Technologies, Inc. v. Emtrak, 
Inc.,518 it is appropriate to find no nexus where the evidence indicates 
that the commercial success was not “attributable” to the claimed 
advantages of the patent.519  As to unexpected results, the PTAB also 
did not err in finding that Novartis failed to substantiate this argument, 
and the PTAB further declined to take up arguments Novartis raised 
for the first time on appeal.520 
Additionally, the Federal Circuit found that there was no due 
process or Administrative Procedure Act (APA) error in the PTAB’s 
partial reliance on a reference (“Sakai”) as supporting motivation to 
combine.521  Although the PTAB’s institution decision had declined to 
institute on anticipation and obviousness over Sakai, both the petition and 
the conduct of the proceeding indicated that Sakai was still at least 
relevant enough to support motivation to combine other references.522  
The Federal Circuit noted that Novartis elected not to move to specifically 
exclude Sakai, citing Genzyme Therapeutic Products Ltd. v. Biomarin 
                                               
 513. Id. at 1331. 
 514. Id. at 1319. 
 515. Id. 
 516. Id. at 1330–31. 
 517. Id. at 1331. 
 518. 544 F.3d 1310, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[E]ven though commercial 
embodiments of [Asyst’s] ’421 invention may have enjoyed commercial success, Asyst’s 
failure to link that commercial success to the features of its invention that were not 
disclosed in [the] Hesser [patent] undermines the probative force of the evidence 
pertaining to the success of Asyst’s . . . products.”). 
 519. Torrent, 853 F.3d at 1331 (citing Asyst Techs., 544 F.3d at 1316). 
 520. Id. at 1328–30. 
 521. Id. at 1324. 
 522. Id. at 1324–26. 
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Pharmaceutical Inc.523  The Federal Circuit also found that the PTAB did 
not err in finding Novartis’s claims obvious.524  The Federal Circuit 
rejected Novartis’s argument that the PTAB failed to take into account 
the potential negatives surrounding the proposed combination.525  The 
Federal Circuit relied on Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L.,526 which instructs 
tribunals to take into account that there might be “conflicting” 
teachings as to potential combinations and, ultimately, the Federal 
Circuit held that the PTAB properly analyzed the record.527  In fact, 
Medichem does not impose a requirement to “expressly discuss each and 
every negative and positive piece of evidence lurking in the record.”528 
E. Written Description and Enablement 
To meet the § 112 requirement, a patentee may not rely on 
background knowledge for written description support absent some 
suggestion in the specification.  In Rivera v. International Trade 
Commission,529 the Federal Circuit affirmed the determination that 
there had been no Tariff Act violation due to invalidity for lack of 
written description.530  Mr. Rivera’s patent related to single-serve coffee 
brewing and addressed compatibility between disk-shaped coffee 
“pods” and cup-shaped coffee “cartridges.”531  The Federal Circuit 
found that the International Trade Commission (ITC) correctly 
determined that Mr. Rivera’s patent did not describe the full scope of 
his claim (specifically, it did not describe a “cartridge or pod adapter 
assembly” that was itself the “pod”; it described only how to adapt a 
cartridge so that a pod could be put into it).532  The Federal Circuit 
rejected Mr. Rivera’s reliance on Honeywell International Inc. v. United 
States.533  In Honeywell, disclosure “of a CRT-type monitor provided 
written description support for other types of monitors.”534  The case 
did not address the situation here, where Mr. Rivera was relying on an 
                                               
 523. 825 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Torrent, 853 F.3d at 1326 n.2. 
 524. Torrent, 853 F.3d at 1327–31. 
 525. Id. at 1327. 
 526. 437 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 527. Torrent, 853 F.3d at 1327 (citing Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1165). 
 528. Id. at 1328 (citing Medichem, 437 F.3d at 1165). 
 529. 857 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 530. Id. at 1323. 
 531. Id. at 1316–17. 
 532. Id. at 1320. 
 533. 609 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1321 (citing Honeywell, 609 
F.3d at 1301). 
 534. Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1321 (citing Honeywell, 609 F.3d at 1301). 
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“undisclosed configuration that eliminates a fundamental 
component . . . (i.e., the ‘pod’).”535  The Federal Circuit also rejected 
Mr. Rivera’s argument that background knowledge of one of skill in 
the art could supplement the written description to provide written 
description support.536  Under Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc.,537 the 
knowledge of ordinary artisans can inform the specification but not fill 
in limitations not disclosed therein, even if those limitations would be 
obvious.538  The court did not find Falkner v. Inglis539 and Boston Scientific 
Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson540 contradictory because, in those cases, the 
specifications at least alluded to the relevant material as a potential 
configuration of the claims.541 
In Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, Aventisub LLC,542 the Federal Circuit 
concluded that a post-priority date reference may be used to 
interrogate the sufficiency of the written description’s disclosure of a 
representative species, affirming in part and reversing in part the 
judgment that Amgen’s patents were not invalid and the district court’s 
entry of a permanent injunction against the sale of Sanofi’s “Praluent” 
product.543  Amgen’s patents related to antibodies that reduce bad 
cholesterol.544  Regarding the § 112 written description and enablement 
requirement, the Federal Circuit found that the district court erred by 
excluding certain evidence tendered by Sanofi, evidence bearing on 
whether Amgen’s patent disclosed a representative number of the 
claimed species.545  Though post-patent evidence is typically not 
germane to evaluating written description, it may be used to evaluate the 
sufficiency of the species disclosure.546  In re Hogan547 was not contrary 
because, in that case, the post-priority-date evidence was being used for 
a different purpose (i.e., to show a change in the state of the art relevant 
                                               
 535. Id. 
 536. Id. at 1322. 
 537. 107 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 538. Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1322 (citing Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1571–72). 
 539. 448 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 540. 647 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 541. Rivera, 857 F.3d at 1322 (citing Bos. Sci., 647 F.3d at 1366; Falkner, 448 F.3d at 
1366). 
 542. 872 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 543. Id. at 1381–82. 
 544. Id. at 1371. 
 545. Id. at 1375. 
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 547. 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
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to evaluating enablement of the genus).548  The Federal Circuit 
remanded for a new trial on written description and enablement “[f]or 
many of the same reasons.”549  The Federal Circuit notes that the district 
court also erred by instructing the jury that disclosure of a “newly 
characterized antigen” could satisfy the written description requirement 
for a claim to an antibody.550  The opinion discusses how prior 
precedent on this issue did not endorse such a rule.551  However, the 
Federal Circuit found that the district court did not err in denying 
Sanofi’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) of no written 
description and no enablement because the record was incomplete 
without the post-patent evidence discussed above.552 
In addition, the Federal Circuit concluded that the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) applications were not prior art because 
Sanofi had not shown that the provisional applications provided 
written description support for the claims of the PCT applications.553  
The Federal Circuit’s opinion discusses how the district court was 
correct to exclude Sanofi’s alleged prior art.554  The references were 
published PCT applications claiming priority to provisionals that 
predated the priority date of Amgen’s patents.555  The district court 
correctly determined that Dynamic Drinkware, LLC v. National Graphics, 
Inc.556 was not contrary because Dynamic Drinkware described how, for 
prior art purposes, the provisional patent application’s specification 
must support the claims in the non-provisional application to properly 
claim priority to the provisional application.557 
The permanent injunction was also vacated because the written 
description/enablement judgment was vacated.558  The Federal Circuit 
noted that the district court’s permanent injunction analysis failed to 
properly apply the public interest factor from eBay, Inc. v. 
                                               
 548. Amgen, 872 F.3d at 1375 (citing In re Hogan, 559 F.2d at 606). 
 549. Id. 
 550. Id. at 1378–79. 
 551. Id. at 1376–77 (citing Centocor Ortho Biotech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 636 F.3d 
1341, 1351–53 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 
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 553. Id. at 1376–77. 
 554. Id. at 1379. 
 555. Id. at 1380. 
 556. 800 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 557. Amgen, 872 F.3d at 1380 (citing Dynamic Drinkware, 800 F.3d at 1378). 
 558. Id. at 1381. 
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MercExchange, LLC.559  Significantly, the district court entered an 
injunction despite its conclusion that a permanent injunction would 
disserve the public interest by reducing consumer choice in drugs.560  
The Federal Circuit emphasized that a district court may only enter a 
permanent injunction if a plaintiff shows that the public interest would 
not be disserved.561  Further, the Federal Circuit found that the district 
court erred in reasoning that reduction in consumer choice, without 
more, was sufficient to disserve the public interest because “[u]nder 
such an approach, courts could never enjoin a drug.”562 
In Storer v. Clark,563 the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s 
interference decision that granted priority to an application by Clark 
(assigned to Gilead), over an application by Storer (assigned to 
Idenix).564  The Federal Circuit found that the PTAB properly 
determined that Storer was not entitled to the priority date of his 
provisional application due to a lack of enablement as to the 
subsequently claimed compounds.565  The Federal Circuit noted that 
Storer initially attempted to have the District of Delaware review the 
PTAB’s priority determination, but the court dismissed the case for 
lack of jurisdiction under Biogen MA, Inc. v. Japanese Foundation for 
Cancer Research.566  The Federal Circuit noted, “Although Storer says 
that Biogen was incorrectly decided, that decision is binding on this 
panel.”567  The claims at issue related to treatment of hepatitis C and 
the formation of specific compounds used therein.568  The Federal 
Circuit concluded that a person of skill in the art would have been 
unable to practice the invention, based on the provisional and the 
prior art, without undue experimentation.569  To assess undue 
experimentation, the Federal Circuit applied the eight-factor test of In 
re Wands.570  The Federal Circuit closely considered the chemical 
                                               
 559. 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Amgen, 872 F.3d at 1381 (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 394). 
 560. Amgen, 872 F.3d at 1381. 
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compounds and techniques at issue and particularly noted the PTAB’s 
determinations that the relevant art—“fluoridation of tertiary 
alcohols”—was “highly unpredictable,” and significant experimentation 
would be necessary to reach the claimed compounds from the disclosure 
in Storer’s provisional patent application.571  On the whole, the record 
supported the PTAB’s determinations.572 
F. Indefiniteness 
In analyzing indefiniteness under § 112, the Federal Circuit found 
that terms of degree having sufficient objective baselines may survive 
an indefiniteness challenge, reversing the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment in Sonix Technology Co. v. Publications 
International, Ltd.573  The patent related to a technique for visually 
encoding information, such as information typically in a universal 
product code (UPC) or QR code, into an item such that the information 
has a “visually negligible” effect on the item’s appearance.574  The Federal 
Circuit found that the district court erred in finding the term “visually 
negligible” indefinite.575  Both sides agreed that the term should receive 
its ordinary meaning, so neither the district court nor the Federal 
Circuit construed the term.576  At the Federal Circuit, the issue received 
de novo review, with clear error review for factual findings.577  The 
Federal Circuit rejected Publications International’s argument for 
deference to the district court’s holding that “visually negligible” was 
subjective because the district court did not make a specific factual 
finding on that issue and expressly explained that its indefiniteness 
determination was not dictated by extrinsic evidence.578 
The Federal Circuit held that the patent contained sufficient 
guidance to avoid indefiniteness.579  The court found that Datamize, LLC 
v. Plumtree Software, Inc.580 and Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc.581 were 
                                               
 571. Storer, 860 F.3d at 1346–47. 
 572. Id. at 1352. 
 573. 844 F.3d 1370, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 574. Id. at 1371–73. 
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not contrary, as those cases involved terms invoking personal taste or 
opinion.582  The “visually negligible” term, by comparison, had a 
sufficient “objective baseline” to allow a person of skill to ascertain its 
scope even though it was a term of degree.583  The Federal Circuit 
considered the written description, file history, and other extrinsic 
evidence, and found those factors supportive.584  Finally, the Federal 
Circuit noted that the appellees’ “other actions during litigation also 
reflect that they understood ‘visually negligible,’” and had even 
proposed a claim construction for them at one point.585 
In One-E-Way, Inc. v. International Trade Commission,586 the Federal 
Circuit reversed the summary determination of invalidity for 
indefiniteness based on the use of the term in a “non-technical manner” 
in the claim.587  One-E-Way’s patents related to wireless headphones that 
would not interfere with one another, even in crowded spaces.588  The 
Federal Circuit determined that the term “virtually free from 
interference” was not indefinite as read in the context of the file history 
and specification because it meant that One-E-Way’s system would 
prevent one user from eavesdropping on another.589  The Federal 
Circuit relied on support from the specification and noted that, in the 
file history, the applicant had specifically written that an example of 
“virtually eliminating” interference was that eavesdropping could not 
occur.590  The Federal Circuit rejected the argument from Sony and the 
other parties that were respondents in the ITC investigation, that the 
claim failed to teach how much interference was permitted, reasoning 
that the use of the term “interference” was “in a non-technical manner to 
simply mean” secure from eavesdropping.591  The Federal Circuit also 
rejected the argument that One-E-Way failed to establish how “virtually 
free from interference” differed from “free from interference,” which 
appeared in other unasserted claims.592  The Federal Circuit reasoned, 
“Audio ‘free from interference’ will be a be a bit better than audio 
                                               
 582. Sonix Tech., 844 F.3d at 1377–78 (citing Interval Licensing, 766 F.3d at 1368, 
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‘virtually free from interference,’” and so audio “free from 
interference” would be “at a minimum, free from eavesdropping as 
well.”593  In dissent, Chief Judge Prost advocated for affirming the ITC’s 
indefiniteness finding and criticized the majority for relying entirely 
on “a single, non-definitional remark from the prosecution history and 
ignor[ing] intrinsic evidence that injects ambiguity.”594 
III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
The Federal Circuit continued to address questions of claim 
construction, implementing the Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. 
Sandoz, Inc.,595 standard of review and expounding on the effect of 
error in claim construction on other issues such as invalidity and 
infringement.596  In Technology Properties Ltd. v. Huawei Technologies 
Co.,597 the Federal Circuit held that the scope of surrender is not 
limited by a patentee disclaiming more than necessary during 
prosecution, vacating a stipulated judgment of noninfringement.598  
The Federal Circuit found that the district court did not err in holding 
that Technology Properties’s traversal during prosecution of a first 
reference (“Magar”) led to disclaimer of two categories of claim 
coverage.599  Although Technology Properties might have traversed 
Magar on only one of the two categories, it was bound by both aspects 
of its double disclaimer, per Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.600  The district 
court erred, however, in its assessment of the scope of disclaimer 
associated with traversal of a second reference (“Sheets”).601  During 
prosecution, Technology Properties disclaimed the use of certain 
control signals to change an oscillator’s clock frequency, but the 
company did not disclaim the use of control signals altogether.602  
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Although this was a “minor modification” to the claim construction, 
the Federal Circuit found vacatur necessary because the judgment was 
based on stipulated noninfringement.603 
In TVIIM, LLC v. McAfee, Inc.,604 the Federal Circuit determined that 
an allegation of inconsistent infringement and validity analyses were 
immaterial to the jury finding because the patentee conceded that 
either analysis was proper regardless of the claim construction 
standard applied.605  The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
judgment of no infringement and patent invalidity by anticipation and 
obviousness of TVIIM’s patent related to techniques for identifying 
computer security vulnerabilities.606  Contrary to TVIIM’s arguments, 
the record did not indicate that the jury applied inconsistent claim 
constructions in its noninfringement and invalidity findings.607  The 
Federal Circuit noted that, although TVIIM on appeal cited three 
terms as having multiple ordinary meanings, TVIIM did not ask the 
district court to construe any of the three, thus it waived any new 
construction.608  The Federal Circuit did not find that any of the terms 
had multiple ordinary meanings and determined that the jury, on the 
evidence presented, could have reasonably found both no 
infringement and invalidity under a single ordinary meaning for each 
term.609  Further, TVIIM conceded that the jury could have reasonably 
found either noninfringement or invalidity (though, it argued, that it 
could not find both) under “any single ordinary meaning 
construction.”610  The Federal Circuit marked this as a dispositive 
concession: “[E]ven if we were to find an inconsistent verdict, substantial 
evidence under ‘any’ construction supports the jury’s verdict of invalidity.  
Consequently, any potential error by the jury regarding 
[noninfringement] was harmless.”611 
However, in another case this term the Federal Circuit held that 
failure to identify prejudice from alleged claim construction errors 
serves a basis for affirmance.  In Comcast IP Holdings I LLC v. Sprint 
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Communications Co.,612 the Federal Circuit affirmed an infringement 
judgment and $7.5 million damages award, plus prejudgment interest, 
against Sprint.613  The three asserted patents are related and involve 
the use of Domain Name System (DNS) to route telephone calls.614  
The Federal Circuit rejected Sprint’s suggestion that the district court 
erred in construing “switched telecommunication system” and noted that 
the specification did in fact support the district court’s construction.615  
The Federal Circuit found that there was sufficient evidence to support 
the jury’s determination that Sprint’s accused call flows included a “call 
destination” and a “unique identifier of a second party.”616  Neither Sprint 
nor Comcast sought construction of either term.617  Thus, the court held 
that the jury was thus free to apply the plain and ordinary meaning, 
and the record, including testimony from Comcast’s expert, 
reasonably supported the finding.618  The Federal Circuit also rejected 
Sprint’s argument that the district court erred in construing the term 
“parsing,” noting Sprint’s failure to identify prejudice from that 
construction “in its opening brief” because it failed to explain how the 
accused call flows do not practice the asserted claims under the 
narrower claim construction.619  Even without waiver, the Federal 
Circuit held that the district court correctly construed the term. 
In Medicines Co. v. Mylan, Inc.,620 the Federal Circuit construed a key 
limitation, “efficiently mixing,” which neither the court nor parties 
treated as a means-plus-function term requiring sufficient disclosure of 
structure under § 112, as limited to a specific mixing technique in the 
specification notwithstanding the following quasi-definitional language 
in the specification:  “‘efficient mixing’ . . . is characterized by 
minimizing levels of Asp9-bivalirudin in the compounding solution.”621  
The Federal Circuit reversed a bench judgment of infringement as to 
one of Medicines patents and affirmed summary judgment of 
noninfringement as to another patent based primarily on claim 
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construction.622  Medicines’s patents related to techniques for 
minimizing impurities in batches of bivalirudin, a synthetic peptide used 
to prevent blood clotting.623  Representative claims from both patents 
addressed “pharmaceutical batches” of bivalirudin compounds, and 
the parties agreed that “pharmaceutical batches” meant a batch or 
batches, made by the same “compounding process.”624  The claims 
went on to require that the batches not exceed a maximum impurity 
level.625  On appeal, the issue was whether, and which of, Medicines’s 
claims required that the “batches” be made using an “efficient mixing” 
process, a process that mixed more efficiently than the prior art 
techniques that the patents described as “old” and “inefficient.”626 
The Federal Circuit found that the district court had correctly held 
that one of Medicines’s patents required “efficient mixing,” but erred 
in holding that the other did not.627  To support its holding, the 
Federal Circuit discussed the specification and file history in detail and 
reasoned that all of Medicines’s claims required “the use of a process 
that achieves batch consistency.”628  From that, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that “batch consistency” required “efficiently mixing.”629 
In both of Medicines’s patents, “efficiently mixing” meant mixing in 
the manner described by one of the examples in Medicines’s written 
description.630  The Federal Circuit rejected Medicines’s argument that 
the term simply meant mixing in such a manner as to minimize the 
relevant impurity.631  Although the patent described “efficiently 
mixing” in such terms, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the 
description was not definitional “because it [did] not accord with the 
linguistic formula used by the patentee to signal the designation of 
other defined terms.”632  The Federal Circuit also cited concerns that 
Medicines’s definition was essentially functional.633  “Although 
functional limitations in patent claims are not per se objectionable 
even when the means-plus-function format is not invoked, they cannot 
                                               
 622. Id. at 1310. 
 623. Id. at 1298. 
 624. Id. at 1300. 
 625. Id. at 1300, 1302. 
 626. Id. at 1301. 
 627. Id. at 1298. 
 628. Id. at 1303. 
 629. Id. at 1298. 
 630. Id. at 1307. 
 631. Id. at 1298, 1306. 
 632. Id. at 1306. 
 633. Id. 
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be ‘so broad that [they] cause[] the claim to have a potential scope of 
protection beyond that which is justified by the specification 
disclosure.’”634  Moreover, the court stated that one of ordinary skill in 
the art would have been guided by the specification to define 
“efficiently mixing.”635  Applying this construction, the Federal Circuit 
found that Mylan did not infringe as a matter of law because Mylan’s 
mixing technique did not comport with the written description’s 
relevant description of “efficiently mixing.”636 
In Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc.,637 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed a noninfringement verdict finding that a reference to 
“advantageously” performing operation did not mean the asserted 
claims’ non-performing designs.638  Core Wireless’s patent related to 
the means for sending packet data from a handset to a network on a 
selected channel.639  The Federal Circuit found that the district court 
did not err in application of its claim construction as JMOL.  The 
Federal Circuit found that, properly construed, Core Wireless’s claims 
required certain channel selection be by the handset, not the 
network.640  The Federal Circuit considered the claim construction 
evidence in detail and rejected Core Wireless’s argument that the 
construction entered by the magistrate judge and district court did not 
require such channel selection by the handset.641  “The problem with 
Core Wireless’s theory is that the entire point of the invention is to 
enable the mobile station [handset] to make the channel selection 
decision . . . .”642  The district court identified the structure that worked 
with the handset making the channel selection, and the limitation at 
issue was a means-plus-function limitation.643  The Federal Circuit 
rejected Core Wireless’s contention that the limitation was only a 
preferred embodiment.644  Ultimately, the court emphasized that a 
reference in the specification to performing channel selection in the 
                                               
 634. Id. at 1306–07 (alternation in original) (quoting In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210 
(C.C.P.A. 1971)). 
 635. Id. at 1309. 
 636. Id. at 1307. 
 637. 853 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 638. Id. at 1361 (finding that the accused device did not infringe and is capable of 
being a mobile station). 
 639. Id. at 1362. 
 640. Id. at 1363. 
 641. Id. at 1362, 1364, 1366. 
 642. Id. at 1366. 
 643. Id. 
 644. Id. at 1368. 
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handset “advantageously” did not mean that the claim covered 
embodiments where channel selection was performed elsewhere.645  
Under this construction, there was sufficient evidence to sustain the 
jury’s noninfringement verdict.646 
In MasterMine Software, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,647 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed in part and reversed in part a judgment of noninfringement 
and invalidity based on claim construction reciting structures 
performing active functions.648  The court determined that the district 
court did not err in requiring that the “pivot tables” in MasterMine’s 
claims actually display data.649  The Federal Circuit relied on the 
specification and noted that the applicant made reference to 
“dragging and dropping” elements into pivot tables.650  The Federal 
Circuit found that this “dragging and dropping” disclosure fell short 
of showing unmistakable disclaimer but supported the district court’s 
construction.651  However, the Federal Circuit found that the district 
court erred in holding five MasterMine claims indefinite as “claiming 
two subject-matter classes” (i.e., an IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc.652-type claiming of both a method and an system).653  
MasterMine’s claims did not introduce method elements into system 
claims but were “simply apparatus claims with proper functional 
language.”654  The Federal Circuit considered its authority on the issue 
and concluded that the claims’ use of “wherein” clauses containing 
active verbs (e.g., “wherein the reporting module . . . presents a set of 
user-selectable database fields”) merely claimed that the system would 
have a structure “capable of performing the recited functions.”655  
Further, the claims did not recite activities performed by the user and 
their use of functional language was “specifically tied to structure.”656  
The Federal Circuit held that, “[b]ecause the claims merely use 
permissible functional language to describe the capabilities of the 
                                               
 645. Id. at 1367. 
 646. Id. at 1370. 
 647. 874 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 648. Id. at 1308. 
 649. Id. at 1310–11. 
 650. Id. at 1312. 
 651. Id. 
 652. 430 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 653. MasterMine Software, 874 F.3d at 1310. 
 654. Id. at 1313. 
 655. Id. at 1316 (citing Microprocessor Enhancement Corp. v. Tex. Instruments 
Inc., 520 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 656. Id. 
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claimed system, it is clear that infringement occurs when one makes, 
uses, offers to sell, or sells the claimed system.”657 
The Federal Circuit determined that the § 112, ¶ 6 means-plus-
function presumption may be rebutted where there is no function 
associated with the “means” term.  In Skky, Inc. v. MindGeek, s.a.r.l.,658 
the Federal Circuit affirmed an IPR determination of 
unpatentability,659 finding that the PTAB did not err in declining to 
apply § 112, ¶ 6 to the preamble term “wireless device means.”660  In 
the claim, there was no function associated with the “wireless device 
means,” and the Federal Circuit held that the term denoted the 
“common parlance” structure of a wireless device.661  Thus, MindGeek 
rebutted the presumption of means-plus-function treatment.  The 
PTAB also correctly rejected Skky’s argument that the term should be 
construed to require multiple processors as inconsistent with the 
claims and written description.662 
In Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,663 the Federal Circuit affirmed a 
summary judgment of noninfringement, finding that statements in an 
IPR preliminary response resulted in prosecution disclaimer.664  The 
Federal Circuit determined that the district court did not err in 
concluding that Aylus’s statements during IPR could be relied on to 
support a finding of prosecution disclaimer.665  The Federal Circuit 
reviewed a number of cases applying prosecution disclaimer in other 
post-issuance proceedings, finding that “[i]t follows that we should apply 
the doctrine in IPR proceedings.”666  Citing Cuozzo Speed Technologies, 
LLC v. Lee,667 the Federal Circuit rejected Aylus’s argument that 
statements in IPR should receive different treatment because an IPR is 
                                               
 657. Id. 
 658. 859 F.3d 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-349, 2018 WL 1994802 (U.S. 
Apr. 30, 2018) (mem.). 
 659. Id. at 1016 (holding that a part or segment of the entire song was 
unpatentable). 
 660. Id. at 1018–19. 
 661. Id. at 1020 (describing the standard to describing devices). 
 662. Id. at 1018. 
 663. 856 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 664. Id. at 1359, 1362 (holding that statements made during IPR proceedings by 
the patent owner can be used to support a prosecution disclaimer and that these 
statements “constitute[d] a clear and unmistakable surrender of claim scope”). 
 665. Id. at 1359. 
 666. Id. at 1359–60. 
 667. 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016). 
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“adjudicative” and not administrative.668  The IPR proceeding extended 
from the inter partes reexamination (IPRx) process, but did not change 
that process’s basic administrative character.669 
Further, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court did not 
err in concluding that statements in a preliminary response may lead 
to prosecution disclaimer.670  Although, per Shaw Industrial Group, Inc. 
v. Automated Creel Systems, Inc.,671 “an IPR does not begin until 
instituted, [the Federal Circuit found] the differences between the two 
phases of an IPR to be a distinction without a difference.”672  
Statements in the preliminary response are part of the public record, 
and the public may rely on them.673  Lastly, the court held that the 
district court also did not err in finding that Aylus had made clear, 
unmistakable disclaimers of claim scope.674 
IV. INFRINGEMENT 
A. Direct Infringement 
In Georgetown Rail Equipment Co. v. Holland L.P.,675 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed an infringement judgment and award of enhanced damages 
because it found that the defendant willfully shipped data to third 
parties meeting the claim limitation of “put into service.”676  Based on 
the patent claims and specification, the district court correctly rejected 
Holland’s arguments that the claim preamble was limiting because the 
phrase “mounted on a vehicle for movement along the railroad track” was 
a statement of intended use and did not exclude devices lacking a 
vehicle mount.677  Further, the Federal Circuit also rejected Holland’s 
argument that Georgetown relied on the preamble during prosecution 
to overcome prior art; the Federal Circuit found that the statements in 
question from the prosecution history were ambiguous.678 
The Federal Circuit also determined that the district court did not err in 
                                               
 668. Aylus Networks, 856 F.3d at 1360–61 (citing Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2143–44). 
 669. Id. at 1361. 
 670. Id. 
 671. 817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 374 (2016) (mem.). 
 672. Aylus Networks, 856 F.3d at 1361. 
 673. Id. 
 674. Id. at 1362 (noting that the case was not “subject to more than one reasonable 
interpretation”). 
 675. 867 F.3d 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 676. Id. at 1233 (holding that substantial evidence supported the infringement finding). 
 677. Id. at 1234. 
 678. Id. at 1238. 
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denying a JMOL and that the record was sufficient to support a 
determination that Holland was “using” the accused data processing 
equipment insofar as it was gathering data and sending it to a third party 
for analysis.679  As in Centillion Data Systems v. Qwest Communications,680 this 
was sufficient to “put into service” those limitations of the claim that 
Holland was not itself performing.681  The record also sufficiently supported 
a determination that Holland had actually gathered the data at issue.682 
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s remedy findings, 
determining that there was no error in denying JMOL of no lost profits.683  
The Federal Circuit found that the record contained sufficient evidence 
to support Georgetown prevailing on Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre 
Works, Inc.684 factors one and four:  demand for the patented product and 
the amount of profit that would have been made.685  Additionally, the 
Federal Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in awarding enhanced damages for willfulness.686  The Federal Circuit 
considered the record and concluded that there was sufficient 
evidence to show that Holland recklessly infringed.687 
Finding no infringement where an operator did not obtain a benefit 
from the invention, the Federal Circuit partially affirmed and partially 
reversed an infringement judgment in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. 
Motorola Mobility LLC.688  The case involved two patents from IV:  the 
’144 patent relating to file transfer between computers and the ’462 
patent relating to a laptop formed by docking a smartphone into a 
“shell.”689 The Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in 
failing to grant JMOL that neither Motorola nor its customers directly 
                                               
 679. Id. at 1237, 1239 (finding no reasonable jury could have found infringing data 
equipment or could have found that the product was intended to be sold as covered 
by the requirements under the theory of infringement). 
 680. 631 F.3d 1279, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that where a customer controls 
a system and derives a benefit from that system, it is tantamount to putting the system 
into service, which is a “use” of the system as a matter of law). 
 681. Georgetown Rail Equip, 867 F.3d at 1239–40 (citing Centillion, 631 F.3d at 1285). 
 682. Id. at 1231, 1239. 
 683. Id. at 1240. 
 684. 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978) (establishing relevant factors for setting 
reasonable royalty rates as equivalent to ordinary licensing negotiations between 
“willing” participants). 
 685. Georgetown Rail Equip., 867 F.3d at 1241–42. 
 686. Id. at 1232, 1245. 
 687. Id. 
 688. 870 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding certain claims are valid within 
patent infringement requirements and other claims remanded). 
 689. Id. at 1323. 
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infringed.690  Applying Centillion to show “use” of the patented system, 
which is required to show infringement, it was necessary for IV to show 
that an accused infringer both “control” the system in question and 
obtain “benefit” from it.691  To infringe, the system had to generate 
delivery reports upon the sending of Multimedia Messaging Service 
(MMS) messages; the record indicated that while reports of this kind 
were stored on users’ phones, they were not accessible and there was 
no evidence of a user ever accessing such reports.692  Moreover, IV had 
not developed any argument that Motorola itself accessed or otherwise 
benefited from such reports. 
In Shire Development, LLC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,693 the 
Federal Circuit reversed an infringement judgment that found no 
infringement of a “consisting of” Markush claim where unclaimed 
materials were also present.694  Shire’s claim required a hydrophilic 
matrix that “consists of compounds selected from the group consisting 
of” various materials.695  In the accused composition, the relevant 
matrix contained an unrecited material, magnesium stearate.696  
Further, the magnesium stearate exhibited lipophilic properties and 
“exerted lipophilic influence” in the accused matrix.697  The Federal 
Circuit found that the district court erred in holding that the presence 
of the magnesium stearate could be discounted for infringement 
purposes.698  The Federal Circuit held that Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp. 
was not applicable.699  Unlike Norian, the magnesium stearate in 
Watson’s composition “structurally and functionally relate[d] to the 
invention.”700  Specifically, the magnesium stearate’s lipophilic influence 
affected the overall hydrophilic character of the matrix—which was a 
requirement of the claim.701  Because of this influence, the exception 
from Norian, which found infringement of a “consisting of” claim 
                                               
 690. Id. at 1330–31. 
 691. Id. at 1329. 
 692. Id. at 1329–30. 
 693. 848 F.3d 981 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 694. Id. at 982 (holding that the defendants were entitled to noninfringement 
because the product did not satisfy the requirements for the claim). 
 695. Id. at 983. 
 696. Id. at 984, 986. 
 697. Id. 
 698. Id. at 986–87. 
 699. Id. at 985 (citing Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp, 363 F.3d 1321, 1324–25, 1331–
32 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 700. Id. at 986. 
 701. Id. 
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notwithstanding presence of unenumerated elements because they were 
“aspects unrelated to the invention,” did not apply.702  The Federal 
Circuit found it irrelevant that Watson was using the magnesium 
stearate as a lubricant, and not for its lipophilic properties.703 
In Life Technologies Corp. v. Promega Corp.,704 the Supreme Court 
reversed the Federal Circuit’s determination that exporting of a single 
commodity component of a multi-component invention to one’s own 
overseas facilities could support § 271(f)(1) liability.705  U.S. law makes 
it illegal to induce infringement outside the United States by exporting 
a “substantial portion of the components of a patented 
invention,” where “such components” are uncombined when exported 
but are later combined to make an infringing product.706  The 
Supreme Court held that, because the statute spoke explicitly in terms 
of plural “components,” this provision in the statute could only be met 
if a defendant exported more than one component.707  Bolstering its 
interpretation, the Court noted that the following sub-section, which 
addresses contributory infringement instead of inducing 
infringement, used “component” in the singular.708  The Court also 
noted in its conclusion, curiously, that “substantial portion” in the 
statute “has a quantitative, not a qualitative, meaning.”709 
The Court’s opinion rested generally on a direct interpretation of 
§ 271(f)(1)’s reference to exporting “a substantial portion” of the 
components of a multi-component invention.710  In that context, 
“substantial” connoted “a quantitative measure.”711  The Court rejected 
Promega’s argument that “substantial” should be read in a case-specific 
manner, mixing qualitative and quantitative considerations.712  As a 
matter of law, a single component can never constitute a “substantial 
                                               
 702. Id. at 981 (quoting Norian Corp., 363 F.3d at 1321, 1331). 
 703. Id. at 986. 
 704. 137 S. Ct. 734 (2017). 
 705. Id. at 737 (finding that the Federal Circuit erred in its assessment of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(f)(1) (2012) and that terms within the statute did not cover components of the 
invention). 
 706. See § 271(f)(1). 
 707. See Life Techs., 137 S. Ct. at 742 (2017) (discussing components that come and 
go abroad being outside the scope). 
 708. Id. at 742. 
 709. Id. at 743. 
 710. Id. at 738–39. 
 711. Id. at 739. 
 712. Id. at 740 (explaining that the case-specific manner requires the fact finder to 
decipher whether components are substantial). 
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portion of the components.”713  The Court also declined to reach the 
related question of “how close to ‘all’ of the components ‘a substantial 
portion’ must be.”714  The Court concluded with a brief discussion of 
the history of § 271(f), finding that it supports the present outcome.715  
Concurring in part, Justice Alito did not view the history of § 271(f) as 
illuminating and noted that the Court’s opinion should not be taken 
as holding that “any number greater than one is sufficient.”716 
This decision will not likely have a large impact.  The vast majority 
of patent cases involve either infringing acts inside the United States 
or the importing of infringing articles into the United 
States.  Comparatively few cases center on exporting, perhaps because 
the United States is not strong technology exporter.717  Also, the patent 
owner can meet the additional requirements of that other sub-section 
because the adjacent sub-section of the statute (35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2)) 
does not have a qualitative requirement—though it is narrower in 
other respects—and it may be possible that a patent owner could still 
stop an exporter who exports only a single component.718  Obviously, 
this decision is significant in the cases where it does apply because it 
could eliminate liability for sales outside the United States, although 
export cases are not a significant percentage of the overall case load in 
U.S. courts. 
B. Induced Infringement 
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc.,719 the Federal 
Circuit found that physicians’ “direction and control” of patients’ self-
administration supported induced infringement, affirming a 
judgment of liability for inducing divided infringement as per Akamai 
Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.720  Eli Lilly’s claims were 
method claims, and the limitations in each claim included a step of 
“administering” a certain amount of folic acid before administering 
pemetrexed (brand name ALIMITA, used in treatment of certain 
                                               
 713. Id. at 743. 
 714. Id. at 742. 
 715. Id. at 742–43. 
 716. Id. at 742 (Alito, J., concurring in part). 
 717. See id. at 738 (majority opinion) (conveying stricter requirements for United 
States born inventions). 
 718. Id. at 739, 742. 
 719. 845 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 720. 797 F.3d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 805 F.3d 
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Eli Lilly & Co., 845 F.3d at 1361. 
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cancers).721  At issue was who, if anyone, was the “direct infringer” for 
the purpose of supporting Eli Lilly’s induced infringement case against 
the defendants who were planning to sell generic pemetrexed.722 
The Federal Circuit found that the district court correctly 
determined that, for purposes of predicate infringement, the 
physicians were “directing or controlling” the patients’ self-
administration.723  Both prongs of Akamai’s direction or control test 
were satisfied.724  First, the receipt of a benefit (i.e., reducing certain 
toxicities associated with pemetrexed) was conditioned on the 
patients’ self-administration, and the physicians’ continued 
participation in treatment was conditioned on the patients taking folic 
acid.725  Second, the physicians established the method and timing of 
the patients’ self-administration by telling patients to take folic acid 
regularly for a period of time before starting the pemetrexed.726 
The Federal Circuit also rejected defendants’ arguments that their 
actions did not otherwise amount to inducement, as well as 
defendants’ validity attacks.727  These discussions were largely specific 
to the record.  Notably, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
definiteness holding, and its construction of “vitamin B12,” despite the 
redundancy in the claim.728 
The ITC may bar importation of components on induced 
infringement grounds.  In Cisco Systems, Inc. v. International Trade 
Commission,729 the Federal Circuit affirmed the limited exclusion order 
against Arista Networks (“Arista”) based on infringement of three 
patents and affirmed determination of no infringement as to two other 
patents.730  The Federal Circuit discussed only two of these patents:  
                                               
 721. Eli Lilly & Co., 845 F.3d at 1361–62. 
 722. Id. at 1364. 
 723. Id. at 1365–67. 
 724. Id. at 1365, 1367–68.  The Akamai direction or control test includes an analysis 
of “circumstances in which an actor (1) ‘conditions participation in an activity or receipt 
of a benefit’ upon others’ performance of one or more steps of a patented method, 
and (2) ‘establishes the manner or timing of that performance.’”  Id. at 1365 (emphasis in 
original) (quoting Akamai Techs., Inc., 797 F.3d at 1022). 
 725. Id. at 1366. 
 726. Id. at 1367. 
 727. Id. at 1369 (noting that the defendants attacked the definiteness of the term 
“vitamin B12,” obviousness, and obviousness-type double patenting). 
 728. Id. at 1369, 1371–72. 
 729. 873 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 730. Id. at 1357. 
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one the ITC held was infringed and one it held not infringed.731 
As to the infringed patent, the Federal Circuit found that the ITC 
did not err in its claim construction, and the Federal Circuit rejected 
Arista’s claim construction argument that the syntax of the claim 
required that user-supplied commands be stored in a specific 
database.732  The Federal Circuit also rejected Arista’s prosecution 
history-based argument on the same claim construction issue.733  The 
Federal Circuit also held that the ITC’s order had sufficient support 
for its finding that certain “components of Arista’s accused products 
induce infringement of the ’537 patent,” and so the ITC did not err in 
extending its exclusion order to bar importation of those 
components.734  While this meant that components such as processors, 
memories, computer processing unit cards, and chassis would be 
excluded, the Federal Circuit noted the ITC’s broad discretion in its 
remedies.735  Ultimately, the Federal Circuit held, “Blocking imports of 
articles that induce patent infringement has a reasonable relationship 
to stopping unlawful trade acts.”736 
As to the noninfringed patent, the record supported the ITC’s 
determination that the accused products “infer[red]” information 
about a subsystem’s operation, which was different from the claim’s 
requirement of “detect[ing]” such operation.737 
C. Indirect Infringement 
In Lifetime Industries, Inc. v. Trim-Lok, Inc.,738 the Federal Circuit 
clarified the application of Ashcroft v. Iqbal739 and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly740 to indirect infringement, reversing the district court’s 
dismissal of a patent infringement complaint.741  The Federal Circuit 
determined that the district court erred in concluding that Lifetime had 
failed to adequately state claims for direct and indirect patent 
                                               
 731. Id. 
 732. Id. at 1361–62.  The reference to storing in a database did not apply to the 
commands but to “router configuration data” derived from those commands.  Id. 
 733. Id. at 1362. 
 734. Id. at 1362–63. 
 735. Id. at 1363. 
 736. Id. 
 737. Id. at 1363–64. 
 738. 869 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 739. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 740. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 741. Trim-Lok, Inc., 869 F.3d at 1372. 
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infringement.742  Lifetime’s patent related to a two-part seal for mobile 
living quarters that extends from the side of an RV.743  The claims 
required both the seal and the RV.744  As to direct infringement, 
Lifetime’s second amended complaint met pleading standards set forth 
in Iqbal and Twombly.745  Although Trim-Lok only manufactures seals and 
not RVs, it was plausible that Trim-Lok had installed a seal onto an RV 
at some point so as to reach the claimed invention.746  The Federal 
Circuit rejected Trim-Lok’s argument that Lifetime’s complaint lacked 
sufficient detail in its allegation, noting that the complaint identified 
where, when, by whom, and why the infringement occurred.747  As to 
indirect infringement, the Iqbal/Twombly standard was also met.748  For 
inducement, Lifetime adequately pleaded that Trim-Lok had 
knowledge of the patent before directing the installation of the seal in 
question on an RV, thus supporting its allegations as to intent.749  For 
contributory infringement, Lifetime adequately pleaded knowledge of 
both the patent and the infringement, which was all that was 
required.750  The Federal Circuit also approved Trim-Lok’s pleading in 
the alternative as to whether the employees who installed the seals were 
Trim-Lok employees (in which case Trim-Lok would face direct 
infringement liability) or non-employees (in which case it would face 
indirect infringement liability).751 
V. REMEDIES 
A. Damages 
The Federal Circuit continued to clarify the mechanics for proving 
damages and for requiring a higher showing of willfulness when 
awarding enhanced damages.  In Prism Technologies LLC v. Sprint 
Spectrum L.P.,752 the Federal Circuit affirmed judgment of infringement 
and $30 million damages award finding no error in leveraging cost-
                                               
 742. Id. at 1373. 
 743. Id. at 1373–74. 
 744. Id. 
 745. Trim-Lok, Inc., 869 F.3d at 1376 (citing Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 663–64; Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 545–46). 
 746. Id. at 1378–79. 
 747. Id. at 1379. 
 748. Id. 
 749. Id. at 1379–80. 
 750. Id. at 1380–81. 
 751. Id. at 1381. 
 752. 849 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 429 (2017) (mem.). 
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avoidance evidence for a reasonable royalty computation.753  The 
Federal Circuit determined that the district court did not err in 
denying Sprint’s motion for a new trial.754  The Federal Circuit also 
held that a new trial was not warranted because Prism’s expert gave 
testimony suggesting that certain Sprint networks were an “Internet 
Protocol network” (a term whose details Sprint was contesting).755  The 
Federal Circuit rejected Sprint’s argument that the district court failed 
to resolve a dispute between the parties as to what “Internet Protocol 
network” required.  In fact, to the contrary, the order denying Sprint’s 
motion to exclude the testimony resolved the issue in Prism’s favor.756  
The Federal Circuit also rejected Sprint’s additional argument for a 
new trial.757  Sprint argued that Prism’s expert referred to a path 
“through” the accused network—as opposed to the path “to access” the 
network—which is what the claim, as interpreted, required.758 
Second, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s discretion in 
admitting evidence of Prism’s recent settlement, which was negotiated 
just before closing arguments in separate litigation, with AT&T.759  The 
Federal Circuit considered the weighing of probativeness versus 
prejudice that the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) 403 applies, noting 
that there is no “per se” rule when it comes to admissibility of such 
licenses.760  It further noted that the AT&T settlement included the 
patents asserted against Sprint (though the settlement included other 
patents), and that Prism had tendered evidence apportioning the 
agreement’s value to the asserted patents.761  It also noted that the AT&T 
settlement was entered “not just after all discovery was complete, but 
after the entire trial was finished, except for closing arguments and jury 
deliberations.”762  Sprint also attempted to urge a “categorical legal rule 
barring admission of a patentee’s licenses entered into in settlement 
of infringement litigation,” but the Federal Circuit concluded that 
because Sprint failed to preserve those arguments, they were waived.763  
                                               
 753. Id. at 1363–64. 
 754. Id. 
 755. Id. at 1367–68. 
 756. Id. at 1367. 
 757. Id. at 1366. 
 758. Id. at 1367–68 (noting that, in context, it was clear to what the expert was 
referring). 
 759. Id. at 1368. 
 760. Id. at 1368; see FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 761. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 849 F.3d at 1370–71. 
 762. Id. at 1371. 
 763. Id. 
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The Federal Circuit went on to express skepticism about such a rule, 
both under applicable Supreme Court precedent and FRE 408.764  
Third, contrary to Sprint’s arguments, the Federal Circuit found that 
the district court did not fail to consider Sprint’s allegations of legal 
error in weighing the motion for a new trial.765 
Fourth, there was no error in admitting Prism’s damages evidence, 
which focused on the costs that Sprint “avoided” by infringement.766  
While Uniloc USA Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.767 requires that a damages proof 
be tied “to the claimed invention’s footprint in the market place,”768 
that requirement “can be met if the patentee adequately shows that the 
defendant’s infringement allowed it to avoid taking a different, more 
costly course of action.”769  Riles v. Shell Exploration & Production Co.770 
was not contrary.771  Riles rejected a patentee’s attempt to use, as part 
of his damages base, certain costs that went beyond the patent.772  The 
Federal Circuit found that “[h]ere, in contrast, the uncontroverted 
evidence showed that Sprint would have chosen to build its own 
backhaul network in the absence of a license.”773  The Federal Circuit 
affirmed that the district court did not err in permitting Prism to use 
Sprint’s costs for leasing backhaul network capacity from third parties 
as a starting point for its damages analysis.774 
As to Prism’s cross-appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the district 
court did not err in denying Prism’s motion for an accounting and post-
2014 royalties.775  The district court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that the jury’s award covered “past, present, and ongoing 
infringement.”776  WhitServe LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc.777 also supported 
the district court’s holding, as the jury’s award was expressly limited to past 
infringement, so an accounting for future infringement was necessary.778 
                                               
 764. Id. at 1372–75. 
 765. Id. at 1375. 
 766. Id. 
 767. 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 768. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 849 F.3d at 1376 (citing Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1317). 
 769. Id. at 1376. 
 770. 298 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 771. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 849 F.3d at 1376 (citing Riles, 298 F.3d at 1312). 
 772. Id. (citing Riles, 298 F.3d at 1312). 
 773. Id. 
 774. Id. at 1376–77. 
 775. Id. at 1377. 
 776. Id. 
 777. 694 F.3d 10 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 778. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 849 F.3d at 1378–79 (citing WhitServe, 694 F.3d at 35). 
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In Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc.,779 the Federal Circuit 
determined that applying the Panduit factors is sufficient to satisfy the 
apportionment requirement in damages analyses.780  The Federal 
Circuit partially affirmed, partially reversed, and partially vacated 
various judgments in a case involving four Mentor patents and two 
Synopsys (parent of EVE) patents.781  The patents related to 
simulation/emulation technology for computer software.782 
In the principal appeal relating to Mentor’s ’376 patent,783 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the judgement of infringement and the 
$36 million lost profits award,784 finding that the district court did not 
err in denying JMOL because substantial evidence supported the 
infringement judgment.785  The district court did not err in holding 
that Synopsys was estopped from contesting validity under assignor 
estoppel; under Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc.,786 that doctrine 
has “continued vitality” even post-Lear, Inc. v. Adkins.787  Likewise, the 
district court did not err in its awarding lost profits.788  The Federal 
Circuit rejected Synopsys’s argument that the district court erred when 
it failed to apportion lost profits to the “inventive contribution” of 
Mentor’s patent.789  The Federal Circuit reasoned that the Panduit 
                                               
 779. 851 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2017), petition for cert. docketed, No. 17-804 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2017). 
 780. Id. at 1290. 
 781. Id. at 1275. 
 782. Id. at 1280. 
 783. The other issues on appeal related to two Synopsys patents.  Regarding 
Synopsys’s ’109 patent, the Federal Circuit reversed the summary judgment of 
indefiniteness.  Id.  The district court erred in holding that the claims’ reference to 
displaying information “visually near” certain other information was indefinite.  Id.  
The patent gives sufficient examples to make a person of skill reasonably certain about 
what “near” meant.  Id. at 1291.  Regarding Synopsys’s ’526 patent, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the summary judgment of § 101 patent ineligibility.  Id. at 1280.  The Federal 
Circuit determined that the patent’s definition of “machine readable medium,” a term 
present in all claims, included “carrier waves,” which rendered the claims patent 
ineligible.  Id. at 1294–95.  Per In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007), claims 
covering signals themselves are not patent eligible.  Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1294–
95.  The Federal Circuit concluded that although the claims also covered some patent 
eligible embodiments, this did not save them.  Id. 
 784. Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1280. 
 785. Id. at 1282. 
 786. 848 F.2d 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 787. 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1283 (citing Diamond Sci. Co., 
848 F.2d at 1222–26). 
 788. Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1290. 
 789. Id. at 1287–88. 
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analysis incorporated sufficient apportionment,790 holding that 
“Panduit’s requirement that patentees prove demand for the product 
as a whole and the absence of noninfringing alternatives ties lost profit 
damages to specific claim limitations and ensures that damages are 
commensurate with the value of the patented features.”791  The Federal 
Circuit noted that Synopsys did not appeal the jury’s relevant Panduit 
fact findings.792  The Federal Circuit also rejected the contention from 
Synopsys and amici that, where complex multi-function devices are at 
issue, there is a risk of “serial infringement claims” unless further 
apportionment is made.793  The Federal Circuit concluded that 
“[u]nder Panduit, . . . there can only be one recovery of lost profits for 
any particular sale.”794 
On the cross-appeal issues,795 the Federal Circuit vacated the motion in 
limine precluding Mentor from presenting willfulness evidence.796  The 
Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in barring Mentor’s 
willfulness evidence.797  The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district 
court’s reasoning that Mentor’s willfulness claim was based only on post-
                                               
 790. Id. at 1288. 
 791. Id. 
 792. Id. at 1288–89. 
 793. Id. at 1289. 
 794. Id. 
 795. The other issues on cross-appeal related to two Mentor patents.  Regarding 
Mentor’s ’882 patent, the Federal Circuit reversed the summary judgment of no 
written description.  Id. at 1296.  The Federal Circuit rejected Synopsys’s argument 
that the specification required a specific relationship between two clocks in the 
claimed invention, with one running faster than the other.  Id.  The originally-filed 
claim 1 expressly required that the clocks be “independent” and undermined 
Synopsys’s contention that the specification was limited in the manner proposed.  Id. 
at 1297.  Regarding Mentor’s ’531 and ’176 patents, the Federal Circuit also reversed 
summary judgment of issue preclusion against Mentor.  Id. at 1301.  Mentor and EVE 
had litigated these patents in 2006, ultimately reaching a settlement and bestowing a 
license to EVE.  Id. at 1295.  Synopsys’s acquisition of EVE in mid-2012 terminated the 
license.  Id. at 1281.  The Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in finding 
Mentor precluded from pursuing infringement counterclaims in the present case.  Id. 
at 1295.  Mentor’s counterclaims were specifically directed to acts occurring after the 
EVE acquisition, and so they could not have been previously litigated.  Id.  The Federal 
Circuit reviewed prior authority on the issue and concluded that Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. 
Marchon Eyewear, Inc., 672 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2012), and Brain Life LLC v. Elekta Inc., 
746 F.3d 1045 (Fed. Cir. 2014), were on point and guided its decision.  Mentor Graphics, 
851 F.3d at 1298. 
 796. Mentor Graphics, 851 F.3d at 1295. 
 797. Id. 
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suit conduct.798  The claim recited some conduct occurring after Synopsys 
filed declaratory judgment claims against Mentor but before Mentor’s 
counterclaim for infringement, and therefore the conduct constituted 
“pre-suit acts.”799  Moreover, the district court was also wrong in finding 
that Mentor’s failure to seek a preliminary injunction meant it could not 
pursue willfulness.800  There is no “rigid rule” on that issue, per Aqua Shield 
v. Inter Pool Cover Team801  and Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics Inc.802 
Following the initial appeal EVE-USA petitioned for a rehearing en 
banc.  In Mentor Graphics Corp. v. EVE-USA, Inc.,803 the en banc court 
declined to revisit the question of the need for apportionment in 
Panduit-based damages cases, denying EVE-USA’s petition for rehearing 
en banc.804  Concurring in the denial, Judge Stoll endorsed the Federal 
Circuit’s determination that when the Panduit factors are applied in a 
lost profits analysis, there is no further apportionment requirement.805  
Also concurring in the denial, Judge Moore noted that EVE asked the 
court to revisit assignor estoppel doctrine, but she found this case an 
insufficient vehicle to do so as the parties did not substantially brief the 
issue.  The facts were not well oriented to consider whether the privity 
doctrine had expanded too broadly.806  In dissent, Judge Dyk 
determined that Supreme Court precedent required apportionment 
in all cases, including lost profits cases applying Panduit, as the first and 
second Panduit factors were insufficient to actually provide the 
necessary apportionment.807 
In Rembrandt Wireless Technologies, LP v. Samsung Electronics Co.,808 the 
Federal Circuit determined that a remand was necessary to determine 
whether, for damages purposes, disclaimer of a claim can cure a failure 
to mark, while affirming infringement judgment and claim 
construction.809  The Federal Circuit held that the district court did not 
err in construing Rembrandt’s claims as broad enough to cover 
                                               
 798. Id. 
 799. Id. 
 800. Id. at 1295–96. 
 801. 774 F.3d 766 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 802. 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016); Mentor Graphics Corp., 851 F.3d at 1296 (citing Halo Elec. 
Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1934; Aqua Shield, 774 F.3d at 773). 
 803. 870 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 804. Id. at 1298. 
 805. Id. at 1299–300. 
 806. Id. at 1304. 
 807. Id. at 1300–04 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 808. 853 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 809. Id. at 1374. 
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multiple “types” of modulation methods.810  Its interpretation was 
based on the applicant’s post-allowance insertion of language into the 
claim stating that the interpretation “clarified” to establish that it 
would cover multiple methods.811  Therefore, the Federal Circuit held 
that despite the statement including an “i.e.” clause, the applicant’s 
claim construction was not rendered indefinite.812  The Federal Circuit 
also rejected Samsung’s argument that the district court’s 
interpretation created a conflict with a dependent claim.813 
Further, the Federal Circuit also concluded that the district court 
did not err in rejecting Samsung’s obviousness attack.814  The Federal 
Circuit held that the “different types” limitation was a question of fact, 
and, therefore, the jury could freely weigh the expert testimonial 
evidence on this issue, as well as to the issue of the sufficiency of 
Samsung’s proof regarding the prior art combination.815  Though 
Rembrandt had argued that one of Samsung’s references taught away 
from combination with the other reference, it was not necessary to 
weigh whether there was substantial evidence to support a teaching 
away determination.816  The Federal Circuit concluded that “[w]hether 
a reference teaches away is doctrinally distinct from whether there is 
no motivation to combine prior art references.”817 
As to damages, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court 
did not err in denying Samsung’s motion to exclude testimony from 
Rembrandt’s damages expert on methodological grounds in his 
assessment of the incremental value associated with the patented 
technology.818  The Federal Circuit rejected Samsung’s arguments that 
the time periods analyzed by the expert were improperly chosen, that 
the expert erred in attributing the entirety of an observed price 
differential to the patented technology, and that the expert should not 
have relied on a settlement agreement that was redacted in various 
                                               
 810. Id. at 1376. 
 811. Id. 
 812. Id. at 1376–77 (interpreting the “i.e.” clause as “two types of modulation 
methods, i.e., different families of modulation techniques, such as [frequency-shift 
keying and quadrature amplitude modification]”). 
 813. Id. at 1377. 
 814. Id. at 1377, 1380. 
 815. Id. at 1378–79.  There was a question of fact as to whether one of Samsung’s 
references disclosed a key limitation, which was left for the jury to decide. 
 816. Id. at 1379. 
 817. Id. 
 818. Id. at 1380. 
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ways.819  As such, the court held that substantial evidence supported 
the jury’s award of damages on “all of Samsung’s infringing sales,” 
subject to the marking and notice issue discussed below.820 
The district court erred, however, in denying Samsung’s motion to 
limit damages based on Rembrandt’s failure to mark products covered 
by one of its claims—a claim that Rembrandt subsequently disclaimed.821  
The Federal Circuit considered how § 287 exists to “protect[] the 
public’s ability to exploit an unmarked product’s features without 
liability for damages until a patentee provides either constructive 
notice through marking or actual notice.”822  The Federal Circuit held 
that Rembrandt cannot perform an “end-run” around the marking 
statute via disclaimer,823 stating that “disclaimer cannot serve to 
retroactively dissolve the § 287(a) marking requirement for a patentee 
to collect pre-notice damages.”824  However, Rembrandt’s argument 
that the marking statute should attach on a claim-by-claim, not patent-
by-patent, basis was novel, not waived, and not developed by the district 
court.  The Federal Circuit “remand[ed] to the district court to address 
in the first instance whether the patent marking statute should attach 
on a patent-by-patent or claim-by-claim basis.”825 
In NOVA Chemicals Corp. (Canada) v. Dow Chemical Co.,826 the Federal 
Circuit held that mere filing of an action to set aside judgment cannot 
lead to an award of enhanced damages, but a lack of substantive 
support for such a complaint can, affirming the finding of 
exceptionality under § 285.827  NOVA Chemicals Corp. (NOVA) had 
been found liable for infringement in 2010, but in 2013, while 
supplemental damages proceedings were still ongoing, it filed a 
complaint for equitable relief from liability based on allegations that 
Dow had committed fraud with respect to true ownership of the 
asserted patents.828  The district court had dismissed NOVA’s equity 
action as lacking plausibility.829 
                                               
 819. Id. at 1380–81. 
 820. Id. at 1382. 
 821. Id. at 1382. 
 822. Id. at 1383. 
 823. Id. 
 824. Id. at 1384. 
 825. Id. at 1384–85. 
 826. 856 F.3d 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 485 (2017) (mem.). 
 827. Id. at 1014. 
 828. Id. at 1015–16. 
 829. Id. at 1016. 
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To the extent the district court’s exceptionality finding was based on 
the mere fact that NOVA filed a complaint for equitable relief from 
liability for its infringement, which was subsequently found 
implausible, the district court erred.830  The Federal Circuit reasoned 
that “[a] party whose only option for relief from a prior judgment is to 
file a separate action in equity should not be disincentivized from 
doing so if that party has a plausible basis for relief.”831  However, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in basing its exceptionality 
finding on the substantive strength of NOVA’s equity arguments.832  
The district court was also correct to base its § 285 decision on a 
comparison of this patent case to the totality of other patent cases.833  
It rejected NOVA’s argument that the baseline for comparison should 
have been other actions to set aside a prior judgment.834  NOVA’s 
argument lacked legal authority, and the Federal Circuit declined to 
hold that the comparison to other cases should be so limited.835 
Finding that a plaintiff’s failure to reassess case viability post-Alice 
supports a fee award, in Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, 
Inc.,836 the Federal Circuit affirmed an award of attorneys’ fees to Bed, 
Bath & Beyond (BBB).837  The district court did not abuse its discretion 
in finding the case exceptional under § 285, particularly in view of 
Alice.838  The Federal Circuit analyzed Inventor Holdings’s (IH) claims, 
which related to techniques for purchasing goods at a local point-of-
sale system from a remote seller, and determined that they fail both 
steps of the Alice test for patent eligibility.839  At step one, the Federal 
Circuit reasoned, “The idea that a customer may pay for items ordered 
from a remote seller at a third-party’s local establishment is the type of 
fundamental business practice that, when implemented using generic 
computer technology, is not patentable under Alice.”840  At step two, the 
Federal Circuit found that only conventional components are disclosed 
to implement this idea.841  The Federal Circuit also rejected IH’s 
                                               
 830. Id. 
 831. Id. at 1017. 
 832. Id. 
 833. Id. at 1018. 
 834. Id. 
 835. Id. at 1018–19. 
 836. 876 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 837. Id. at 1373–74. 
 838. Id. at 1377–78. 
 839. Id. at 1378. 
 840. Id. 
 841. Id. 
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argument that, because the district court had rejected other defendants’ 
§ 101 challenges pre-Alice, it was reasonable for IH to believe its claims 
patent-eligible.842  First, the district court never endorsed the eligibility 
of IH’s claims or gave reasons for its denial of other defendants’ 
motions.843  Second, “Alice was a significant change in the law as applied 
to the facts of this particular case.”844  Post-Alice, IH had an obligation 
“to reassess its case in view of new controlling law.”845  The district court 
also did not abuse its discretion in awarding appellate attorneys’ fees, 
per Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.846 
In Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc.,847 the Federal 
Circuit determined that the district court neither abused its discretion 
in rejecting BRP’s Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.848 challenge 
to royalty rate testimony from Arctic Cat nor erred in denying JMOL on 
the same issue.849  The record was sufficient to establish that a later-
developed system from BRP could be used as a value benchmark for the 
infringing system.850  The district court also did not abuse discretion in 
granting Arctic Cat an ongoing royalty.  Though BRP argued that the 
ordered rate “impermissibly covers [BRP’s] profits, [the Federal 
Circuit] has affirmed rates at or near the infringer’s alleged profit 
margin.”851  The district court also did not err in denying JMOL on 
willfulness because the record included sufficient evidence on the 
issue.  The district court’s jury instruction that willfulness could be 
proved by evidence that BRP “actually knew or should have known” of 
the risk of infringement was consistent with Halo Electronics Inc. v. Pulse 
Electronics, Inc. and WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp.852 
                                               
 842. Id. at 1378–79. 
 843. Id. at 1379. 
 844. Id. 
 845. Id. 
 846. 745 F.3d 513 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Inventor Holdings, 876 F.3d at 1380 (citing 
Therasense, 745 F.3d at 517) (noting that § 285 does not prevent trial courts from 
awarding attorneys’ fees for an entire case and appeals). 
 847. 876 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 848. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 849. Arctic Cat Inc., 876 F.3d at 1369–70. 
 850. Id. at 1369. 
 851. Id. at 1370. 
 852. 837 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 734 (2018); Arctic Cat 
Inc., 876 F.3d at 1371. 
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B. Attorneys’ Fees 
In Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC,853 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the exceptionality finding and award of attorneys’ fees, 
concluding that arguments that the positions taken were “objectively 
reasonable” insufficient.854  As required by Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon 
Health & Fitness, Inc.,855 the district court properly examined the 
totality of the circumstances and determined that the case stood out 
from others.856  The case’s core dispute was whether a previous Bayer 
license (executed under UK law) gave Dow’s partner rights to exploit 
certain patents commercially.857  The district court found Bayer’s 
interpretation of the license as conveying only non-commercial rights 
unpersuasive and found its pre-suit investigation lacking.858  In 
particular, it cited the surrounding conduct and circumstances for the 
license’s negotiation and recited a variety of Bayer’s statements and 
conduct that the district court viewed as unacceptable.859  The Federal 
Circuit rejected Bayer’s argument that the case could not be 
exceptional because Bayer’s contract interpretation was objectively 
reasonable.860  Octane Fitness rejected such rigidity, and the district 
court’s analysis properly reviewed the totality of the case.861  The 
Federal Circuit held that, even though Bayer presented expert 
testimony from a “former Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom,” this testimony did not undermine the district court’s 
analysis because the expert had only considered the license’s text, not 
surrounding conduct.862  The Federal Circuit also declined Bayer’s 
argument for re-weighing evidence on appeal.863  Per Highmark Inc. v. 
Allcare Health Management Systems, Inc.,864 such was reserved to the 
district court’s discretion.865 
                                               
 853. 851 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 854. Id. at 1303. 
 855. 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014). 
 856. Bayer, 851 F.3d at 1303 (citing Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1752 (holding that 
an “exceptional case” is one that stands out from others on the basis of the strength of 
a party’s litigating position or the way in which the case was litigated)). 
 857. Id. 
 858. Id. at 1304–05. 
 859. Id. 
 860. Id. at 1305. 
 861. Id. at 1306. 
 862. Id. at 1307. 
 863. Id. 
 864. 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). 
 865. Bayer, 851 F.3d at 1307–08. 
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In University of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der 
Wissenschaften E.V.,866 the Federal Circuit found no abuse of discretion 
in declining to find a case exception even considering the weaknesses 
of the case, affirming non-exceptionality finding and denial of § 285 
attorneys’ fees motion.867  The case involved University of Utah’s 
(“UUtah”) claim that Dr. Brenda Bass was the sole inventor, or joint 
inventor, of patents assigned to Max Planck that listed Dr. Thomas 
Tuschl as first-named inventor.868  It was undisputed that after Dr. 
Tuschl published some preliminary results concerning RNA 
interference, Dr. Bass published a mini-review hypothesizing that 
certain activity observed by Dr. Tuschl involved molecules having a 
feature called “3′ overhangs.”869  Dr. Tuschl went on to explore 3′ 
overhangs, which ultimately led to the patents in question.870  Dr. Bass 
testified that she had not done any experiments to study the effect of 
3′ overhangs or to otherwise develop the inventions Dr. Tuschl 
patented.871  Notwithstanding these facts, UUtah pursued a high 
damages request.872  Just before summary judgment, UUtah withdrew 
its claim for sole inventorship.873  The district court granted summary 
judgment for Max Planck on the joint inventorship claim but rejected 
Max Planck’s claim for attorneys’ fees and exceptional case status.874  
The Federal Circuit determined this was not an abuse of discretion 
because Octane Fitness does not require any particular methodology for 
exceptionality, and the district court’s opinion set forth why the case 
did not “stand[] out from [other patent cases]” to be considered 
exceptional.875  The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in determining that UUtah’s conduct, 
notwithstanding Dr. Bass’s testimony, did not warrant an 
exceptionality finding.876 
In Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v. All-Tag Security S.A.,877 the Federal Circuit 
                                               
 866. 851 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 867. Id. at 1319. 
 868. Id. at 1320. 
 869. Id. 
 870. Id. 
 871. Id. 
 872. Id. at 1322. 
 873. Id. at 1321. 
 874. Id. at 1321–22. 
 875. Id. at 1323 (citing Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. 
Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014)). 
 876. Id. 
 877. 858 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 650 (2018). 
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determined that a finding of exceptionality absent evidence of bad faith 
was an abuse of discretion, reversing exceptional case determination 
and award of attorneys’ fees under § 285.878  The Federal Circuit found 
that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that 
Checkpoint’s conduct warranted an exceptionality finding.879  Though 
a party’s “motivation” in bringing a suit is relevant to exceptionality per 
Octane Fitness, in this case, the record indicated that Checkpoint’s 
belief in All-Tag’s infringement was reasonable, and there was no 
evidence of harassment or abuse, or other indicators of bad faith.880  
Though the district court concluded that Checkpoint’s goal by the 
litigation was “to protect its own competitive advantage,” a patent right 
permits such protection.881  The Federal Circuit also considered how 
Checkpoint’s claims survived summary judgment motions.882  And 
although the products tested by Checkpoint’s expert were, apparently, 
not the specifically accused products, “[t]here was no representation 
by All-Tag that the accused products were different from the tested 
products, and the district court did not so find.”883 
In Rothschild Connected Devices Innovations, LLC v. Guardian Protection 
Services, Inc.,884 the Federal Circuit reversed a denial of motion to 
declare case exceptional under § 285, finding that a failure to declare 
exceptionality was an abuse of discretion, notwithstanding the 
plaintiff’s attempt to withdraw the complaint.885  The Federal Circuit 
considered how Rothschild had maintained “willful ignorance” of 
prior art cited by appellant ADS Security (ADS) in a post-complaint 
email, even after ADS filed for attorneys’ fees.886  The Federal Circuit 
held that, despite Rothchild voluntarily moving to dismiss its own 
action prior to the fees motion, the case could still be considered 
exceptional because Rothchild submitted affidavits opposing fees to 
the district court stating that it continued to believe its claims were 
valid and had still not considered ADS’s tendered claims.887  The 
Federal Circuit reasoned, “It is unclear how Rothschild’s counsel and 
                                               
 878. Id. at 1373. 
 879. Id. at 1376–77. 
 880. Id. at 1375. 
 881. Id. 
 882. Id. at 1375–76. 
 883. Id. at 1376. 
 884. 858 F.3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 885. Id. at 1385. 
 886. Id. at 1387. 
 887. Id. at 1388. 
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founder could reasonably believe that claim 1 is valid if neither analyzed 
the purportedly invalidating prior art provided by ADS.”888  The district 
court’s failure to address these “incongruent statements” was abuse of 
discretion per Atlantic Research Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Troy.889  The 
Federal Circuit also identified other problems in the district court’s review 
of the record.  The district court failed to properly consider 
Rothschild’s conduct in other litigation, where it had settled the vast 
majority of its fifty-eight filed cases for nuisance value.890  The district 
court also erred in reasoning that an exceptionality finding would 
interfere with the operation of Rule 11, which the district court 
reasoned had encouraged Rothschild to voluntarily withdraw its 
complaint.891  Per Octane Fitness, litigation conduct may support 
exceptionality even if it is not on its own sanctionable under Rule 11.892 
Concurring, Judge Mayer wrote separately to note that Rothschild’s 
infringement complaint was “frivolous on its face” due to obvious § 101 
problems, and thus supported exceptionality under Octane Fitness even 
absent Rothschild’s problematic affidavits and willful ignorance.893 
In AdjustaCam, LLC v. Newegg, Inc.,894 the Federal Circuit reversed 
the denial of a motion for § 285 attorneys’ fees because of the court’s 
failure to recognize the impact of the Markman order rendering the 
case baseless.895  The Federal Circuit determined that the district court 
abused its discretion in two respects.  First, it failed to follow the 
instructions of a previous remand, which had come following Octane 
Fitness, that had instructed the district court to evaluate the full merits 
of Newegg’s motion.896  The district court’s re-adoption of its previous 
findings was inconsistent with the remand order.897  Although the 
matter had been assigned to a new judge following the original district 
judge’s retirement, the Federal Circuit held that it could not excuse 
the district court’s failure to reevaluate the record.898  University of Utah 
                                               
 888. Id. 
 889. 659 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Rothschild Connected Devices Innovations, 858 F.3d 
at 1388.  This abuse of discretion occurs when the court “fail[s] to conduct an adequate 
inquiry.”  Atl. Research Mktg. Sys., 659 F.3d at 1360. 
 890. Rothschild Connected Devices Innovations, 858 F.3d at 1389. 
 891. Id. at 1390. 
 892. Id. 
 893. Id. at 1390–91 (Mayer, J., concurring). 
 894. 861 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 895. Id. at 1354–55. 
 896. Id. at 1357, 1359. 
 897. Id. at 1359. 
 898. Id. at 1357, 1359–60. 
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v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Wissenschaften e.V. did not 
bar the Federal Circuit from reversing because, in this case, there was 
“no evidence that the district court properly weighed the issues.”899  
Second, the district court clearly erred in its assessment of the 
substantive strength of AdjustaCam’s case.900  The Federal Circuit 
considered how the court’s Markman order rendered AdjustaCam’s 
case baseless and criticizes the district court for relying, in its non-
exceptionality determination, on an argument AdjustaCam had not 
actually made.901  Further, the Federal Circuit considered how 
AdjustaCam’s use of “after-the-fact declarations” to excuse its behavior 
was unreasonable per Octane Fitness.902  Because of both of the district 
court’s errors, the Federal Circuit reversed. 
In AIA America, Inc. v. Avid Radiopharmaceuticals,903 the Federal 
Circuit held that there is no Seventh Amendment right to a jury for 
fact finding in fee awards, affirming the § 285 attorneys’ fee award to 
Avid.904  The Federal Circuit rejected the Alzheimer Institute of 
America’s (“Institute”) argument that the Seventh Amendment 
required a jury trial to determine the facts underlying the award.905  
The Federal Circuit applied the test of Tull v. United States906 to 
conclude that an award of fees is properly characterized as an equitable 
remedy, not a legal one, so the Seventh Amendment requires no jury 
trial.907  It rejected the Institute’s argument that, because the fee award 
involved a measure of fact finding as to state of mind and intent, a jury 
trial was required; such an argument lacked case law support.908  The 
Federal Circuit also found that the district court also did not err in 
making fact findings that went beyond what the jury had addressed.909  
                                               
 899. Id. at 1360. 
 900. Id. at 1359. 
 901. Id. at 1360. 
 902. Id. at 1361. 
 903. 866 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 904. Id. at 1371. 
 905. Id. at 1372, 1374. 
 906. 481 U.S. 412 (1987). 
 907. Avid, 866 F.3d at 1373 (citing Tull, 481 U.S. at 418 (finding that, in 
determining whether a statutory cause of action involves only legal rights, the court 
compares the action to those brought in eighteenth-century English courts and then 
determines whether the action is legal or equitable in nature)). 
 908. Id. at 1373–74. 
 909. See id. at 1372, 1374 (noting the jury’s conclusion that Institute lacked standing 
to press a patent suit against Avid and had engaged in bad conduct in obtaining the 
patent in question). 
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Cases like Door-Master Corp. v. Yorktowne, Inc.910 and Jurgens v. CBK, 
Ltd.911 bar a court from making fact finding inconsistent with the jury’s 
verdict, but they do not bar additional fact finding that is not 
inconsistent with the verdict.912  The district court also did not violate 
the Institute’s due process rights because it provided both parties an 
opportunity for briefing, submission of evidence, and an in-court 
hearing on the fee issue.913 
In Nantkwest, Inc. v. Matal,914 the Federal Circuit reversed a denial of 
attorneys’ fees motion finding that the PTO may recover attorneys’ fee 
following a successful defense in a § 145 appeal.915  The case was a § 145 
appeal to the Eastern District of Virginia from the PTO’s rejection of 
a patent application assigned to Nantkwest.916  The Federal Circuit 
found that the district court erred in reasoning that the “all expenses” 
provision of § 145 did not authorize payment of attorneys’ fees, 
particularly against the backdrop of the American Rule.917  The court 
expressed “substantial doubts” that the American Rule applies to § 145 
proceedings.918  Baker Botts L.L.P. v. Asarco LLC.919 does not mean that 
the American Rule’s specific requirements must apply to all fee statutes 
irrespective of a prevailing party.920  But even if the American Rule were 
to apply, § 145’s reference to awarding “expenses” includes attorneys’ 
fees.921  The Federal Circuit relied on various dictionaries, as well as 
historical versions of the Patent Act and Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, 
Ltd.,922 as demonstrating that “expenses” is a broader term than “costs” 
                                               
 910. 256 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 911. 80 F.3d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 912. Avid, 866 F.3d at 1374. 
 913. Id. 
 914. 860 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017), vacated, 869 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en 
banc). 
 915. Id. at 1353; see 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2012) (allowing a patent applicant to appeal to 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia if that person is dissatisfied 
with a decision of the PTAB under 34 U.S.C. § 134(a)). 
 916. Nantkwest, 860 F.3d at 1353–54. 
 917. See id. at 1354–56, 1359 (noting that according to the American Rule, litigants 
generally pay their own attorneys’ fees, win or lose). 
 918. Id. at 1355. 
 919. 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015) (holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not permit 
bankruptcy courts to award attorneys’ fees to counsel or other professionals employed 
by the bankruptcy estate for work performed in defending a fee application in court). 
 920. Nantkwest, 860 F.3d at 1355. 
 921. Id. at 1359. 
 922. 566 U.S. 560 (2012). 
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and includes attorneys’ fees.923  The Federal Circuit also rejected 
Nantkwest’s argument that the PTO’s attorneys’ fees were not “expenses 
of the proceedings” because the PTO was represented by its own full-
time employees, whose salaries it was obligated to pay regardless of the 
suit.924  Citing regional circuit authority and Raney v. Federal Bureau of 
Prisons,925 the Federal Circuit reasoned that the PTO can recover an 
apportionment of its lawyers’ salaries “because the litigation required 
the lawyers to divert their time away from other pending matters.”926  In 
dissent, Judge Stoll would have concluded that § 145 lacked the 
specificity necessary to overcome the American Rule’s general bar 
against shifting attorneys’ fees.927 
Acting sua sponte, the Federal Circuit vacated the NantKwest Federal 
Circuit opinion and ordered a rehearing en banc.928  The Federal 
Circuit has requested new briefing to address whether the Federal 
Circuit properly determined that § 145 authorizes a district court to 
award attorneys’ fees to the PTO.929 
The Octane Fitness standard for awarding attorneys’ fees applies to 
cases under the Lanham Act.  In Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc.,930 
the Federal Circuit vacated a determination of attorneys’ fees.931  The 
Federal Circuit found that the district court erred in not applying the 
same standard for attorneys’ fee recovery under the Lanham Act as 
under the Patent Act.932  The Federal Circuit reasoned that, applying 
Second Circuit law, Lanham Act fee recovery would apply the standard 
of Octane Fitness.933 
Further, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court also 
erred in its award of fees under § 285 and Octane Fitness.934  The district 
court clearly erred in finding that Fossil had declined to abandon 
various invalidity defenses until after trial.  The record indicated that 
Fossil had not pursued such defenses at trial.935  Despite the record 
                                               
 923. Nantkwest, 860 F.3d at 1356–57. 
 924. Id. at 1359. 
 925. 222 F.3d 927 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 926. Nantkwest, 860 F.3d at 1359. 
 927. Id. at 1360. 
 928. NantKwest, Inc. v. Matal, 869 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 929. Id. 
 930. 866 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 931. Id. at 1333. 
 932. Id. at 1335. 
 933. Id. at 1336. 
 934. Id. 
 935. Id. 
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indicating otherwise, the district court erroneously determined that 
another of Fossil’s invalidity defenses “bordered on frivolous.”936 The 
district court also erred in failing to take into account that Romag had 
previously been sanctioned for its own litigation conduct.937  The 
Federal Circuit rejected Romag’s argument that the district court 
denied attorneys’ fees connected to one of Fossil’s noninfringement 
defenses based solely on the district court’s previous refusal to grant a 
Rule 50(a) motion on the subject.938  The district court’s reasoning was 
not based solely on the Rule 50(a) denial.939 
Dissenting in part, Judge Newman agreed that the issue of fees 
under the Lanham Act should be remanded for treatment under 
Octane Fitness.940  However, she would have affirmed the district court’s 
§ 285 award as within the district court’s discretion.941 
C. Sanctions and Inequitable Conduct 
In Walker v. Health International Corp.,942 the Federal Circuit concluded 
that the presentation of meritless arguments, even post-settlement, 
warranted both trial and appellate sanctions, affirming the lower court’s 
judgment award, and granted defendants’ motion for appellate 
sanctions.943  Under Tenth Circuit precedent, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding Mr. Walker’s conduct sufficiently 
vexatious to support an award of attorneys’ fees as a sanction.944  The 
Federal Circuit rejected each of Mr. Walker’s arguments, holding that 
the district court created an “ample” record of Mr. Walker’s bad 
conduct, finding no error in the district court’s refusal to re-hear 
arguments already deemed meritless and that the district court had 
jurisdiction notwithstanding the settlement.945  Additionally, the Federal 
Circuit determined that Mr. Walker’s appeal was frivolous because it 
presented meritless arguments and baseless accusations against the 
opposing counsel, even after these errors were pointed out to Mr. 
                                               
 936. Id. at 1339. 
 937. Id. at 1340. 
 938. Id. at 1341. 
 939. Id. 
 940. Id. at 1342 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 941. Id. at 1342–43. 
 942. 845 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 943. Id. at 1151. 
 944. Id. at 1153. 
 945. Id. at 1154–55. 
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Walker.946  The Federal Circuit held Mr. Walker and his counsel jointly 
and severally liable, awarding Rule 38 sanctions amounting to 
$51,801.88 in double costs and attorneys’ fees.947 
In Organik Kimya San. Ve Tic., A.Ş. v. International Trade Commission,948 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s award of default judgment and 
a limited exclusion order barring Organik Kimya from importing 
certain polymers for twenty-five years unless and until Organik Kimya 
could show that it was no longer seeking to import polymers developed 
using trade secrets of the Complainant Dow Chemical.949  The Federal 
Circuit held that the ITC did not abuse its discretion in entering 
default judgment after finding that Organik Kimya had engaged in 
severe discovery misconduct, including “spoliation of evidence on a 
staggering scale.”950  The Federal Circuit rejected Organik Kimya’s 
argument that the ITC should have applied the framework of Micron 
Technology, Inc. v. Rambus Inc.951 when contemplating entry of default 
judgment.952  Micron addressed a district court’s power to enter default 
judgment as part of its “inherent authority to control the judicial 
process and litigation.”953  This holding was inapplicable because 
neither the Administrative Law Judge nor the ITC was relying on 
inherent authority to enter default judgment, but on express 
regulatory authority established in 19 C.F.R. § 210.33(b).954  Thus, 
simple abuse of discretion analysis applied and led to affirmance. 
The ITC also did not abuse its discretion in the limited exclusion 
order, including its term.955  The evidence supported the ITC’s 
conclusion that it would have taken Organik Kimya twenty-five years to 
develop the polymers in question independent from Dow’s trade 
secrets.956  The Federal Circuit concluded, “Given this basis for the 
[ITC’s] decision, and that Organik Kimya can end the exclusion order 
                                               
 946. Id. at 1156. 
 947. Id. at 1157. 
 948. 848 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 949. Id. at 995. 
 950. Id. at 997. 
 951. 645 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 952. Organik, 848 F.3d at 1003.  Additionally, in a footnote, the opinion notes that 
the same outcome would have applied even had Micron’s analysis applied.  Id. at 1003. 
 953. Id. at 1326. 
 954. 19 C.F.R. § 210.33(b) (2017). 
 955. Organik, 848 F.3d at 1005. 
 956. Id. (finding Dow’s expert credible “when he opined that it would take Organik 
Kimya fifteen to twenty-five years to develop opaque polymers” independent of Dow’s 
trade secrets). 
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period at any time by seeking an advisory opinion or initiating a 
modification proceeding before the [ITC],” there was neither legal 
error or abuse of discretion in the ITC’s choice of remedy.957 
In Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Merus N.V.,958 the Federal Circuit 
found litigation tactics disguising prosecution misconduct warranted 
an adverse inference of specific intent, affirming a judgment of patent 
unenforceability for inequitable conduct.959  The district court 
correctly established the broadest reasonable interpretation of 
Regeneron’s claims.960  Applying that interpretation, the district court 
correctly determined that certain references withheld during 
prosecution were non-cumulative and but-for material.961  The Federal 
Circuit rejected each of Regeneron’s arguments for non-materiality 
and cumulativeness.962 
The Federal Circuit found no abuse of discretion in entering an 
adverse inference of specific intent to deceive based on Regeneron’s 
litigation misconduct.963  The Federal Circuit considered a variety of 
acts by Regeneron that the district court found sanctionable, including 
Regeneron’s refusal to provide element-by-element infringement 
contentions, and its refusal to engage with the district court’s claim 
construction procedural rules, specifically, its refusal to propose 
constructions beyond “plain meaning.”964  Also, the Federal Circuit 
considered a record of bad conduct by Regeneron in connection with 
the district court’s inquiry into the scope of waiver of privilege in 
connection with certain key documents bearing on Regeneron’s 
conduct during prosecution.965  Applying Second Circuit law, the 
Federal Circuit concluded that the district court was entitled to draw 
an adverse inference generally and not with respect to a single piece 
of problematic evidence.966  It rejected Regeneron’s argument that the 
adverse inference was actually a dismissal, which would have required 
a showing of bad faith.967  Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc.,968 
                                               
 957. Id. at 1005. 
 958. 864 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017), reh’g denied, 878 F.3d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per curiam). 
 959. Id. at 1346. 
 960. Id. at 1348. 
 961. Id. at 1352–53. 
 962. Id. at 1352–56. 
 963. Id. at 1356. 
 964. Id. at 1357. 
 965. Id. at 1361–62. 
 966. Id. at 1351, 1363. 
 967. Id. at 1363–64. 
 968. 269 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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relied on heavily by the dissent, was not contrary because the adverse 
inference was not a sanction only against litigation misconduct, but 
against litigation misconduct that “obfuscated [Regeneron’s] 
prosecution misconduct.”969  Unlike Aptix, the unenforceability 
determination was not a sanction in its own right, but only the proper 
result once the adverse inference was combined with the materiality 
determinations discussed above.970  Dissenting, Judge Newman would 
have reversed, reasoning that an unenforceability declaration is not an 
available remedy for litigation misconduct.971 
VI. EQUITABLE DEFENSES 
A. Laches 
In SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC,972 
the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s en banc opinion, 
holding that laches remains a defense to patent infringement.973  The 
Supreme Court reasoned that, similar to Petrella, application of laches 
in patent infringement cases would undermine Congress’s guidance as 
to the term for recovering damages in patent cases, i.e., § 286’s six-year 
damages limitation.974  The Supreme Court reasoned that § 286 
“represents a judgment by Congress that a patentee may recover damages 
for any infringement committed within six years of the filing of the 
claim.”975  The Court rejected First Quality’s argument that Petrella should 
not apply because § 286 “runs backward from the time of suit,” not 
forward from the accrual of the cause of action.976  The Court further 
rejected the notion that there was a meaningful difference between 
§ 286 and the statute of limitations in Petrella, noting that Petrella 
described the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations as running 
backward from the complaint.977  The Court also rejected the Federal 
Circuit’s reasoning that § 286’s reference to “except as otherwise 
provided by law” permitted continued application of laches.978  The 
                                               
 969. Regeneron Pharm., 864 F.3d at 1364. 
 970. Id. at 1364. 
 971. Id. at 1365–66. 
 972. 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017), vacating in part, 807 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 973. Id. at 959–60. 
 974. Id. at 960–61. 
 975. Id. at 961. 
 976. Id. at 961–62. 
 977. Id. at 962. 
 978. Id. at 961. 
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Federal Circuit reasoned that § 282 codified laches as a defense, 
apparently relying on that section’s reference to “unenforceability.”979  
But even if that section somehow incorporated laches, the court held 
that nothing in § 282 suggests that laches could be invoked to bar a 
damages claim that was otherwise within § 286’s damages period.980 
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito discussed, in some detail, a 
variety of pre-1952 Patent Act cases that the Federal Circuit cited and 
concluded that these cases do not support First Quality’s arguments.981  
He separately addressed claims at law, claims in equity, and post-
merger cases982 and concluded that while there was some precedent 
for applying laches to defeat damages claims pre-1952, it was not 
sufficiently uniform to overcome Petrella’s reasoning.983 
Dissenting, Justice Breyer found laches to be an available defense, 
largely relying on pre-Patent Act practice that, in his view, applied 
laches in patent damages cases “with virtual unanimity.”984 
B. Patent Exhaustion 
Foreign sales and use-restricted sales may exhaust U.S. patent rights.  
In Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.,985 the Supreme 
Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s determinations concerning patent 
exhaustion.986  First, the Supreme Court found that the Federal Circuit 
erred in determining that there was no exhaustion from Lexmark’s 
sale in the United States of printer cartridges subject to “single-use/no 
resale” restrictions.987  While such restrictions “may have been clear 
and enforceable under contract law, . . . they do not entitle Lexmark 
to retain patent rights in an item it has elected to sell.”988  The Supreme 
Court discussed how exhaustion doctrine imposes positive limits on 
the scope of a patentee’s rights such that, after a sale, “there is no 
exclusionary right left to enforce.”989  The Supreme Court also drew a 
distinction between a patentee’s ability to restrict the acts of its 
                                               
 979. Id. at 962–63. 
 980. Id. at 963. 
 981. Id. 
 982. Id. at 964–66. 
 983. Id. at 966. 
 984. Id. at 967 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 985. 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017), rev’g in part, 816 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 986. Id. at 1531, 1535, 1538. 
 987. Id. at 1531. 
 988. Id. at 1532. 
 989. Id. 
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licensees, as in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co.,990 
which can preserve the right to sue for infringement, and the ability to 
restrict the post-sale activities of purchasers.991 
Further, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit also erred 
in determining that there was no exhaustion from Lexmark’s sale of 
products overseas.992  “An authorized sale outside the United States, 
just as one within the United States, exhausts all rights under the 
Patent Act.”993  The Supreme Court rejected Lexmark’s argument that 
the territorial nature of patent law should lead to a different result.994  
Because exhaustion is a “separate limit on the patent grant,” it may be 
triggered whenever—and wherever—the patentee makes a decision to 
sell an item embodying the patent rights.995  Boesch v. Graff996 was not 
contrary because it involved an overseas sale in which “the patentee 
had nothing to do with the transaction.”997  The Supreme Court also 
considered and rejected the rule proposed by the government that 
foreign sales exhaust patent rights absent specific reservation of such 
rights,998 commenting that “[the government’s] position is largely 
based on policy rather than principle.”999 
VII. PATENT OFFICE APPEALS 
A. Inter Partes Reviews 
1. IPR procedure and practice 
In Cascades Projection LLC v. Epson America, Inc.,1000 the Federal Circuit 
denied Cascades’s petition for en banc hearing of its appeal; instead, 
the patentee’s argument against the constitutionality of IPR proceedings 
will be heard by a three-judge Federal Circuit.1001  Cascades argued that a 
                                               
 990. 305 U.S. 124 (1938). 
 991. Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. at 1534. 
 992. Id. at 1535. 
 993. Id. 
 994. Id. at 1536–37. 
 995. Id. at 1537. 
 996. 133 U.S. 697 (1890). 
 997. Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. at 1537. 
 998. Id. 
 999. Id. 
 1000. 864 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 1001. Id. at 1310–11 (holding that a patent creates a private property right and the 
AIA statutory scheme meets the constitutional requirements of due process in 
disposition of property). 
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patent right is a private right, not a public one, and therefore the PTAB’s 
cancellation of patents in IPR was an unconstitutional exercise of judicial 
power.1002  Concurring in the denial of initial hearing en banc, Judge 
Newman reasoned that the matter should be resolved by a panel of the 
Federal Circuit prior to any en banc consideration.1003  Also concurring in 
the denial of initial hearing en banc, and joined by Judges Prost and 
Hughes, Judge Dyk viewed the issued raised in the petition as settled in 
MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,1004 which held that patent 
rights are public rights.1005  Addressing the dissents, he saw no 
inconsistency between MCM and either Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff,1006 
or McCormick Harvesting Machinery Co. v. Aultman & Co.1007  He also saw 
no inconsistency in concluding that patent rights are public rights, 
conferred by federal statute.1008 
Dissenting, Judge O’Malley expressed uncertainty that MCM was 
correctly decided.1009  She approved Judge Reyna’s dissent and noted 
that McCormick indicated that patent rights may only be annulled by 
the courts and not the Patent Office.1010  Judge Reyna’s dissent read 
McCormick as limiting the power to “annul” patents as vesting only in 
the judiciary and not the Patent Office.1011  He also viewed MCM and 
Patlex as “inconsistent and irreconcilable” opinions within the Federal 
Circuit’s case law.1012  Finally, he cited the separation of powers as an 
issue to be analyzed carefully.1013 
The Federal Circuit granted a petition for en banc rehearing and 
vacates its opinions in Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp.,1014 and Wi-Fi 
                                               
 1002. Id.  The Supreme Court has since ruled that patents are public rights. See Oil 
States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greens’s Energy Grp., LLC, No. 16-712, 2018 WL 1914662, 
at *6 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018). 
 1003. Id. at 1311 (Newman, J., concurring). 
 1004. 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 1005. Id. at 1293 (holding that because patent rights are public rights, the Seventh 
Amendment posed no barrier to administrative agency review as to patent validity); 
Cascades Projection, 864 F.3d at 1312 (Dyk, J., concurring). 
 1006. 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 
1985). 
 1007. 169 U.S. 606 (1898); Cascades Projection, 864 F.3d at 1311–12. 
 1008. Cascades Projection, 864 F.3d at 1312. 
 1009. Id. at 1312–13 (O’Malley, J., dissenting). 
 1010. Id. at 1313. 
 1011. Id. at 1314 (Reyna, J., dissenting). 
 1012. Id. 
 1013. Id. 
 1014. Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 837 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2016), rev’d, 878 
F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
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One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp.1015  The case concerned the extent to which 
the PTAB’s decisions on whether a petition for an IPR is not time 
barred are reviewable by the courts.1016  Sitting en banc, the Federal 
Circuit held that the PTAB’s determination that Broadcom’s petition 
for IPR was not time barred was judicially reviewable.  The Federal 
Circuit reasoned that the statement that IPR institution decisions are 
non-appealable in § 314(d) is expressly limited to institution decisions 
“under this section,” i.e., institution decisions evaluating whether the 
petitioner is likely to prevail as set forth in § 314(a).1017  The Federal 
Circuit found that “[i]t does not address any other issue relevant to an 
institution decision.”1018  Because the time-bar provision is in a 
different section § 315(b), it is not addressed by the nonappealability 
restriction of § 314(d).  The Federal Circuit reasoned that this 
approach is consistent with the approach of Cuozzo, which, when 
discussing § 314(d), noted that it barred judicial review of the PTAB’s 
assessment of a “reasonable likelihood of success” for the petition1019  
In this decision, the Federal Circuit overruled the contrary reasoning 
of Achates Reference Publishing, Inc. v. Apple Inc.1020 
Concurring, Judge O’Malley would have reached the same outcome, 
but she would have analyzed the PTAB’s time-bar assessment as an 
instance of the PTAB exceeding its statutory authority to undertake an 
IPR.1021  In dissent, Judge Hughes viewed the majority’s reading of 
§ 314(d) as excessively narrow and incompatible with the statute, and 
contrary to Cuozzo.1022  In his view, Cuozzo rejected the notion that 
§ 314(d) was limited to barring review of reasonable-likelihood-of-
success determinations and specifically held that Congress had “told 
the Patent Office to determine whether the IPR should proceed, and 
it has made the agency’s decision ‘final’ and ‘nonappealable.’”1023 
In Ultratec, Inc. v. CaptionCall, LLC,1024 the Federal Circuit vacated the 
IPR determination of obviousness and anticipation, finding the 
                                               
 1015. 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Wi-Fi One, LLC, 837 F.3d at 1329. 
 1016. Wi-Fi One, LLC, 837 F.3d at 1333. 
 1017. Wi-Fi One, LLC, 878 F.3d at 1370–71. 
 1018. Id. at 1372. 
 1019. Id. at 1369 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC 
v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2141, 2142 (2016)). 
 1020. 803 F.3d 652 (Fed. Cir. 2015), overruled by Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1367. 
 1021. Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1375 (O’Malley, J., concurring). 
 1022. Id. at 1377–78 (Hughes, J., dissenting). 
 1023. Id. at 1379. 
 1024. 872 F.3d 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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PTAB’s procedures for reviewing late-submitted evidence 
inadequate.1025  The PTAB abused its discretion by denying Ultratec’s 
request to supplement the record with testimony from CaptionCall’s 
expert made during co-pending district court litigation, which was 
inconsistent with statements the expert had made during the IPR.1026  
The Federal Circuit considered how admission and review of the 
expert’s statements would have imposed little burden on the PTAB 
and discussed how the PTAB’s procedures for requesting 
supplementation of the record have the effect of denying the PTAB 
any opportunity to actually know the content of the requested 
supplementation before ruling on the motion.1027  The Federal Circuit 
criticized the PTAB’s practice of denying a request to admit evidence 
without examining the evidence it denied.  In the IPR proceeding, the 
PTAB never reviewed the expert’s testimony because it was not 
accompanied with Ultratec’s motion to supplement the record; 
instead, the PTAB only considered “the parties’ competing 
characterizations” of the testimony, as articulated during a conference 
call of which there was no record.1028 
The Federal Circuit found that the PTAB also failed to provide a 
reasoned basis for its denial, and its procedures on this issue “impede 
meaningful appellate review of the agency decision-making.”1029  The 
Federal Circuit rejected CaptionCall and the PTAB’s argument that 
Ultratec bore responsibility to bring a stenographer to the conference 
call at issue, as the rules impose no such burden.1030  Further, the 
Federal Circuit held that it was the PTO’s responsibility to provide a 
satisfactory explanation for its action.1031 
In related appeals for Vicor Corp. v. SynQor, Inc.,1032 the Federal 
Circuit partially affirmed and partially vacated the PTAB’s IPR 
determination that some of SynQor’s claims from two of its patents 
were patentable and others anticipated or obvious.1033  As to the first 
                                               
 1025. Id. at 1269. 
 1026. Id. at 1270. 
 1027. Id. 
 1028. Id. at 1273. 
 1029. Id. at 1274. 
 1030. Id. at 1274–75. 
 1031. Id. at 1275. 
 1032. 869 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 1033. Id. at 1312 (finding that the PTAB sufficiently addressed the patentee’s 
argument that the voltage-range limitation claims in the patent would have been 
obvious and that other claims were anticipated). 
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group of rejection for the first patent, the Federal Circuit found that 
substantial evidence supported the PTAB’s decision not to adopt the 
proposed grounds because there was sufficient evidence to indicate 
that a person of skill would not have been motivated to combine the 
cited references in the required manner.1034 
As to the second group of proposed rejections, the Federal Circuit 
found that the PTAB erred in affirming the examiner’s withdrawal of 
rejections “based solely on SynQor’s proffered objective evidence of 
nonobviousness.”1035  The Federal Circuit found that the court stated 
that the PTAB should have considered all the Graham factors, not just 
the objective evidence.1036  Second, the PTAB’s apparent assessment of 
the secondary considerations was inconsistent with how it treated 
secondary considerations evidence in reexamination of two other 
SynQor patents “without any explanation to justify such 
inconsistency.”1037  Prior decisions relating to SynQor’s patents did not 
address secondary considerations, which required giving the parties an 
opportunity to address the issues on remand.1038 
As to the third group of proposed rejections, the PTAB erred in 
finding that a certain combination of prior art elements were 
nonobvious because “on the same day, the [PTAB] reached the 
opposite conclusion on this issue in [another SynQor] reexamination 
on essentially the same record.”1039  The Federal Circuit determined 
that vacatur was necessary because the PTAB failed to explain its 
inconsistent results.1040  Moreover, the Federal Circuit discussed some 
of the Board’s apparent reasoning in declining to adopt the rejections 
from the separate reexamination and finds it lacking.1041  The Federal 
Circuit concluded that “the direct conflict between the [PTAB’s] fact 
findings in the reexaminations before us is unsupported by any 
rational explanation in either of the Board’s decisions.”1042  The 
Federal Circuit also concluded that the PTAB’s failed to address “all 
grounds for proposed rejection” presented by Vicor.1043 
                                               
 1034. Id. at 1318, 1320. 
 1035. Id. at 1320–21. 
 1036. Id. at 1320. 
 1037. Id. at 1321. 
 1038. Id. at 1316–17. 
 1039. Id. at 1322–23. 
 1040. Id. at 1312, 1323. 
 1041. Id. at 1323. 
 1042. Id. 
 1043. Id. at 1324. 
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On the second patent, for the first proposed rejection, the Federal 
Circuit held that the PTAB correctly found the claims anticipated on 
the presented record.1044  The Federal Circuit rejected SynQor’s 
arguments that it presented a new ground of rejection that affected 
the outcome, and that the PTAB misinterpreted the reference at 
issue.1045  For the second proposed rejection, the PTAB correctly found 
the claims obvious.1046  The Federal Circuit rejected SynQor’s 
argument that the record demonstrated teaching away.1047  The third 
and fourth proposed rejections were among those suffering from 
inconsistent treatment between the two reexamination proceedings, 
and the Federal Circuit vacated the PTAB’s treatment of them.1048 
In Idemitsu Kosan Co. v. SFC Co.,1049 the Federal Circuit held that an IPR 
decision may rely on post-institution arguments, affirming the IPR 
obviousness determination.1050  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit found 
that the PTAB did not err in determining that the prior art taught 
combining various compounds for the purpose of light emission.1051  The 
Federal Circuit rejected Idemitsu’s argument that the PTAB made 
improper assumptions in its characterization of the prior art.1052  The 
Federal Circuit also rejected Idemitsu’s argument that the PTAB’s 
reasoning came from an argument that was raised “too late” in the IPR 
proceedings.1053  The Federal Circuit outlined the back-and-forth of SFC’s 
petition, Idemitsu’s response, which raised the issue in question, and 
SFC’s reply, which more fully developed the issue.1054  This outline 
determined that that “what Idemitsu characterize[ed] as an argument 
raised ‘too late’ is simply the by-product of one party necessarily getting 
the last word.”1055  Under Genzyme Therapeutic Products Ltd. v. Biomarin 
Pharmaceutical Inc., the PTAB is permitted to reach counterarguments not 
preemptively raised in either the petition or the institution decision.1056  
                                               
 1044. Id. at 1324–25. 
 1045. Id. at 1324. 
 1046. Id. at 1326. 
 1047. Id. 
 1048. Id. at 1321–22. 
 1049. 870 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 1050. Id. at 1377 (affirming the court of appeals’ holding that Idemitsu Kosan’s 
patent was unpatentable as obvious and supported by substantial evidence). 
 1051. Id. at 1380. 
 1052. Id. at 1379–80. 
 1053. Id. at 1380. 
 1054. Id. at 1381. 
 1055. Id. 
 1056. Genzyme Therapeutic Prods. Ltd. v. Biomarin Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 
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The Federal Circuit declined to find error in the Board’s fact finding on 
this issue without expert testimony, at least in this context.1057 
While Idemitsu argued in its response that the prior art taught away 
from the claimed technology, the Federal Circuit found that it did not 
provide supporting evidence.1058  The Federal Circuit determined that 
“SFC, of course, bears the ultimate burden of establishing 
unpatentability, but it is not required as a matter of law to rebut mere 
attorney argument with expert testimony in order to satisfy that burden.”1059  
The Federal Circuit found the PTAB’s fact-finding sufficiently 
supported by the record in the context.1060 
In NFC Technology, LLC v. Matal,1061 the Federal Circuit reversed and 
remanded an IPR obviousness determination, holding that minimal 
documentation corroborating inventorship was not fatal to the 
patentee’s priority claim.1062  The court found that the PTAB erred when 
it determined that NFC Technology (NFC) failed to show that certain 
third-party prototyping activity predating a cited reference did not inure 
to NFC’s benefit.1063  The Federal Circuit considered how the testimony 
and documentary evidence of record established NFC’s pre-critical date 
conception and found that the PTAB improperly discounted certain 
evidence establishing conception and inurement.1064  The Federal 
Circuit emphasized that the PTAB also relied improperly on Woodland 
Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc.1065 to find that the absence of emails or 
other communications between the inventor and the third-party 
prototyper led to a conclusion that the prototyper was not acting 
according to the inventor’s design or direction.1066  In Woodland Trust, as 
in NFC Technology, in view of the amount of time that had passed, it was 
not surprising that certain documents that might have existed in the past 
could not be produced at present for corroboration.1067  Quoting In re 
Jolley,1068 the Federal Circuit wrote, “Corroboration of every factual issue 
                                               
1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 1057. Id. at 1371–72. 
 1058. Idemitsu Kosan Co., 870 F.3d at 1381. 
 1059. Id. 
 1060. Id. at 1381. 
 1061. 871 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 1062. Id. at 1368. 
 1063. Id. at 1370. 
 1064. Id. at 1372, 1374–75. 
 1065. 148 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 1066. NFC Tech., 871 F.3d at 1373 (citing Woodland Trust, 148 F.3d at 1373). 
 1067. Id. at 1373–74. 
 1068. 308 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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contested by the parties is not a requirement of the law.”1069  Because the 
PTAB had not yet determined whether the prototype at issue actually 
reduced the claims to practice, it was necessary to remand the case.1070 
In In re Chudik,1071 the Federal Circuit reversed an anticipation 
rejection supported by two references after initial examination.1072  
The patent at issue related to a surgical implant for use in shoulder 
surgery.1073  The Federal Circuit determined that the rejections were 
not supported by substantial evidence.1074  For the rejections over the 
first reference (“Rambert”), the court found that the PTAB erred in 
reasoning that, although the reference depicted a configuration that 
did not precisely practice the claim, the device in the reference “can 
still be arranged” in such a way as to practice and, therefore, 
anticipate.1075  The Federal Circuit held that “[p]rior art that ‘must be 
distorted from its obvious design’ does not anticipate a new 
invention.”1076  The PTAB and examiner’s failure to explain how the 
Rambert device could practice the claim without tearing the reference 
apart warranted reversal.1077  For the rejections over the second 
reference (“Bouttens”), the PTAB committed a similar error, reasoning 
that the reference indicated a certain cavity could have “any” suitable 
shape and certain parts could be reconfigured.1078  The Federal Circuit 
found that the PTAB failed to explain how such a device would actually 
work, and its reasoning amounted to “a significant and impermissible 
modification” improper for an anticipation analysis.1079 
In Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal,1080 the en banc court barred the PTAB 
from placing the burden of persuasion on patent owners proposing 
substitute claims in an IPR without formal rulemaking from the PTO.  
The Federal Circuit vacated the PTAB’s denial of motion to amend 
                                               
 1069. NFC Tech., 871 F.3d at 1374. 
 1070. Id. at 1375. 
 1071. 851 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 1072. Id. at 1367. 
 1073. Id. 
 1074. See id. at 1367, 1371–72, 1374–75 (finding that because the substantial evidence 
showed that the devices had to be distorted from their obvious design to practice as 
the claim depicts, the designs do not anticipate a new invention). 
 1075. Id. at 1373. 
 1076. Id. at 1374 (quoting In re Wells, 53 F.2d 537, 539 (C.C.P.A. 1931)). 
 1077. Id. at 1374. 
 1078. Id. 
 1079. Id. at 1374–75. 
 1080. 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
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claims in IPR and remanded.1081  The Federal Circuit found that the 
PTAB erred in placing the burden of proof on the patent owner in 
assessing the patentability of proposed substitute claims.1082  No single 
opinion was joined by a majority of judges sitting en banc, though a 
majority supported vacating the judgment).1083  In her opinion, Judge 
O’Malley reasoned that vacatur was warranted because the PTAB’s 
decision was incompatible with the unambiguous statutory text of 35 
U.S.C. § 316(e).1084  The PTAB’s reasoning thus failed step one of 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.1085  In Judge 
O’Malley’s view, § 316(e) unambiguously required the IPR 
petitioners—not patent owners—to bear the burden of proof on all 
issues of unpatentability, including for proposed substitute claims.1086  
Were the statute ambiguous, the result would be the same because the 
PTO has promulgated no regulation requiring Chevron deference and 
the most reasonable reading of the statute was the one given above.1087 
With support from a majority of judges sitting en banc, O’Malley 
ordered that the PTAB re-assess “the patentability of the proposed 
substitute claims without placing the burden of persuasion on the 
patent owner.  The [PTAB] must follow this same practice in all 
pending IPRs unless and until the PTO Director engages in notice-and-
comment rulemaking.”1088 
Similar to Judge O’Malley, Judge Moore reasoned that § 316(e) is 
unambiguous in its assignment of the burden of proof for motions to 
substitute claims in an IPR.1089  Further, Judge Moore would have 
specifically held that PTAB decisions designated as precedential (here, 
MasterImage 3D, Inc. v. RealD Inc.1090) or informative (here, Idle Free 
                                               
 1081. Id. at 1296 (determining that the PTAB can no longer place the burden of 
establishing the patentability of amended claims on the patent owner in IPR 
proceedings). 
 1082. Id. at 1324. 
 1083. Id. at 1295. 
 1084. Id. at 1296; see also 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2012). 
 1085. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Aqua Prods., 872 F.3d at 1315 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
842). 
 1086. Aqua Prods., 872 F.3d at 1295. 
 1087. Id. at 1335–36. 
 1088. Id. at 1328. 
 1089. Id. at 1328 (Moore, J., concurring). 
 1090. IPR2015-00040, 2015 WL 10709290 (P.T.A.B. July 15, 2015), overruled by Aqua 
Prods., 872 F.3d 1290. 
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Systems, Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc.1091) are not entitled to Chevron deference.1092 
Concurring, Judge Reyna reasoned that § 316(e) is ambiguous as to 
who bears the burden of persuasion on a motion to amend claims in 
IPR, and so proceeded to Chevron step two.1093  He would have held that 
the PTO did not promulgate regulations concerning assignment of the 
burden of proof sufficient enough to satisfy Chevron step two, and the 
PTAB’s reasoning would not be given Chevron deference.1094  
Interpreting § 316(d) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.121 in the first instance, 
Judge Reyna would have held that those rules “place a default burden 
of production [though not of persuasion] on the patentee.”1095  This 
final conclusion was joined by Chief Judge Prost and Judges Chen, 
Taranto, and Hughes, though they do not join Judge Reyna’s Chevron 
step two analysis or his conclusion that vacatur was warranted.1096 
Dissenting from the judgment, Judge Taranto reasoned that 
§ 316(e) was ambiguous as to who bears the burden of persuasion on 
a motion to amend claims in IPR, and so proceeded to Chevron step 
two.1097  He would have held that Chevron deference was owed, however, 
to the PTO’s allocation of the burden of proof per 37 C.F.R. § 42.20(c), 
and so he would have affirmed the PTAB’s decision.1098  Judge Hughes 
joined the Taranto opinion, and further reasoned that 37 C.F.R. 
§ 42.20(c) would be due under Auer v. Robbins1099 deference even if not 
Chevron deference.1100 
2. Obviousness 
In In re Van Os,1101 the Federal Circuit vacated a rejection for 
obviousness finding that the PTAB may not rely on conclusory statements 
of intuitiveness.1102  The claims, which were apparently assigned to Apple, 
related to a touchscreen interface that permits rearranging icons, and 
                                               
 1091. IPR2012-00027, 2013 WL 5947697 (P.T.A.B. June 3, 2013), overruled by Aqua 
Prods., 872 F.3d 1290. 
 1092. Aqua Products, 872 F.3d at 1328. 
 1093. Id. at 1334–35 (Reyna, J., concurring). 
 1094. Id. at 1335. 
 1095. Id. 
 1096. Id. 
 1097. Id. at 1342 (Taranto, J., dissenting). 
 1098. Id. 
 1099. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
 1100. Aqua Prods., 872 F.3d at 1342 (Hughes, J., dissenting). 
 1101. 844 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 1102. Id. at 1361–62 (explaining that “conclusory assertion[s]” with no “articulated 
rationale” do not support a “motivation to combine”). 
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they concerned a sustained button press that would trigger an editing 
mode.1103  The Federal Circuit found that the PTAB erred in holding, 
without discussion, that it would have been “intuitive” to apply sustained-
button-press-to-activate technology from a prior art reference for the 
purpose of invoking editing mode.1104  The PTAB needed to provide 
further reasoning or analysis was necessary to support finding that 
motivation existed to make this modification.1105  Concurring in part 
and dissenting in part, Judge Newman agreed that the PTAB’s 
treatment of the sustained-press-to-edit mode was inadequate, but she 
would have reversed rather than vacated and remanded.1106 
In Rovalma S.A. v. Bohler-Edelstahl GmbH & Co.,1107 the Federal Circuit 
held that the IPR statute does not bar the PTAB from relying on the 
patentee’s own submissions to find obviousness, vacating the IPR 
determination.1108  The PTAB switched its claim construction view—
the institution decision adopted the constructions of the petitioner, 
Böhler, but the final decision adopted the constructions of patentee 
Rovalma.1109  The final decision relied in part on Rovalma’s own 
submissions to find obviousness.1110  The Federal Circuit found that the 
PTAB erred by failing to sufficiently explain the basis for its 
decision.1111  Specifically, the PTAB only substantively discussed one of 
the limitations of the claims and applied generally conclusory 
reasoning to the others.1112  Further, the Federal Circuit found that the 
PTAB’s discussion of motivation to combine was also lacking.1113  This 
alone was sufficient to warrant vacating and remanding the decision, 
so the PTAB could better explain itself.1114 
The Federal Circuit emphasized that the IPR statute did not bar the 
                                               
 1103. Id. at 1360, 1362. 
 1104. Id. at 1361. 
 1105. Id. at 1361–62. 
 1106. Id. at 1362 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 1107. 856 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 1108. Id. at 1019 (explaining that:  (1) “substantial-evidence issues” obviated the 
need for remand; (2) the Board was within its rights to use “patentee’s submissions” to 
discern a claim of obviousness; and (3) the Board inadequately explained its 
determination of obviousness, leaving an open question of whether there were 
procedural violations). 
 1109. Id. at 1024, 1026. 
 1110. Id. at 1024. 
 1111. Id. at 1025–26. 
 1112. Id. 
 1113. Id. 
 1114. Id. 
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PTAB from relying on Rovalma’s own submissions to support its 
obviousness determination.1115  Rovalma had notice of the arguments 
Böhler was making and had an opportunity to respond to them.1116  
The Federal Circuit found that In re Magnum Oil Tools International 
Ltd.1117 was not contrary because, in this appeal, the PTAB did not 
engage in improper burden-shifting.1118  Further, it is well-established 
in other contexts that a tribunal may rely on a party’s own submissions 
in making findings against it.1119 
Agreeing with Rovalma’s contention that it did not receive sufficient 
process under the APA, the Federal Circuit remanded.1120  The same 
deficiencies in the PTAB’s final decision discussed above made it 
impossible to “conclusively determine whether the [PTAB’s] actions 
complied with the APA’s procedural requirements.”1121 
In Outdry Technologies Corp. v. Geox S.p.A.,1122 the Federal Circuit held 
that the PTAB may establish a motivation to combine by reciting the 
petitioner’s arguments, affirming IPR determination of 
obviousness.1123  Outdry’s patent related to methods for waterproofing 
leather goods.1124  The PTAB correctly interpreted the claims, 
ultimately rejecting Outdry’s plea for a narrower construction 
unsupported by the specification.1125  The Federal Circuit also rejected 
Outdry’s attempt to overcome the prior art by relying on the language 
of the preamble, which recited a “process for waterproofing 
leather.”1126  In this case, the preamble “like most preambles [was] 
simply a statement of intended use, not a separate claim limitation,” as 
per Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp.1127  
Further, the PTAB’s finding that a person of skill would have been 
                                               
 1115. Id. at 1026–28. 
 1116. Id. 
 1117. 829 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 1118. Rovalma S.A., 856 F.3d at 1026–28. 
 1119. Id. (citing various cases that demonstrate where tribunals have used party 
submissions against them). 
 1120. Id. at 1029–30. 
 1121. Id. 
 1122. 859 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-408, 2018 WL 1994804 (U.S. 
Apr. 20, 2018). 
 1123. Id. at 1370. 
 1124. Id. at 1366. 
 1125. Id. at 1367–68. 
 1126. Id. 
 1127. 320 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Outdry Techs. Corp., 859 F.3d at 1368 (citing 
Boehringer Ingelheim Vetmedica, 320 F.3d at 1345). 
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motivated to combine references to reach the claimed inventions was 
supported by substantial evidence.1128  Unlike in several recent cases 
where the PTAB failed to adequately explain its analysis of motivation 
to combine, the Federal Circuit “clearly articulated Geox’s arguments” 
showing a motivation1129 stating that the PTAB’s “reliance on Geox’s 
arguments does not undermine its otherwise adequate explanation for 
finding a motivation to combine.”1130  Moreover, there was no 
requirement that the motivation to combine be the same motivation 
described by Outdry’s inventors.1131 
In Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co.,1132 the 
Federal Circuit held that a lack of clear criticism undermines a 
“teaching away” challenge, affirming an IPR determination of 
obviousness.1133  Broad Ocean filed its IPR petition challenging Nidec’s 
patent on obviousness and anticipation grounds.1134  The PTAB 
instituted on the obviousness challenge but denied institution based 
on anticipation because Broad Ocean failed to supply an affidavit 
claiming the accuracy of the translation.1135  Broad Ocean filed a 
second petition re-raising the anticipation ground, including the 
affidavit and seeking joinder with the already-running obviousness 
proceeding.1136  Upon review, the PTAB denied institution as time 
barred.1137  After rehearing, the PTAB reconstituted the Federal Circuit 
with five judges, instead of three, and granted joinder of the two 
proceedings.1138  The expanded PTAB panel ultimately issued the final 
written decision on both obviousness and anticipation grounds.1139 
The Federal Circuit found no need to examine whether the PTAB’s 
construction of the preamble term “HVAC system” as a limitation was 
                                               
 1128. Outdry Techs. Corp., 859 F.3d at 1369–70. 
 1129. Id. at 1369. 
 1130. Id. at 1370. 
 1131. Id. at 1371–72 (“Any motivation to combine references, whether articulated in 
the references themselves or supported by evidence of the knowledge of a skilled 
artisan, is sufficient to combine those references to arrive at the claimed process.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 1132. 868 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-751, 2018 WL 1994809 (U.S. 
Apr. 30, 2018). 
 1133. Id. at 1019 (holding that the PTAB appropriately determined the claim for 
obviousness, but the PTAB declined to reach a conclusion on the anticipation claim). 
 1134. Id. at 1015. 
 1135. Id. 
 1136. Id. 
 1137. Id. 
 1138. Id. 
 1139. Id. at 1015–16. 
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erroneous because it was undisputed that the prior art taught an HVAC 
system either way.1140  The PTAB also did not err in finding that the 
prior art did not teach away from the proposed combination.1141  
Applying Meiresonne v. Google, Inc.,1142 nothing in the art “criticize[d], 
discredit[ed], or otherwise discourage[d]” use of the technology in 
question.1143  The Federal Circuit also rejected Nidec’s argument that 
the prior art, by implication, rejected use of technology like that in the 
companion reference.1144  Because the PTAB’s decision could be 
affirmed on obviousness grounds, there was no need to reach the 
separate issue of whether the PTAB properly rejected a time-bar 
challenge by Nidec to also enter an obviousness determination.1145 
Judge Dyk’s concurrence expressed reservations about the PTAB’s use 
of an expanded PTAB panel to join issues that would otherwise be time 
barred.1146  In this case, the PTAB allowed § 315(c)’s joinder provisions 
to be used in a manner that essentially added issues to the case, i.e., 
Broad Ocean’s anticipation challenge.1147  Judge Dyk believed “it 
unlikely that Congress intended that petitioners could employ the 
joinder provision to circumvent the time bar by adding time-barred 
issues to an otherwise timely proceeding.”1148  Judge Dyk also expressed 
concern about the PTAB’s practice of expanding the administrative 
panel from three judges to five in the context of rehearing a challenged 
issue:  “While we recognize the importance of achieving uniformity in 
PTO decisions, we question whether the practice of expanding panels is 
the appropriate mechanism of achieving the desired uniformity.”1149 
In In re Stepan Co.,1150 the Federal Circuit held that the PTAB must 
fully explain its basis for findings in its motivation to combine analysis, 
vacating the PTAB’s decision to affirm the examiner’s rejection of 
                                               
 1140. Id. at 1017. 
 1141. Id. at 1017–18. 
 1142. 849 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Nidec Motor Corp., 868 F.3d at 1017 (citing 
Meiresonne, 849 F.3d at 1382). 
 1143. Nidec Motor Corp., 868 F.3d at 1017. 
 1144. Id. 
 1145. Id. at 1019. 
 1146. Id. at 1019–20 (Dyk, J., concurring). 
 1147. Id. at 1020. 
 1148. Id. 
 1149. Id. 
 1150. 868 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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claims.1151  The claim related to an herbicide formulation.1152  The 
Federal Circuit held that the PTAB failed to adequately support its 
determination that the applicant, upon being presented with the prior 
art, had failed to establish how the claimed matter demonstrated more 
than “routine optimization” of known techniques.1153  The Federal 
Circuit determined that “[m]issing from the Board’s analysis is an 
explanation as to why it would have been routine optimization to arrive 
at the claimed invention.”1154  On appeal, the PTAB argued that the 
evidence in the record was sufficient to establish a motivation to 
combine references with a reasonable expectation of success.1155  
Citing In re Lee,1156 the Federal Circuit rejected this as “post hoc 
rationalization.”1157  It also rejected a finding by the PTAB as to the 
content of a reference.1158  Finally, the court found that the PTAB erred 
by shifting the burden of proving patentability to Stepan because the 
PTAB had not established a prima facie obviousness case.1159  Further, 
the PTAB erred insofar as it determined that the scope of Stepan’s 
claims was entirely within the scope of the prior art disclosure.1160  
While there was some overlap, it was incomplete, and it was thus the 
PTAB’s burden to establish that the non-overlapping element was 
obvious.1161 
Dissenting, Judge Lourie would have affirmed.1162  While 
acknowledging imperfections in the PTAB’s opinion, to him, the claim 
was clearly obvious over the references.1163 
In EmeraChem Holdings, LLC v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.,1164 
the Federal Circuit held that an uncorroborated declaration was 
insufficient to establish an inventorship claim for cited prior art, 
                                               
 1151. Id. at 1347–48 (remanding the case because of evidentiary issues, questioning 
the Board’s determination of a “reasonable expectation of success” for a person skilled 
in the art, and concluding that the Board’s findings lacked support that the burden 
rests with the PTO for establishing a “prima facie case of obviousness”). 
 1152. Id. at 1344. 
 1153. Id. at 1346. 
 1154. Id. 
 1155. Id. 
 1156. 277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1157. In re Stepan Co., 868 F.3d at 1347. 
 1158. Id. 
 1159. Id. at 1348. 
 1160. Id. 
 1161. Id. 
 1162. Id. at 1348–49 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 1163. Id. 
 1164. 859 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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affirming the IPR determination on obviousness as to some claims and 
vacating the determination as to others.1165  The court held that the 
PTAB did not err in rejecting EmeraChem’s contention that certain 
portions of a key reference were not § 102(e) prior art because they 
were not “by another.”1166  EmeraChem’s sole evidence on this point 
was an uncorroborated declaration by an individual named as an 
inventor on both the patent under review and the prior art reference, 
and the PTAB was under no obligation to accept the declaration as 
true.1167  In re DeBaun,1168  and In re Katz,1169 were not contrary because, 
although the cases involved reliance on a declaration, they “required 
more than a naked assertion by the inventor,” such as additional 
explanation of relevant circumstances.1170  The Federal Circuit noted 
that contemporary documentary corroboration is not required “in 
every case.”1171 
The Federal Circuit did find error in the PTAB’s obviousness 
determination in certain dependent claims without addressing the IPR 
petition or institution decision.1172  Although the Petition included 
general statements concerning this reference or the reference being 
cited for other claims, it did not give EmeraChema sufficient notice 
under the APA’s requirements.1173  In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC,1174 
is not contrary because, in that case, the institution decision “gave the 
patentee notice of the prior art combination that the final decision 
relied upon.”1175  Genzyme did not authorize the PTAB’s decision 
because, there, the patentee had sufficient notice and opportunity to 
respond to the combination the PTAB ultimately used.1176 
In Corning v. Fast Felt Corp.,1177 the Federal Circuit reversed an IPR 
determination of nonobviousness because the record could support 
                                               
 1165. Id. at 1348, 1352. 
 1166. Id. at 1348. 
 1167. Id. at 1345–46. 
 1168. 687 F.2d 459 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
 1169. 687 F.2d 450 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
 1170. Emerachem Holdings, 859 F.3d at 1347 (explaining that these cases provided 
additional evidence—a drawing and additional explanation—to support their 
respective declarations, whereas Emerachem only provided the declaration). 
 1171. Id. at 1347. 
 1172. Id. at 1348. 
 1173. Id. 
 1174. 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016). 
 1175. Emerachem Holdings, 859 F.3d at 1350. 
 1176. Id. 
 1177. 873 F.3d 896 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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no other outcome.1178  The PTAB analysis implicitly applied a claim 
interpretation that failed to reflect the broadest reasonable 
interpretation of a key term.1179  The Federal Circuit considered the 
record and concluded that the PTAB’s decision could only be 
understood as applying a narrow claim scope.1180  The Federal Circuit 
found remand unnecessary because the record lacked sufficient 
evidence to overcome Owens Corning’s prima facie demonstration of 
obviousness based on the proper broadest reasonable interpretation 
construction.1181  Also, Fast Felt did not seek remand in the event that 
the Federal Circuit agreed with Corning’s claim interpretation.1182 
In CRFD Research, Inc. v. Matal,1183 the Federal Circuit consolidated 
three IPR appeals for the same patent, affirmed the invalidation of two 
claims, and reversed the patentability determination of a third claim, 
rendering all challenged claims unpatentable.1184  Essentially, the 
Federal Circuit held that the PTAB may not shortcut the IPR 
obviousness analysis by over-reliance on non-anticipation findings.  
CFRD’s patent related to technology for transferring an ongoing 
communication session from one device to another.1185  The opinion 
analyzes the three written decisions sequentially.1186 
In the first decision, the Federal Circuit agreed with the PTAB’s 
findings on certain CFRD claims regarding anticipation or obviousness 
because the determinations were supported by substantial evidence.1187  
In the second decision, the Federal Circuit found that the PTAB did 
not err in finding other CFRD claims anticipated or obvious.1188  For 
some of these claims, the reasoning of the first decision applied; for 
others, the Federal Circuit considered how the PTAB’s determinations 
were supported by substantial evidence.1189 
In the third decision, the Federal Circuit determined that the PTAB 
committed legal error by failing to separately analyze certain obviousness 
                                               
 1178. Id. at 901. 
 1179. Id. at 900–01. 
 1180. Id. 
 1181. Id. at 901. 
 1182. Id. 
 1183. 876 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 1184. Id. at 1349 (affirming the Board’s findings for some claims regarding 
obviousness and anticipation, but finding error with others). 
 1185. Id. at 1333. 
 1186. Id. at 1337, 1340–41, 1344. 
 1187. Id. at 1337, 1340. 
 1188. Id. at 1342–43. 
 1189. Id. at 1343. 
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arguments made by the petitioner Hulu and by generally over relying on 
a previously performed anticipation analysis.1190  The Federal Circuit 
stated that “[w]hatever the merits of the [PTAB’s} determination that [a 
reference] does not anticipate . . . [a certain limitation], its findings on 
anticipation [were] insufficient as a matter of law to decide the 
obviousness inquiry.”1191  The court found that the PTAB also erred when 
it declined to consider arguments in Hulu’s petition relating to a non-
instituted single-reference obviousness analysis that Hulu had 
incorporated into its multiple-reference grounds.1192  Ultimately, the 
Federal Circuit held that, under a proper obviousness analysis, the record 
demonstrated the unpatentability of CFRD’s claim.1193 
3. Claim Construction 
In MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC v. Ricoh Americas Corp.,1194 the 
Federal Circuit held that distinctions between a provisional and final 
application support a broad claim construction, affirming an IPR 
anticipation decision.1195  MPHJ Technology Investments’s (MPHJ) 
patent related to a virtual copier.1196  MPHJ argued that, properly 
construed, its claims required “single button” operation, meaning that 
a user would push the “go” button on a copier one time and the image 
would be seamlessly replicated onto other devices and applications.1197  
The Federal Circuit held that the PTAB correctly rejected MPHJ’’s 
argument.1198  The Federal Circuit also affirmed PTAB’s findings that 
MPHJ’s claims described a configuration which required a user to take 
multiple steps to initiate a scan and transmit an electronic image.1199  
The Federal Circuit noted that language tending to adopt a “single 
button” limitation in MPHJ’s provisional was removed in the final 
                                               
 1190. Id. at 1345. 
 1191. Id. 
 1192. Id. at 1346 (“To bar Hulu from pressing an argument it raised in a ground the 
[PTAB] found ‘redundant’ and that it expressly incorporated into other proposed 
grounds of unpatentability on which the Board instituted would not only unfairly 
prejudice Hulu, but would also raise questions about the propriety of the Board’s 
redundancy decision.”). 
 1193. Id. at 1349. 
 1194. 847 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 1195. Id. at 1363 (holding that the patent did not adequately describe an operation 
and there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of anticipation). 
 1196. Id. at 1364. 
 1197. Id. at 1368. 
 1198. Id. at 1369. 
 1199. Id. at 1368. 
1250 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1141 
 
application, and that references to “single button” operation in the 
final specification characterized it as optional.1200  Thus, the Federal 
Circuit held that the PTAB did not err in finding several of MPHJ’s 
claims anticipated.1201  Further, the PTAB also did not err in its other 
claim constructions.1202 
Dissenting, Judge O’Malley would have adopted MPHJ’s “single 
button” claim interpretation based on statements in the specification 
amounting to “unmistakable disavowal.”1203  She would have partially 
reversed the PTAB’s anticipation determination, as well as its alternative 
determination of obviousness (which the majority did not reach).1204 
In Organik Kimya AS v. Rohm & Haas Co.,1205 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the IPR decisions confirming patentability as to two Rohm & 
Haas patents, holding that grammatical uncertainty in the 
specification does not require an expansive view of the “broadest 
reasonable interpretation” standard.1206  The Federal Circuit found 
that the PTAB did not err in its determination of the broadest reasonable 
interpretation of a claim term.1207  The Federal Circuit considered the 
record, and rejected Organik’s argument that definitional language in 
the specification was grammatically ambiguous.1208  Organik argued that 
the PTAB erred in resolving the ambiguity with the narrower of two 
possible approaches.1209  The language in question1210 was not actually 
ambiguous and meant that the suitable swelling agents were those having 
the characteristic in question.1211  Applying that construction, the 
Federal Circuit concluded the record established neither anticipation 
nor obviousness.1212 
4. Moving Forward with IPR Practice 
The Supreme Court has recently issued two decisions that will impact 
                                               
 1200. Id. at 1368–69. 
 1201. Id. at 1369. 
 1202. Id. at 1370. 
 1203. Id. at 1374–76 (O’Malley, J., dissenting). 
 1204. Id. at 1380–81. 
 1205. 873 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 1206. Id. at 892, 896. 
 1207. Id. at 892. 
 1208. Id. 
 1209. Id. 
 1210. “Suitable swelling agents include, are those which, [have a certain 
characteristic].”  Id. 
 1211. Id. 
 1212. Id. at 894, 896. 
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IPR practice.  First, the Supreme Court in SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu,1213  
examined whether, in an IPR, the PTAB must enter a final decision on 
every claim addressed in the petition, or only some of the claims.1214  In 
the decision being reviewed, the Federal Circuit held that the PTAB, in its 
written decision, did not have to address those claims for which the PTAB 
did not institute IPR.1215  The Supreme Court reversed this decision 
finding that the PTAB must resolve all claims in the IPR petition.1216 
Second, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of IPR 
proceedings in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC.1217  
The Supreme Court held that, because patents are public rights, an IPR is 
constitutional both under Article III and the Seventh Amendment.1218 
B. Inter Partes Reexamination 
In Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Strava, Inc.,1219 the Federal Circuit 
vacated in part and affirmed in part the PTAB’s rejection for 
obviousness following inter partes reexamination (IPRx).1220  The 
Federal Circuit held that the PTAB did not erroneously rely in part on 
Strava’s expert declarations.1221  Even though Strava’s expert 
declaration included certain borderline legal conclusions (e.g., stating 
something “would have been obvious”), this did not render the 
declaration unreliable.1222  However, the PTAB failed to support its 
obviousness determinations for some claims with sufficient factual 
findings and explanations.1223  The Federal Circuit determined that the 
PTAB decision failed to materially discuss Strava’s arguments for 
several claims, and its attempt to incorporate by reference the 
examiner’s determinations, which, in turn, referenced Strava’s 
submissions and expert declarations, was improper.1224  The Federal 
Circuit held that “[t]his multi-layered incorporation by reference does 
                                               
 1213. No. 16-969, 2018 WL 1914661 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018). 
 1214. Id. at *2. 
 1215. SAS Inst., Inc. v. Complementsoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 
2016), rev’d, No. 16-969, 2018 WL 1914661 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018). 
 1216. SAS Inst., Inc., 2018 WL 1914661, at *9–10. 
 1217. No. 16-712, 2018 WL 1914662 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018). 
 1218. Id. at *11. 
 1219. 849 F.3d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 1220. Id. at 1040–49 (noting that the PTAB properly relied on the expert declaration, 
even though it committed error in a few but not all of the claims). 
 1221. Id. at 1039–41. 
 1222. Id. at 1041. 
 1223. Id. at 1041–44. 
 1224. Id. at 1041–46. 
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not satisfy the substantial evidence standard of review.”1225  While the 
PTAB may, in some cases, incorporate by reference an examiner’s 
treatment, simply incorporating a party’s arguments by reference is 
insufficient because it does nothing to “transform . . . attorney 
argument into factual findings or supply the requisite explanation that 
must accompany those findings.”1226  The Federal Circuit further 
reviewed several categories of the PTAB’s decision concerning Icon’s 
claims, finding some adequately supported by factual findings and 
explanation, whereas others were not.1227  Those determinations 
lacking sufficient explanation were vacated and remanded; the rest 
were affirmed.1228  Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge 
O’Malley agreed with the majority’s discussion, but she would have 
reversed rather than vacated on those claims where the PTO and PTAB 
had failed to carry their burden to establish unpatentability.1229 
In In re Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC,1230 the Federal Circuit held that 
dismissal of invalidity counterclaims without prejudice does not invoke 
§ 317(b) estoppel against IPRx, affirming the PTAB’s determination of 
unpatentability.1231  The PTO did not err when it denied Affinity’s 
motion to have the IPRx terminated after Affinity settled a co-pending 
district court litigation with requestor Apple.1232  Section 317(b) only 
imposes an estoppel against maintenance of IPRx proceedings 
following a “final decision” in civil litigation as to patentability.1233  
Because the district court litigation never reached the merits of Apple’s 
invalidity counterclaims and because the district court dismissed those 
counterclaims without prejudice to Apple re-filing them, there was no 
“final decision” suitable to invoke § 317(b).1234 
As to the validity analysis, the Federal Circuit rejected Affinity’s claim 
interpretation as unduly narrow.1235  Affinity argued that claim steps of 
“sending” certain content to two separate computers must occur 
                                               
 1225. Id. at 1042. 
 1226. Id. at 1043–44. 
 1227. Id. at 1049. 
 1228. Id. 
 1229. Id. (O’Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 1230. 856 F.3d 902 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-233, 2018 WL 1994800 (U.S. 
Apr. 30, 2018). 
 1231. Id. at 907–08. 
 1232. Id. at 904. 
 1233. Id. 
 1234. Id. at 905. 
 1235. Id. at 907. 
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without any intervening step after “receiving” a request.1236  The 
Federal Circuit reasoned that this was inconsistent with the claim 
language, which set the two steps up as separate steps—i.e., not a single 
step.1237  The Federal Circuit also noted that the claim preamble used 
the open-ended term “comprising” in setting forth the claim.1238 
The Federal Circuit affirmed an IPRx obviousness determination in 
In re Ethicon, Inc.,1239 holding that a normal desire to optimize the 
claimed invention can support a finding of obviousness.1240  The claims 
at issue related to drug-delivery stents.1241  The Federal Circuit found 
that substantial evidence supported the PTAB’s determination that the 
prior art taught all limitations of Ethicon’s claims and taught a 
motivation to combine them.1242  The Federal Circuit rejected 
Ethicon’s argument that one reference taught away from another 
stating that the mere statement that one sort of polymer “is probably 
more desirable,” without more, is not teaching away.1243  There was also 
no error in the PTAB’s determination that a person of skill would have 
relied on certain art that was somewhat old and tangentially related to 
the field at issue.1244  The art taught the general properties of the 
copolymer family that was ultimately claimed.1245  Moreover, the 
Federal Circuit held that the PTAB also did not err in concluding that 
Ethicon’s evidence on secondary considerations of nonobviousness 
was insufficient to overcome the prima facie obviousness case.1246  
Ethicon was relying “solely on its expert’s conclusory testimony” 
regarding copying; its evidence on unexpected results was thin, and its 
evidence on commercial success “did not establish that any success, 
praise or unexpected results were due to the [patented] coating, 
rather than due to an unclaimed feature such as the drug or stent 
design.”1247  Dissenting, Judge Newman would have held that the claims 
were nonobvious, noting that none of the references cited disclosed 
                                               
 1236. Id. at 906. 
 1237. Id. at 907. 
 1238. Id. 
 1239. 844 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 1240. Id. at 1352. 
 1241. Id. at 1346–47. 
 1242. Id. at 1350. 
 1243. Id. at 1351. 
 1244. Id. at 1349, 1351. 
 1245. Id. at 1351 (“The normal desire of artisans to improve upon what is already 
generally known can provide the motivation to optimize.”). 
 1246. Id. at 1352. 
 1247. Id. 
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the copolymer coating material described in the claims.1248 
In Fairchild (Taiwan) Corp. v. Power Integrations, Inc.,1249 the Federal 
Circuit granted a motion to remand to the PTAB with instructions to 
vacate the IPRx decision and issue the reexamination certificate 
because of a jury verdict confirming the nonobviousness of the asserted 
patents.1250  The IPRx proceeding was initiated by Power Integrations 
in 2012 and concerned a patent that was the subject of ongoing 
litigation between Power Integrations (PI) and Fairchild.1251  While the 
district court matter was pending, the examiner in the IPRx rejected 
Fairchild’s claims, the PTAB affirmed, and Fairchild appealed.1252 
In the meantime, the litigation resulted in a jury verdict rejecting 
PI’s invalidity arguments.1253  Sometime after the PTAB’s affirmance, 
the Federal Circuit affirmed that aspect of the district court 
judgment.1254  The time for PI to seek a writ of certiorari expired, 
rendering that aspect of the district court proceeding final.1255  35 
U.S.C. § 317(b) thus barred “maintain[ing]” the IPRx proceeding, 
which by this time was on appeal to the Federal Circuit, because the 
proceeding involved claims that were raised in a civil action that had 
reached final decision.1256  The Federal Circuit reasoned that “[i]f a 
defendant brought an invalidity challenge in a district court litigation 
and was unsuccessful, it is not permitted to bring the same challenge 
in an [IPRx].”1257  The Federal Circuit’s affirmance of the jury’s verdict 
included a remand on infringement and other issues unrelated to 
patent validity was irrelevant for purposes of applying § 317(b).1258  
And, while Fairchild had claims in the IPRx that were not in the 
litigation, it had committed to abandon those claims.1259  On remand, 
the Federal Circuit ordered the PTAB to dismiss the IPRx as to the 
claims in the litigation and to issue a reexamination certificate 
                                               
 1248. Id. at 1358 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 1249. 854 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 1250. Id. at 1366. 
 1251. Id. at 1365. 
 1252. Id. 
 1253. Id. 
 1254. Id. (citing Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 843 
F.3d 1315, 1340–42 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). 
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Cir. 2013)). 
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2018] 2017 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 1255 
 
invalidating the abandoned claims.1260 
In In re Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC, the Federal Circuit found that the 
PTAB properly refused to terminate a merged reexamination proceeding 
following the district court verdict of patentability as to only one 
requestor.1261  The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s determination 
that merged reexamination proceedings two IPRxs and one ex parte 
reexamination (EPRx) could continue even after a district court litigation 
involving one of the requesting parties resulted in a verdict confirming 
patentability for some claims.1262  The Federal Circuit also affirmed the 
PTAB’s determination of unpatentability for all claims.1263 
The Federal Circuit held that the PTAB did not err in denying 
Affinity’s motion to terminate the entire merged proceeding after it 
obtained a verdict in civil litigation that some, but not all, of the claims 
under reexamination were valid.1264  Applying § 317(b)’s plain 
language, the estoppel to continue reexamination proceedings only 
applies to the party that actually participated in the civil action (the 
PTO severed out Volkswagen’s participation) and only applies to those 
claims actually addressed in the action.1265  The Federal Circuit rejected 
Affinity’s argument that reexamination should be terminated as to all 
claims in the patent (as opposed to only those claims in the civil 
action), and rejected Affinity’s argument that § 317 imposes a “patent-
based,” as opposed to claim-based, estoppel in the case of already 
instituted reexamination proceedings.1266  The Federal Circuit also 
rejected Affinity’s argument for preclusive effect against the 
reexaminations initiated by parties other than Volkswagen.1267  As to 
the EPRx, § 317 had no effect.1268  And regarding the non-Volkswagen 
IPRx, as stated above, the statute imposes estoppel only against those 
who actually participate in the civil litigation.1269 
Regarding the validity analysis, the Federal Circuit found that the 
PTAB’s conclusion that Affinity’s claims were unpatentable over the 
                                               
 1260. Id. 
 1261. In re Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC, 856 F.3d 883, 886 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 
No. 17-233, 2018 WL 1994800 (U.S. Apr. 30, 2018). 
 1262. Id. 
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prior art was supported by substantial evidence as to all challenged 
claims.1270  The Federal Circuit also rejected Affinity’s argument that 
the PTAB erred in analyzing Affinity’s objective indicia of 
nonobviousness.1271  It noted that Affinity “provided no explanation or 
analysis that corroborates the relationship between the claims of the 
patent and the relevant market.1272  And although Affinity had 
demonstrated a significant history of licensing, the Federal Circuit 
noted that “the mere fact of licensing alone cannot be considered 
strong evidence of nonobviousness if it cannot also be shown that the 
licensees did so out of respect for the patent rather than to avoid the 
expense of litigation.”1273  The Federal Circuit noted that Affinity had 
failed to make this latter showing.1274 
In In re AT & T Intellectual Property II, L.P.,1275 the Federal Circuit held 
that a decision to institute IPRx is not reviewable despite a requestor’s 
motion to have the petition denied, and it affirmed the IPRx 
determination of anticipation.1276  Per § 312(c) and Belkin International, 
Inc. v. Kappos,1277 the Federal Circuit lacked authority to review the 
PTAB’s institution decision.1278  Although the petitioner, LG, had sought 
denial of the petition so that it could file an IPR petition, the Federal 
Circuit determined that the PTAB could still review the petition.1279  As 
to the anticipation determination, the Federal Circuit found that 
substantial evidence supported the PTAB’s determination.1280  The 
Federal Circuit also rejected AT & T’s contention that the examiner 
shifted its basis for finding anticipation.1281 
In Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Cirrex Systems, LLC,1282 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed in part and reversed in part an IPRx determination finding 
that the claims at issue were unpatentable for lack of written 
                                               
 1270. Id. at 898, 900. 
 1271. Id. at 887. 
 1272. Id. at 901. 
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description.1283  On claim construction, the Federal Circuit considered 
how the parties agreed to construction of a certain term, but it found 
that the PTAB erred in holding that this construction covered a 
specific embodiment.1284  The discussion was highly fact specific and 
concerned equalization and attenuation of light signals in a fiber optic 
communication system.1285  Applying the correct construction, the 
Federal Circuit found all the claims on appeal lacking in written 
description support, so the PTAB erred insofar as it had held some 
claims patentable.1286  The Federal Circuit noted that each of the claims 
that the PTAB found patentable had been added by amendment 
during prosecution and so cannot be relied on to establish written 
description support per Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp.1287  Applying 
the appropriate claim construction, the Federal Circuit found that the 
material Cirrex had been citing for its written description arguments 
failed to teach a requirement of the claims—namely, the attenuation 
of certain light signals while they were still inside a certain circuit.1288 
As to the claims where the PTAB had found unpatentability for lack 
of written description, the Federal Circuit affirmed.1289  The material 
cited by Cirrex failed to teach the claims’ requirement of a “diverting 
element” inside a certain circuit.1290 
In IPCom GmbH v. HTC Corp.,1291 the Federal Circuit held that the 
PTAB’s failure to identify a specific algorithm for a means-plus-
function limitation required partial vacatur and remanded the PTAB’s 
IPRx obviousness determination.1292  The Federal Circuit found the 
PTAB erred in its interpretation of a means-plus-function limitation 
appearing in several claims.  Specifically, the PTAB erroneously failed 
to identify the algorithm in the specification corresponding to the 
claimed means.1293  Under In re Donaldson Co.,1294 the application of the 
                                               
 1283. Id. at 1011. 
 1284. Id. at 1005–06. 
 1285. E.g., id. at 1000 (discussing the scientific process of the optical network assembly). 
 1286. Id. at 999. 
 1287. 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that the patentee’s initial 
disclosure limits the permissible scope of his later-drafted claims); Cisco Sys., 856 F.3d 
at 1007 (citing Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1479). 
 1288. Cisco Sys., 856 F.3d at 1009. 
 1289. Id. at 1011. 
 1290. Id. 
 1291. 861 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 1292. Id. at 1378. 
 1293. Id. at 1369. 
 1294. 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
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“broadest reasonable interpretation” standard is not a justification for 
construing a means-plus-function limitation as encompassing any 
means capable of performing the function.1295  The PTAB had rejected 
the algorithm tendered by patent owner IPCom, but it did not identify 
an algorithm of its own.1296  On remand, the PTAB needed to identify 
the appropriate algorithm.1297  The Federal Circuit vacated the 
obviousness determinations for claims affected by this issue.1298 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s remaining 
determinations.1299  For those claims unaffected by the issue above, 
substantial evidence supported the Board’s obviousness 
determinations.1300  The Federal Circuit considered the references, 
and the proof of motivation to combine.1301  The court found that the 
PTAB did not err in reviewing the patentability of certain claims.  
These claims had initially been part of the IPRx, but the PTAB did not 
mention them when it issued a new ground of rejection following an 
initial determination of patentability by the examiner.1302  Following 
the PTAB’s decision, IPCom reopened prosecution and amended the 
claims in question.1303  On that basis, the court held that there was no 
error in the PTAB exercising jurisdiction to consider HTC’s challenge 
to the claims when the matter returned to the PTAB.1304 
In Soft Gel Technologies, Inc. v. Jarrow Formulas, Inc.,1305 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the PTAB’s IPRx obviousness determinations holding 
that the “reasonable expectation of success” concept does not require 
certainty.1306  In its analysis, the Federal Circuit was mostly fact-oriented, 
and it rejected Soft Gel’s arguments as to the content of the record.1307  
In rejecting Soft Gel’s argument that a person of skill would not have 
had a reasonable expectation of success in combining various aspects of 
the references, the Federal Circuit noted that the law does not require 
                                               
 1295. IPCom GmbG, 861 F.3d at 1369 (quoting In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1194). 
 1296. Id. at 1370–71. 
 1297. Id. at 1371. 
 1298. Id. 
 1299. Id. at 1372–76. 
 1300. Id. at 1376. 
 1301. Id. at 1375. 
 1302. Id. at 1371. 
 1303. Id. 
 1304. Id. at 1372. 
 1305. 864 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 1306. Id. at 1335. 
 1307. Id. at 1340. 
2018] 2017 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 1259 
 
“absolute predictability.”1308  A reference suggesting that one dissolve a 
certain compound (“CoQ10”) in lemon oil was sufficient to support a 
reasonable expectation of success in dissolving CoQ10 in d-limonene (a 
major constituent of lemon oil).1309  Thus, the Federal Circuit affirmed. 
C. Interference 
In Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Chinese 
University of Hong Kong,1310 the Federal Circuit vacated the cancellation 
of Stanford’s patent claims following interference proceedings due to 
written description issues.1311  The claims related to methods for detecting 
fetal aneuploidies (abnormalities in the number of fetal 
chromosomes).1312  After the PTAB found Stanford’s claims 
unpatentable, Stanford appealed to the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California under § 146.1313  Subsequently, Biogen 
MA, Inc., v. Japanese Foundation for Cancer Research,1314 held that, for post-
AIA interferences, the Federal Circuit is the exclusive appellate tribunal 
from PTAB interference decisions, and the appeal was subsequently 
transferred to the Federal Circuit.1315  The Federal Circuit declined to 
address Stanford’s argument that Biogen was incorrectly decided.1316  
Instead, the Federal Circuit noted that the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in that case, and thus Biogen remains controlling law.1317 
The Federal Circuit rejected Stanford’s argument that discovery taken 
while the case was in the Northern District of California, including expert 
discovery, could be taken into account in reviewing the Board’s 
interference decisions.1318  “Given that the district court did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction to review the Board’s interference decisions, 
Stanford’s attempt to include evidence elicited during proceedings there 
is inappropriate—the activities in the district court are a nullity.”1319 
The Federal Circuit determined that on the record before it, the 
                                               
 1308. Id. at 1342. 
 1309. Id. at 1339. 
 1310. 860 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 1311. Id. at 1369. 
 1312. Id. at 1370. 
 1313. Id. at 1373 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 146 (2012)). 
 1314. 785 F.3d 648 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 1315. Bd. of Trusts. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 860 F.3d at 1373 (citing Biogen, 
785 F.3d at 650). 
 1316. Id. at 1374. 
 1317. Id. 
 1318. Id. at 1375. 
 1319. Id. at 1374. 
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PTAB erred in relying on certain testimony from Chinese University of 
Hong Kong’s expert as to how a person of skill would have read various 
references in Stanford’s specification at the time of the invention.1320  
The testimony failed to cite support for its conclusions, and Stanford 
had assembled counterevidence.1321  Therefore, the Federal Circuit 
held that the PTAB should not have relied in an unquestioning way on 
the testimony in question.1322  Nor should the PTAB have presumed 
that a reference in Stanford’s specification could only disclose one 
technique or another; it could have disclosed both.1323 
D. Derivation 
Encouragement to undertake research does not amount to 
derivation.  In Cumberland Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Mylan Institutional 
LLC,1324 the Federal Circuit affirmed an infringement judgment 
against Mylan.1325  Cumberland’s patent was to “acetylcysteine 
compositions substantially free of chelating agents,” such as 
Cumberland’s ACETADOTE product.1326  The Federal Circuit found 
that the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Mylan had 
failed to prove derivation.  Even though the FDA had prompted 
Cumberland to undertake the research that eventually led to the 
invention, this did not establish derivation.1327  Per Gambro Lundia AB 
v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,1328 “derivation” does not necessarily occur by 
a third party communicating an idea that makes the invention 
obvious.1329  Similarly, an FDA suggestion that Cumberland “remove or 
reduce” the previously present chelating agent did not teach the 
claimed invention because it did not “direct a skilled artisan to remove 
[the chelating agent], add nothing else, and test the resulting 
formulation in exactly the manner to lead to the invention.”1330  The 
Federal Circuit determined that the district court also did not clearly 
err in rejecting Mylan’s obviousness challenge.  Though the FDA had 
                                               
 1320. Id. at 1377. 
 1321. Id. 
 1322. Id. at 1376. 
 1323. Id. at 1377. 
 1324. 846 F.3d 1213 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 1325. Id. at 1215. 
 1326. Id. at 1214. 
 1327. Id. at 1221. 
 1328. 110 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 1329. Cumberland Pharm., 846 F.3d at 1218. 
 1330. Id. at 1221. 
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encouraged Cumberland to remove the chelating agent, all prior art 
indicated that without such an agent, the formulation would be 
unstable.1331  Because stability was expressly a requirement of the claim, 
the Federal Circuit held that there was no clear error in the district 
court’s determination that a person of skill “would not have reasonably 
expected a chelating-agent-free intranvenous acetylcysteine 
formulation to succeed in being stable.”1332 
E. Covered Business Methods 
As covered business method (CBM) proceedings become more 
popular, the Federal Circuit addressed the subject-matter eligibility for 
various methods.  In Secure Axcess, LLC v. PNC Bank National Ass’n,1333 
the Federal Circuit held that references in the specification to use the 
claimed invention in banking was insufficient to establish the CBM 
status, reversing the determination that Secure Axcess’s patent was a 
CBM patent and vacating subsequently-made claim construction and 
obviousness determinations.1334  The patent claimed methods and 
systems for authenticating web pages in connection with “activities that 
are financial in nature” described in various portions of the written 
description.1335  The Federal Circuit emphasized that CBM-status 
inquiry focuses on the claims, not the written description.1336  Further, 
the Federal Circuit found that the PTAB erred in reasoning that CBM 
status could be triggered by claims addressing technology “incidental 
to a financial activity.”1337  Under Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc.,1338 
the statutory definition of a CBM patent does not include patents 
claiming material “incidental” to such activities.1339  The court found 
remand unnecessary:  on the appellate record, Secure Axcess’s patent 
lacked “a single claim that could qualify this patent as a ‘patent that 
claims a method or corresponding apparatus . . . used in the practice 
                                               
 1331. Id. at 1222. 
 1332. Id. 
 1333. 841 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2017), reh’g denied, 682 F. App’x 928 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 
(per curiam), and cert. denied, No. 17-357, 2018 WL 1994803 (U.S. Apr. 30, 2018). 
 1334. Id. at 1373. 
 1335. Id. 
 1336. Id. at 1378–79. 
 1337. Id. at 1380. 
 1338. 848 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017), reh’g denied, 859 F.3d 998 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per 
curiam), and petition for cert. docketed, No. 17-350 (U.S. Sept. 7, 2017). 
 1339. Secure Axcess, 848 F.3d at 1380 (citing Unwired Planet, 841 F.3d at 1382). 
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[etc.] of a financial product or service.’”1340 
Dissenting, Judge Lourie concluded that Secure Axcess’s patent was 
directed to a covered business method, reasoning that the claims were 
“used in the practice” of providing financial services, particularly in 
view of the written description’s repeated references to banks, and 
Secure Axcess’s assertion of the patent against a litany of banks.1341 
On petition for a rehearing en banc, the Federal Circuit denied review 
of the Secure Axcess determination limiting CBM status to claims reciting 
financial activity.1342  The issue was whether patents whose claims 
included no reference to financial activity, but whose specifications 
indicated that they were for use in that field, qualified for CBM 
review.1343  The judges were decidedly split in opinion.1344  In 
concurrence, Judge Taranto approved the Federal Circuit’s decision 
that claims not clearly directed to financial activity would not qualify for 
CBM review.1345  He noted that congressional redrafting would be a 
better approach to address the policy concerns raised by others.1346  Also 
concurring, Judges O’Malley and Reyna approved the denial of en banc 
review, for the reasons in Judge Plager’s concurrence in the denial of 
Federal Circuit rehearing.1347  Concurring from denial of the rehearing, 
Judge Plager endorsed the PTAB’s reasoning and emphasized that 
because this was an appeal from an administrative agency, the Federal 
Circuit was not in a position to substitute an alternate basis on the CBM-
coverage issue from the basis used by the PTAB.1348  He associated Judge 
Lourie’s dissent as advocating such an alternate basis.1349 
As in his dissent from the panel opinion, Judge Lourie disagreed 
with the panel’s analysis and argued that the matter should have 
appeared en banc.1350  In his view, the Federal Circuit’s reasoning was 
inconsistent with the statutory language, congressional intent, and 
                                               
 1340. Id. at 1382 (alternations in original). 
 1341. Id. at 1382, 1385 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 1342. Secure Axcess v. PNC Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 859 F.3d 998, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (per 
curiam). 
 1343. Id. at 1000 (Taranto, J., concurring). 
 1344. Judge Stoll did not participate in the en banc proceeding.  Judge Plager 
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 1345. Id. at 998, 1000 (Taranto, J., concurring). 
 1346. Id. at 999. 
 1347. Id. at 1003 (O’Malley, J., concurring). 
 1348. Id. at 1013–14 (Plager, J., concurring). 
 1349. Id. 
 1350. Id. at 1004 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
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Federal Circuit precedent.1351  Also dissenting, Judge Dyk raised 
questions regarding the issue of whether claims address a “financial 
product or service” is appealable under the AIA.1352  In his view, it is 
not appealable, and Versata Development Group, Inc. v. SAP America, 
Inc.,1353 reaching the opposite result, was wrongly decided.1354 
In Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services,1355 the Federal Circuit held 
that there was no estoppel against maintaining a CBM challenge on claims 
that were not previously instituted, affirming CBM patent-ineligibility 
determination.1356  Credit Acceptance Corp.’s (CAC) patent related to 
providing financing to a customer who is purchasing a product from a 
dealer’s inventory.1357  Two CBM proceedings were at issue, both 
brought by Westlake.  The first resulted in an institution decision that was 
pre-Alice and in which the PTAB declined to institute review of certain 
claims of CAC’s patent.1358  The second CBM petition was post-Alice, but 
before the first proceeding reached a final written decision, and this time 
the PTAB addressed the subject-matter patentability of the claims it had 
previously declined to review.1359  The PTAB reached a written review on 
the first CBM proceeding and CAC moved to terminate the second 
claim, arguing that § 325(e)(1) barred Westlake from challenging the 
claims that the PTAB had declined to institute on.1360 
The Federal Circuit held that it has jurisdiction to review the PTAB’s 
decision that Westlake was not estopped.1361  The court did not find 
Cuozzo contradictory because § 325(e)(1) is not limited to institution 
decisions; its estoppel governs any stage of subsequent proceedings, 
and the ability of an estopped petitioner to “maintain” a 
proceeding.1362  The Federal Circuit reasoned that the AIA does not 
bar review of such decisions, and noted that it would be incongruous 
for estoppel to be non-reviewable as to subsequent CBM proceedings, 
but would be reviewable as to subsequent district court or ITC 
                                               
 1351. Id. at 1008. 
 1352. Id. at 1010 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 1353. 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 1354. Secure Axcess, 859 F.3d at 1010–11. 
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 1358. Id. 
 1359. Id. at 1048. 
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proceedings, as per AIA § 18(a)(1)(D).1363 
The Federal Circuit determined that the PTAB did not err in 
concluding that Westlake was not estopped.  Under Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor 
Graphics Corp.,1364 there was no estoppel in future PTO proceedings for 
claims on which CBM was not instituted.1365  The Federal Circuit reasoned 
that Shaw Industries Group v. Automated Creel Systems, Inc.1366 was 
supportive because, in that case, IPR estoppel attached only to those 
grounds that could have actually been raised during the IPR—which 
did not include non-instituted grounds.1367  Likewise, the court found 
that the PTAB did not err in finding the claims patent-ineligible.  At 
Alice step one, they claim the abstract idea of processing an application 
for financing a purchase.1368  There was no meaningful distinction 
against the abstract claims in Alice or Bilski v. Kappos.1369  The Federal 
Circuit rejected CAC’s argument that the claims improved the 
functionality of computers—they did so only by automating previously 
manual processes, so the computer-specific solution of Enfish was not 
applicable.1370  The claims also failed to recite an inventive concept at 
Alice step two.1371  Nothing in the recitation of components transforms 
the claim into anything more than an abstract idea. 
Dissenting in part, Judge Mayer would have held that the Federal 
Circuit lacks jurisdiction to review the PTAB’s decision to deny a 
motion to terminate for § 325(e)(1) estoppel.1372 
In Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service,1373 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed a CBM determination of subject-matter ineligibility.1374  As an 
initial matter, the PTAB’s determination that the Postal Service had 
standing to file a petition for CBM review is subject to judicial 
review.1375  The Federal Circuit reasoned that neither Cuozzo, nor 
                                               
 1363. Id. at 1050–51. 
 1364. 814 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2016), overruled by Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, 872 
F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc). 
 1365. Credit Acceptance Corp., 859 F.3d at 1052 (citing Synopsys, 814 F.3d at 1316). 
 1366. 817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 374 (2016). 
 1367. Credit Acceptance Corp., 859 F.3d at 1053. 
 1368. Id. at 1054. 
 1369. 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (plurality opinion); Credit Acceptance Corp., 859 F.3d at 
1054. 
 1370. Credit Acceptance Corp., 859 F.3d at 1055. 
 1371. Id. at 1056. 
 1372. Id. at 1057 (Mayer, J., dissenting in part). 
 1373. 868 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 1374. Id. at 1371. 
 1375. Id. at 1356–59. 
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Achates, precludes judicial review, as the determination of whether a 
party has statutory authorization to file a petition is qualitatively 
different from the merits-oriented analysis in institution decisions that 
35 U.S.C. § 324(e) puts beyond judicial review.1376  As to the merits, the 
Federal Circuit found that the PTAB did not err in determining that 
the Postal Service had standing to file a petition for CBM review.1377  
Applying de novo review, there was no error in the PTAB’s 
determination that Return Mail’s § 1498(a) suit against the Postal 
Service in the Claims Court was a suit for “infringement” sufficient to 
confer standing.1378  The Federal Circuit rejected Return Mail’s 
argument that AIA § 18(a)(1)(B)’s provision permitting CBM review 
upon an infringement suit could only be triggered under the Patent 
Act,1379 holding that “[i]nfringement is a prerequisite to § 1498(a) 
liability; the government’s infringement triggers its obligation to pay just 
compensation.”1380  The Federal Circuit noted that this reading creates 
tension with the estoppel provision of AIA § 18(a)(1)(D), which by its 
text applies to petitioners litigating in district court or the ITC, but does 
not mention the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.1381  As to the dissent’s 
argument about whether the word “person” in § 18(a)(1)(B) could 
include the Postal Service, the Federal Circuit noted that Return Mail 
had not made this argument, and it disagreed that the term could not 
include a government agency in this context.1382 
On the merits, the court held that the PTAB had properly found 
Return Mail’s claims patent-ineligible under § 101.  Under Alice step 1, 
the claims were directed to the abstract idea of relaying “mailing 
address data” by reviewing encoded data about message addressing 
and transferring certain electronic data based on whether the sender 
did or did not want to receive corrected addresses for the addressee in 
question.1383  The Federal Circuit held that Return Mail’s claims were 
not specific to improving technology, but rather that they were fully 
practicable by a human mind.1384  Under Alice step 2, the court held 
                                               
 1376. Id. at 1356–59. 
 1377. Id. at 1356–57. 
 1378. Id. at 1362–63, 1366–67. 
 1379. Id. at 1361. 
 1380. Id. at 1364. 
 1381. Id. (“Although this raises certain policy concerns, Congress is better suited to 
address them by revising the estoppel provisions for CBM review should it see fit.”). 
 1382. Id. at 1365. 
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that the claims lacked an inventive concept.  Their references to 
“encoded data,” and certain uses of the data, “amount[ed] to a basic 
logic determination of what to do given a user’s preferences.”1385  The 
Federal Circuit rejected Return Mail’s argument that the claims should 
be found non-abstract because, as a practical matter, the claims did not 
preempt any commercially deployed mail processing systems.1386  Per 
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., “the absence of complete 
preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.”1387 
Dissenting, Judge Newman would have held that the issue of whether the 
Postal Service was a “person” under § 18(a)(1)(B) was a jurisdictional issue, 
not subject to waiver, and she would have held that the term “person,” in 
this context, does not include the United States or its agencies.1388 
VIII. PHARMACEUTICALS AND BIOLOGICS PRACTICE 
Federal law does not authorize an injunction to force biosimilar 
manufacturers to engage in Biologics Price Competition and 
Innovation Act1389 (BPCIA) sharing of application details.  In Sandoz 
Inc. v. Amgen Inc.,1390 the Supreme Court vacated in part and reversed 
in part the Federal Circuit’s opinion1391 interpreting various aspects of 
the BPCIA.1392  The Supreme Court closely analyzed 35 U.S.C. § 262(l), 
which describes the “patent dance” that biosimilars must engage in 
before beginning marketing.1393  The Supreme Court found that the 
Federal Circuit correctly held that federal law does not authorize an 
injunction to require a biosimilar applicant (here, Sandoz) to disclose 
its FDA application and manufacturing information to the 
manufacturer of the reference product (the “sponsor”; here, Amgen), 
as contemplated by § 262(l)(2)(A).1394  The appropriate remedy for an 
applicant’s failure to disclose such material is the sponsor’s ability to 
                                               
 1385. Id. at 1368–69. 
 1386. Id. at 1369–70. 
 1387. Id. at 1370. 
 1388. Id. at 1371–72 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 1389. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered section of 42 U.S.C.). 
 1390. 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017). 
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file a declaratory judgment action for infringement because the 
submission of the application to the FDA is itself an infringing act 
under § 271(e)(2)(C)(i) and (ii).1395  Though reaching the same 
outcome, the Supreme Court changed the reasoning.  The Supreme 
Court made clear that the act of “artificial infringement” for 
biosimilars occurs with submission of the application.1396 
However, the Supreme Court determined that the Federal Circuit 
erred when it rejected Amgen’s request for an injunction under state 
law.1397  Contrary to the Federal Circuit’s reasoning, federal law does 
not provide any remedy for an applicant’s failure to disclose its 
application and manufacturing information, so the Federal Circuit 
erred in concluding that federal law provided the “only remedies” for 
such failure.1398  The Supreme Court vacated that determination, as 
well as the Federal Circuit’s analysis of California law as a potential 
basis for a state-law injunction.1399  On remand, the Federal Circuit may 
revisit the California law issues.1400 
The Federal Circuit also erred in its analysis of when an applicant 
must notify a sponsor of its biosimilar application to the 
FDA.1401  Interpreting § 262(l )(8)(A), “the applicant may provide 
notice either before or after receiving FDA approval.”1402  The Federal 
Circuit’s reasoning that the notice must come after the FDA’s approval 
was inconsistent with the overall structure of the statute.1403 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer noted that the FDA may, at 
some point, “determine[] that a different interpretation would better 
serve the statute’s objectives.”1404  Should it do so, then, under National 
Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,1405 the FDA 
“may well have authority to depart from, or to modify, today’s 
interpretation.”1406 
On remand from the Supreme Court, based on preemption 
grounds, the Federal Circuit held that the BPCIA preempts state 
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enforcement of the “patent dance” provisions, affirming dismissal of 
Amgen’s state law claims relating to Sandoz’s noncompliance with 
§ 262(l)(2)(A) of the BPCIA.1407  At issue was whether Amgen could 
seek any relief under state law for Sandoz not providing Amgen with 
its biosimilar application prior to filing.1408  The Federal Circuit 
rejected Amgen’s argument that Sandoz had waived any argument that 
the BPCIA preempted California law on this point by failing to make 
it before the district court because the Supreme Court expressly invited 
the Federal Circuit to analyze the preemption issue.1409  Even if the 
Federal Circuit did not assess the issue, Sandoz would be able to take 
it up on remand.1410  The Federal Circuit then concluded that the 
BPCIA preempts any state law remedies for failure to comply with 
§ 262(l)(2)(A).1411  In its reasoning, the Federal Circuit noted the 
intrinsically federal nature of patent law and how states have not 
traditionally regulated in that area.1412  Applying Arizona v. United 
States1413 and Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.1414 the Federal Circuit found 
that the federal government has “fully occupied” the relevant field of 
biosimilar patent litigation.1415  The Federal Circuit also rejected 
Amgen’s argument that its state law claims are not in conflict with the 
BPCIA.1416  Noting that Congress created no injunctive remedy for 
breach of § 262(l)(2)(A), and reasoning that such must have been 
intentional, the court concluded that applying state law would create 
a conflict in the method of enforcement.1417 
A BPCIA sponsor may list and sue on patents it believes infringed 
even if the biosimilar application fails to disclose necessary information 
required under the Act.  In Amgen Inc. v. Hospira, Inc.,1418 the Federal 
Circuit dismissed an appeal relating to the denial of discovery motion, 
and it denied writ of mandamus concerning same, under the 
BPCIA.1419  The district court denied Amgen’s motion to compel 
                                               
 1407. Amgen, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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discovery into certain cell culture mediums for lack of relevance.1420  
However, the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.1421  
Though the discovery order conclusively determined a disputed 
question (whether the cell mediums were discoverable), and was 
completely separate from the merits of the action, it was still an act that 
was reviewable on appeal from a final judgment, per Coopers & Lybrand 
v. Livesay.1422  Amgen’s forced delay for review after final judgment of 
whether the cell medium data should have been disclosed and/or 
discoverable under BPCIA was consistent.1423  The Federal Circuit 
found that “the lack of immediate appeal over orders denying 
discovery of paragraph (l)(2)(A) information does not render such 
orders ‘effectively unreviewable’ or distinguish them from run-of-the-
mill discovery disputes.”1424 
Amgen’s petition for mandamus was denied because Amgen did not 
establish that it had a clear and indisputable right to relief.1425  Amgen 
was responsible for electing to neither list nor sue on its cell-culture 
patents, which the opinion reasons it could have done notwithstanding 
Hospira’s non-disclosure of its cell mediums in its paragraph (l)(2)(A) 
disclosures.1426  “Paragraph (l)(3)(A) merely requires the sponsor to 
list patents that it ‘believes . . . could reasonably be asserted.’”1427  It does 
not impose sanctions for mistakenly (but in good faith) asserting 
patents that ultimately turn out to be noninfringed.1428  Nor would 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 have precluded Amgen from listing 
the cell-culture patents as one of the reasons for Amgen’s uncertainty 
about the infringement question was Hospira’s own failure to make its 
disclosure.1429  Because Amgen could have listed the patents in 
question in which case it could have sought discovery relating to them, 
the Federal Circuit concluded that the denial of discovery did not 
                                               
 1420. Id. at 1358.  Amgen claimed the cell culture medium data should have been in 
Hospira’s paragraph (l)(2)(A) disclosures, and was trying to use discovery to learn 
about them so as to evaluate possible infringement of other patents.  Id. 
 1421. Id. at 1356. 
 1422. 437 U.S. 463 (1978), superseded by FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f), as stated in Microsoft 
Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702 (2017). 
 1423. Amgen Inc., 866 F.3d at 1359–60. 
 1424. Id. at 1360. 
 1425. Id. at 1363. 
 1426. Id. at 1361. 
 1427. Id. at 1362 (omission in original). 
 1428. Id. 
 1429. Id. 
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undermine the purpose of the BPCIA.1430 
IX. PATENT MARKING 
The patentee has the burden at all times to prove compliance with the 
marking statute.  In Arctic Cat Inc. v. Bombardier Recreational Products Inc., 
the Federal Circuit generally affirmed an infringement verdict and 
damages award, while vacating denial of JMOL as to marking.1431  Arctic 
Cat’s patents related to a thrust steering system for personal watercraft.1432 
Regarding marking, the Federal Circuit found that the district court 
erred by placing the burden of proving a marking defense on the 
defendant, BRP.1433  Instead, the Federal Circuit held that “[t]he 
burden of proving compliance with marking is and at all times remains 
on the patentee.”1434  However, the alleged infringer must meet a low 
bar:  “bears an initial burden of production to articulate the products 
it believes are unmarked ‘patented articles’ subject to § 287.”1435  The 
Federal Circuit held that, because the district judge committed this 
error at the summary judgment stage, Arctic Cat was not properly 
informed of its burden to prove compliance with § 287.1436  The 
judgment as to marking is thus vacated “so that Arctic Cat has an 
opportunity to proffer evidence” on the issue.1437 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit addressed many novel questions in 2017, but 
many issues remain unresolved.  In the next year, the court will 
continue to delineate the legal lines from lower court appeals and 
address new directives from the Supreme Court.  In particular, the 
Supreme Court has recently published two decisions that will influence 
the development of patent law and practice. 
First, in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 
the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of IPR proceedings, 
established by the AIA, which have been used to challenge thousands 
                                               
 1430. Id. at 1362–63. 
 1431. Arctic Cat Inc., v. Bombardier Recreational Prods. Inc., 876 F.3d 1350, 1372 
(Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 1432. Id. at 1357. 
 1433. Id. at 1369. 
 1434. Id. at 1367. 
 1435. Id. at 1368. 
 1436. Id. at 1367. 
 1437. Id. at 1369. 
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of patents since 2012.1438 
The PTAB declared Oil States’s patent, which relates to hydraulic 
fracturing, invalid.1439  Oil States argued that patents are private 
property rights that can only be revoked by a federal court under 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution, not by an executive branch agency 
like the PTAB.1440  The PTO maintained that patents are public rights 
derived from a federal regulatory system, and there is thus no 
constitutional impediment to the PTAB invalidating patents.1441  The 
justices addressed this clash between two policy issues, holding that, 
because patents are public rights, IPRs do not violate either Article III 
or the Seventh Amendment.1442  The second decision, SAS Institute, Inc. 
v. Iancu, also implicates the PTAB’s proceedings.  The case involved 
the IPR process for instituting AIA reviews of patents.1443  The SAS 
Institute ruling eliminated the PTAB’s practice of instituting review on 
only some grounds and restructured the AIA process and petitioners’ 
approach to IPRs.1444  The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit 
holding that the PTAB must resolve all claims in an IPR petition.1445 
Still on the Supreme Court’s docket, in WesternGeco LLC, the Court 
asked the U.S. Solicitor General to weigh in on the issue of the 
availability of lost profits damages in patent cases when infringing 
actions take place outside the United States.1446  In the lower court’s 
decision, ION was found to have infringed WesternGeco’s patents by 
shipping parts of a system for underwater oil and gas exploration from 
the United States to be combined overseas.1447  While a jury initially 
awarded WesternGeco $93 million in lost profits damages,1448 the 
                                               
 1438. No. 16-712, 2018 WL 1914662, *3 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018). 
 1439. Id. at *5. 
 1440. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Oil States, 2018 WL 1914662 (No. 16-712), 2017 WL 
3713059, at *3. 
 1441. Brief for the Federal Respondent at 2–3, Oil States, 2018 WL 1914662 (No. 16-
712), 2017 WL 4805230, at *2–3. 
 1442. Oil States, 2018 WL 1914662, at *11. 
 1443. No. 16-969, 2018 WL 1914661, *2 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2018). 
 1444. Id. at *4. 
 1445. Id. at *9–10. 
 1446. WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/westerngeco-llc-v-ion-geophysical-corp-2 
(last visited May 9, 2018). 
 1447. WesternGeco LLC v. Ion Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 1340, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 
2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016). 
 1448. WesternGeco LLC v. Ion Geophysical Corp., 953 F. Supp. 2d 731, 740 (S.D. 
Tex. 2013), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 837 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted, 138 S. Ct. 734 (2018). 
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Federal Circuit reversed finding that the damages award was not 
available because ION’s infringement took place “on the high seas, 
outside the jurisdiction of U.S. patent law.”1449  In its briefing, 
WesternGeco argued that there are no limitations on damages based 
on an act of infringement of U.S. patents to ship components to other 
countries to be combined there.1450 
While the 2017 term indicated a balancing of the Federal Circuit’s 
patent docket, the recent Supreme Court decisions in TC Heartland 
and SAS Institute will likely lead to an influx of appeals. 
                                               
 1449. WesternGeco, 791 F.3d at 1349. 
 1450. Id. at 1351. 
